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1856–1939

Freud is dead. These simple words, charged with meaning, have re-echoed widely throughout the world. To the small remaining circle of those who enjoyed his friendship the words signify a direct and inestimable loss. Never again shall we experience that peculiar union of good-will and realism so characteristic of his personality. Quite devoid of illusions—no man could be more so—yet he was enamoured of life, and one left him after every talk with the sensation of having inspired a bracing air under a clear sky. And then there was his sense of life, his hearty greeting, his unfailing interest in the small things as well as in the great; every sentence expressing both distinction and thought; the instant readiness to help, the essential kindliness of nature, the warmth of personal feeling, the fulness of personality. A sum of such features made him not only a great man, but an endearing figure who of necessity inspired fondness, respect and devotion in all near him.

As one who enjoyed his friendship through good and bad times for more than thirty years I find it hard to say which feature of his personality most impressed me—his unfailing serenity in painful circumstances, his unbreakable courage and determination, his cheerful humour and keen appreciation of the little things of daily life, or the goodness of his character and personality. He had the simplicity that seems always to accompany true greatness in men, though without any of the illusions about humanity that sometimes allows simplicity to decline into simpleness. His loyalty to friends was never blind, but was conditioned by their relationship to him; when disappointed or wounded he rarely hit back, though he never prided himself on turning the other cheek. When deserted by a friend he took thought rather on the value the friendship had once had; now it was over there was nothing more to be said. This experience he had to taste many times, since the emotions stirred by his work were such as not all co-workers could serenely master, and those who could not were apt to express their difficulties by personal unpleasantness. Freud has often been called a pessimist, but it is likely that this phase signifies rather a projection of the depressing feelings some aspects of his work evoked in idealistic readers. In truth his temperament was decidedly a cheerful one. I have seen him deeply

grieved in moments of personal bereavement (and he suffered a number of bitter experiences of this nature) ; I have seen him grave and helpless in the face of injustice and cruelty that he could not avert ; I have seen him in acute and hopeless physical misery, but I never saw him inwardly depressed. A man who continues his work unremittingly, being at the same time a source of joy and stimulation to his environment, for sixteen years after an excision of the superior maxilla (followed by many operations for the recurrence of the cancer) cannot fairly be described as a pessimist.

Freud was not destined to end his days in Vienna, the city whose fame is enhanced through his genius. Despoiled and insulted by the Nazi invaders of Austria, he chose the road of exile rather than submit to further indignities or worse. I approached Sir Samuel Hoare, then the Home Secretary, and shall never forget the ready and sympathetic welcome he accorded to the idea of a refuge in England being offered to Freud, his family and a number of his colleagues. Freud himself was specially gratified, since England was of all countries the one he had all his life held in the highest esteem. He was received here with every courtesy. Hearing of the state of his health, the officers of the Royal Society waived the immemorial demand for attendance at Burlington House to sign the roll-book, and instead waited on him at his residence, a privilege previously accorded only to a reigning sovereign. I shall never forget his humorously exultant cry of ' Heil Hitler ' when he first caught sight of the garden where, thanks to that baleful spirit, he was to enjoy many happy hours. Despite the suffering inflicted by almost constant pain and discomfort his nature expanded joyfully at the sense of freedom he experienced in England and at the loving care with which his family and friends were able to surround him.

To the wider group of psycho-analysts who may or may not have known Freud personally, his passing brings the pang of losing their chief teacher, the source of all their analytical knowledge and interests. More than that, Freud's personality shone through in his writings to such an extent that an attentive student of them could not but feel a direct knowledge of him, as of a distant friend. Then there is the thought that we can no longer look for any more of his ever-fresh and stimulating additions to our knowledge. We have received all that we can and we now have to build for ourselves on that basis.

A still wider circle of discerning people, with some appreciation of the distant bearing of Freud's discoveries, will feel that his death constitutes one of the important dates in human history. The future

world may well speak of a pre-Freudian and a post-Freudian era in thought. Man's conquest of nature has been proceeding for many thousands of years and fumbling attempts have often been made in his more difficult task of self-conquest, but Freud's life-work represents the first serious endeavour to apply to it the methods of science. Although man has made since the dawn of history hardly any perceptible progress in the direction of self-conquest, the existence of this problem and the need to solve it had long been recognized by religion and philosophy, if not by science. One may fairly say, however, that before Freud, little, if any, light had been thrown on the real *nature* of the problem. With only his conscious mind at his disposal, man has for æons struggled to make something worth while of life, but now for the first time, thanks to Freud's genius and labours, he has been given the opportunity of access to his unconscious mind where his essential difficulties and problems reside. With all these inner difficulties man has made a considerable muddle of existence and has been responsible for endless unnecessary misery as well as for superb acts of creation. Now at long last, with the advent of Freud, he has the chance of making his life anew. Vistas open here of distant perspectives which we ourselves shall not explore and we have to rest content with the satisfaction of having at least glimpsed them. It will be long, perhaps centuries, before the bearing of Freud's work on the weal and woe of mankind is truly appreciated and before full use is made of it, but when this happens his name will become imperishingly engraved as one of the greatest benefactors of mankind.

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It is not proposed here to recount the well-known facts of Freud's career. He has himself narrated the essential ones in his *Selbstdarstellung*. Nor is this the moment to attempt an objective and comprehensive study of his personality. One must, however, express the earnest hope that this will be done in the lifetime of those who knew him, for it would be a neglect of our duty to posterity to allow it to go by default. Future generations of psychologists will assuredly wish to know what manner of man it was who, after two thousand years of vain endeavour had gone by, succeeded in fulfilling the Delphic injunction : know thyself. Their wish will not be one of simple curiosity ; they will understand that to know Freud's personality will bring them closer to the inspiration of his achievement. They will, furthermore, have a legitimate scientific interest in trying to comprehend the precise balance of mental energies that made it

possible for him to accomplish his Herculean feats. For Herculean they truly were. Few, if any, have been able to go as far as he did on the path of self-knowledge and self-mastery—even with the aid of the pioneer torch he provided with his methods and previous exploration, and even with the invaluable assistance of years of daily personal work with expert mentors. How one man alone could have broken all this new ground, and overcome all difficulties unaided, must ever remain a cause for wonder. It was the nearest to a miracle that human means can compass, one that surely surpasses even the loftiest intellectual achievements in mathematics and pure science. Copernicus and Darwin dared much in facing the unwelcome truths of outer reality, but to face those of inner reality, costs something that only the rarest of mortals would unaided be able to give.

Doubtless many qualities went to make up such an original mind as Freud's was, but he possessed certain notable ones in such a high degree that they must surely have played an important part in making possible his creative work. They thus deserve to be specially signalized, though it would be inappropriate here to offer conjectures about their source or inner significance. We know that purely intellectual gifts alone are inadequate for the purpose of endopsychic exploration. Freud possessed these, it is plain, in rich measure, though he himself did not esteem them highly. We look rather for what may be called traits of character, and here also Freud's endowment was outstanding.

If one had to place one of these traits above all others it would probably be that of the amazing intellectual courage—the rarest and most transcendent form of courage—Freud displayed. When faced over and again with the dark unknown, and apparently unknowable, his impulse was always to press forward, undaunted by the possibilities of what he might encounter and alone in an uncharted territory with no precursor or companion with whom to share his doubts. He possessed the quality of intellectual daring in the highest degree. Horror, fear, disgust at the revelations made within the depths of his own mind or in those of his patients : nothing restrained him—least of all the knowledge of what his colleagues would probably think of his findings. Perhaps the hardest obstacle of all to overcome was not the content alone of the unconscious material, but the extraordinary form it took. Never before had anyone dared to read sense and meaning into mental processes that so flagrantly ignored all the mental laws of logical exposition. Imagine meeting a race of beings

whose minds were timeless, had no conception of a negative, were quite insensitive to contradictory juxtapositions and who expressed themselves by the curious devices of displacement, condensation, primitive symbolism and all the other mechanisms with which Freud has made us familiar. How many investigators in that situation would have ventured to think it possible to read sense into such a meaningless farrago ? Moreover, with the material in question, that of dreams, neurotic and psychotic phantasies, etc., he had been assured beforehand by all authorities that it was by definition devoid of meaning, being the jumbled product of disorder in the organ itself of meaning—the brain ; after all, Freud had been educated, not as a psychologist or mythologist, but in the tenets of orthodox neurology. Undeterred by this bias, however, Freud determined to examine the facts themselves and let nothing but their evidence influence his conclusions.

What little we know of intellectual courage, that quality so seldom found even among men of distinction, indicates that it is closely akin to scepticism. Those possessing it do not take things for granted, nor are they affected by the opinions of others. They prefer to suspend their judgement until they can examine the matter personally and form their own opinion. Freud's indifference to the views of other people was one of his most highly developed characteristics, one so striking as to be observed in ordinary life by those who met him even casually. Certain aspects of it—in the way he insisted on coming to an independent decision even in small matters—were so pronounced as to evoke the epithets ' opinionated ', ' suspicious ', or even ' obstinate ' on the part of the unsympathetic, where his friends would rather speak of his resolution, determination or independence of spirit. Be that as it may, it is of interest that on rare occasions faint hints would transpire of just the opposite qualities, namely, of credulity or suggestibility, so that one might wonder if his pronounced independence had not in part been developed as a reaction to some early propensities of that sort. There can, however, be no doubt about the great value this quality of independence had both in the scepticism indispensable to his scientific inquiries and to the life of a pioneer these brought in their train.

A mere tendency to doubt and to ignore conventional opinions cannot in itself lead to originality in any significant sense ; it may end only in social eccentricity. It relates to true originality only when it is informed, i.e. only when the scepticism is founded on some objective reason and not on any personal foible. The elusive qualities of judge-

ment, of critical power and especially of self-criticism are necessary to this end, and these qualities also Freud possessed in a high degree. He had a judicial mind, one which would unprejudicedly balance differing considerations and could with an intuitive sense of perspective distinguish the important from the unimportant, the essential from the irrelevant. By significant originality one must mean something more than flashes of insight, however brilliant and accurate these may be. With most of Freud's discoveries it is possible to point to precursors—indeed he himself called attention to them—who had made what may be called lucky guesses. Freud's merit lay in taking his new ideas seriously, in following them up in detail with unsparing labour, and in not resting until he had established them on a wide basis of correlation with other, known ideas,. He once compared the difference in these two attitudes to that between a casual flirtation and a responsible marriage.

For courageous scepticism to result in valuable originality it needs another quality besides judgement, namely, honesty of mind. With Freud this virtue was so immediate and innate that it infused his whole personality. And he was as honest with himself as with others. He was always the first to point out the imperfections and misapprehensions in his work, and in correcting them in the interest of greater accuracy he was indifferent to the charges brought against him of self-contradiction or fickle changeability. His sensitiveness to the inner voice of criticism, however, was accompanied by a remarkable resistance to any outside influence or pressure ; here he displayed a courage in the face of bitter opposition, and a tenacity in his adherence to his hardly-won convictions, that in themselves raise him far above most of his contemporaries. Honesty with Freud was more than a simple natural habit. It became an active love of truth and justice—the Maat of whom he wrote so warmly in his last book—and brought with it an equally strong dislike of any deception, ambiguousness or prevarication. Even the simplest form of compromise, a quality that would certainly have made his life easier, was anathema to him. He went so far here as to develop a dislike of the usual formalities of social relationships, conventional or otherwise, and laid little store by the common graces of life.

Though perhaps not by nature devoid of the capacity for truculence and pugnacity Freud must early in life have decided that it was a quality not to be cultivated. He undoubtedly attached far more value to peaceful than to militant pursuits. Once only, at the outset

of his career, did he enter into controversy with an opponent. All other attacks on his work—and no man could have had more—he answered in the same fashion as our great Darwin, whom he resembled in many other respects : namely, by simply producing a further piece of research. This attitude he adopted both from conviction and by temperament. He had little belief in the value of controversy in scientific matters. He observed how many other factors played a part in it besides the ostensible search for truth, factors such as the desire to prove oneself personally in the right, to score off an opponent, and so on ; so he refrained from polemics as being something that wasted time and emotional energy and brought one no nearer to the goal. The greatness of his character thus showed itself both in his scientific work itself and in his attitude towards it.

Freud would have been prepared to die rather than to yield in a conviction or over anything he was persuaded was right, but he would do a great deal to avoid a quarrel. Perhaps it was the pettiness, as well as the futility, of quarrelling that made him so averse to it. He had a true nobility of mind. It was impossible to imagine his ever doing a petty thing or thinking a petty thought. He was one of the rare spirits that transcend the smallnesses of life and thus show us the picture of true greatness.

About one thing Freud was serious above all else and it became the driving force of his life. That was the search for knowledge. His mind was not of the philosophic or contemplative kind ; it was a restlessly inquiring mind. He believed that knowledge was a real thing, not a mere point of view, and that within our limited powers much of it could be attained. But he also knew that in order to do so the strictest honesty was essential and that for this supreme goal one must be ready to sacrifice much else—not only time and endless labour, but *amour propre*, any reputation for consistency in the sense of fixity and whatever personal feeling might threaten to interfere with the single aim of truth.

Freud's mind and character cannot be viewed as a mere summation of the admirable qualities that have just been described. The courage, the scepticism, the honesty, the search for truth and knowledge and his other characteristics were not isolated qualities. They were fused together into a remarkably harmonious whole. They became all of a piece, and that was the man Freud. In any discussion of psychical integrity one must always think of Freud as a supreme example of it. There is general agreement over the importance a ' strong ego ' plays

in bringing about psychical integrity and without doubt Freud possessed an immensely strong ego. We know that this is a concept not very easy to define, but it connotes two things which we find exemplified in a high degree with Freud: tolerance of anxiety, i.e. such mastery of it that it affects one but little, and a firm apprehension of reality. Above all else Freud was a realist.

Side by side with the capacity to admit and face the evil of life, a capacity essential to the realist, went equally pronounced abilities to enjoy its good. Freud was a man keenly alive to the sublimities of human existence and also aware of how much the appreciation of little everyday things goes to make the good life. He was a man schooled to restraint in emotion, but his fundamental benevolence was unmistakable and constantly transpired in unostentatious fashion. He had great personal charm, though without any trace of that facile charmingness that so often passes for the real thing. A smile, the more attractive for its sincerity, was never far from his lips and his fondness for humour and wit (particularly with an ironical tinge) was proverbial among his friends. Though not demonstrative by nature he had, it was not hard to perceive, a deep fund of tenderness as well as kindliness. It is not surprising that he inspired devotion.

Freud was a remarkable example of a natural psychologist. By this I mean that he had the rare faculty of recognising a psychological fact and of respecting it instead of discounting it. One example will illustrate this faculty. In the earliest days of his work he collected a number of cases where sexual seduction of a child by an adult appeared to play a part in the genesis of the later neurotic symptoms. Then he found that several of these stories were simply untrue: there had been no seduction. Most workers would at this point, I am sure, have shrunk back from the morass in which they found themselves. Not so Freud. He held fast to the fact that the patient had told him these stories. This remained a fact, and he turned his interest to it, with the result that he discovered the importance of the infantile phantasy life in the genesis of the neuroses.

One cannot describe the man Freud without laying stress on the fact that he was a Jew. Though never orthodox or in any way religious he held together with his people, was a Governor of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and took an interest in all that concerned the fate of Jewry. The Nazi intolerance of this spared him no more than it had Einstein. The fact itself is of more than personal interest, since it is doubtful if without certain traits inherited from his Jewish

ancestry Freud would have been able to accomplish the work he did. I think here of a peculiar native shrewdness, a sceptical attitude towards illusion and deception, and a determined courage that made him impervious to hostile public opinion and the contumely of his professional colleagues.

Nor should mention be omitted of an aspect of Freud that for many had the greatest value, his capacity as a writer. The bestowal on him of the Goethe prize at Frankfurt in 1930 was only a recognition of how widely connoisseurs of literature esteemed him as a master of German prose. It would be truer to call it Austrian prose, since Freud showed a marked preference for what he called the *Geschmeidigkeit* of the Austrian manner of writing. To judge from the voluminousness alone of his correspondence and scientific works Freud must have been a very ready writer. The fluency never became ambagiosity ; on the contrary, the ease and grace of his style are equalled only by the conciseness of expression. As every conscientious translator of his, however, must admit, Freud was not an over-careful writer ; at times, when questioned on an ambiguous phrase, he would reproach himself laughingly with *Schlamperei*, a harsh term for even his willing self-criticism. There was lucidity, but there was also elision, in his swift pen. His outstanding literary merit was the distinction of his style. It seemed impossible for him to write the simplest sentence without infusing it with something of his originality, elegance and dignity. The same was true of his conversation ; banality, even in the tritest matter, was alien to him and every remark would be trenchant, well-turned and distinctive. It was these qualities, with the extraordinary purity and felicity of his phrasing, that led some Germans to esteem him as a writer as others esteem him as a man of science.

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Freud's achievements are documented in the magnificent corpus of the *Gesammelte Schriften*, a collection we cannot but envy our German-speaking colleagues. Dare we hope to possess one day a copy of it in English ? There comes to my mind here a remark the philosopher Lugwig Klages once made in my presence. Someone had asked him whose writings one had best read to get a grasp of Freud's doctrines. He answered unhesitatingly : ' His own '. It is unfortunately true that this remark, obvious as it is, needs to be made now as much as it did then, more than thirty years ago. It is, in my opinion, impossible to acquire a thorough knowledge of psycho-analysis

without making a careful study of Freud's writings, and to do this assuredly means reading them more than once. Moreover, they should be read in their chronological order ; one can no more apprehend a new branch of science without studying its genetic development than one could a complex case of character or neurosis formation. ' There is no royal road to learning ' is a profound saying. We may in the future learn in psycho-analysis things Freud never knew, but it will be exceedingly hard to do so if we do not first learn the things he has taught us. It is greatly to be hoped, in short, that Freud's works will never become a classic of the kind, like *The Origin of Species* and many other original works, that are respectfully admired, but only at a distance. The vitality and intimacy of thought that breathes through them should make them an ever-fresh inspiration for generations to come.

The task of presenting to an audience of analysts an epitome of Freud's achievements may well seem superfluous and is only worth attempting if our imagination can thereby gain some further sense of grandeur at the perspective. They can be regarded from many different points of view, some larger, some smaller, and each one of us will probably estimate these differently. One has already been mentioned : namely, the significance of the opportunity he has offered to mankind to proceed with the vital endeavour to extend to himself man's mastery over nature—an endeavour that is becoming increasingly urgent if he and his doings are to survive at all. It would not be surprising if this were rated as Freud's most important achievement. The *humanist* will also treasure the influence of Freud's work as tending towards a larger tolerance of the differences among people and a deepened understanding of the mental difficulties under which human beings labour. The outcome of his detailed researches inevitably inculcates a humane and liberal attitude to life.

The *philosopher of science* must be impressed by the vast extension of natural law Freud effected in his demonstration that an immense number of phenomena previously dismissed as arbitrary, accidental or meaningless are as strictly determined by preceding events as the numerous classes of phenomena where this has already been recognized. Without entering into a discussion of the—nowadays vexed—question concerning the philosophical status of such concepts as ' determinism ' and ' cause and effect ' we may affirm that, whatever terminology relating to these concepts may be finally agreed on, recognition will be accorded to Freud's reducing to order a mass of

hitherto inchoate happenings. And that this feat comprises the will of man and his religious beliefs—the two most refractory phenomena of nature outside of meteorology—can only enhance its significance.

With this reducing to order also went a comprehensive gain in correlation of very disparate phenomena. This forging of links between apparently disconnected processes was highly characteristic of Freud's work. His researches reached into many spheres of mental activity: psychopathological symptoms, the meaning of dreams, the unconscious processes underlying wit, the genesis of character formation, motivation in conduct, the study of artistic creativeness, of myths and folklore, of religious ritual and belief—to mention only some of them. They even extended to the remote past of man where various data permitted him to draw important analogies between the development of the mind in the individual and that in the race. In all these fields he established innumerable correlations and sought constantly for general laws that would co-ordinate his mass of general data. We need not consider here the peculiar mental mechanisms he exposed in these disparate phenomena, but I would stress the connections he established in all of them with what he came to regard as the main clue to the understanding of the mind: namely, the fundamental importance of the conflicts between instincts in the earliest situation of life where the infant is concerned with its first human environment, its parents.

To the *biologist* Freud's outstanding achievement was his production of evidence to show that all of man's mind, from the most aberrant 'criminal' activity to the loftiest ethical strivings and beliefs, could be traced through complicated changes to a few primitive instincts. That this must ultimately be possible had of course been surmised by many freethinkers, but it was Freud who actually carried it out. In doing so he filled an essential gap in evolutionary theory. I once called him 'the Darwin of the Mind' and I still think this designation an apt one. The reason why the great biological discovery of the last century did not affect human thought and social institutions as much as had at one time been expected was evidently that it had stopped short at the human body. To have shown that the same laws of development from lowly origin hold good also for the human mind and the human soul was an outstanding merit of Freud's life-work.

Freud was undoubtedly more successful in his detailed unravelling of the endless modifications undergone by the sexual instinct than in his studies of any of the others. Perhaps because of a lack of

interest in natural history, he seemed to pass over-rapidly from somewhat complex human attitudes, such as hate, to extremely abstract and not altogether satisfying conceptions, notably that of the death-instinct. Furthermore, his biological contributions were marred by adherence to a peculiarly simplistic form of the long-abandoned Lamarckian views on heredity. On the other hand he added a great deal to our knowledge of the 'fate' of instincts and the extraordinary vicissitudes they undergo in the course of development. He also made suggestions that are likely to prove invaluable in the future concerning the origin and nature of instinct itself.

To the *psychologist* Freud's gifts were the richest he had to offer. For he opened to them a whole province, the Unconscious Mind. It would not be a great exaggeration if we summed up in one phrase Freud's contribution to knowledge: he discovered the Unconscious. Although many poets and philosophers had previously divined the presence of an unconscious mind in man, it was Freud who first demonstrated its existence by devising a special method to render it accessible to study. This he did some forty-three years ago, since when he worked unceasingly at charting this newly discovered province of knowledge. He thus created, under the name of Psycho-Analysis, a completely new department of science, an achievement with which hardly any other human being can be credited. Nor was the originality of his achievement its most distinctive feature. This resided rather in the profound significance of his detailed findings. For the momentous conclusion he finally reached was that all we know of ourselves, of our interests, strivings, aversions and aspirations —our conscious mind in short—is but a pale and distorted reflection of the inner personality from which all the surface manifestations emanate. To explore and understand these profound and unknown depths is to learn the inner nature of man.

It has been well observed that most important discoveries in science are due to the invention of some method or technique, and Freud's were no exception to this rule. All his psychological work really rests on his appreciation of what is somewhat misleadingly called 'Free Association', and the method of research thus devised is the essence of psycho-analysis. With a ruthless determination he took literally the maxim that contiguity in mental processes signifies a relationship in their content, an act of sheer originality that has already had revolutionary consequences in psychology.

The *sociologist* will gain in the future far more from Freud's work than

he has hitherto, since he has up to the present been strikingly backward in availing himself of the new knowledge. Intent on marking out his relatively new sphere of work the sociologist has tended to exaggerate the difference between the activities of man as an individual and man as a member of society. Freud has shown, on the contrary, that it is impossible to comprehend any of man's activities until one realizes that he is nothing but a social creature, that even his most autistic activities can, when analysed, be shown to relate essentially to his fellows. The phenomena the sociologist studies are either, as social institutions are, rationalized expressions of deep unavowed needs or are, as those of mass psychology, more direct manifestations of the deeper impulses. To those who say that Freud was insufficiently interested in general sociological considerations one need only quote his *Massenpsychologie* and *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*.

Two of Freud's main conclusions should be of fundamental importance to the student of social phenomena: his demonstration of the predominating part played in the mind of man by the irrational and by conflict respectively. Both the extent and the power of the irrational are commonly underestimated, grossly so. In his intensive studies of the phantasy life of the unconscious Freud revealed its complexity and its unsuspected potency. This is not the place to describe the intricacies of the various laws which Freud discovered to appertain to the workings of the unconscious mind. They are in many respects startlingly different from those of the conscious mind, which was one reason among others why they were widely received with incredulity when first announced. These workings, although they have their own peculiar logic, are above all what the conscious mind would regard as irrational. The unconscious mind, closely tuned as it is to the fundamentals of life—love and hate, birth and death, power and helplessness—is in poor relationship to the outer world of reality. Indeed in this respect it is often as fantastic and delusional as the wanderings of any lunatic. But it is not much concerned with what we call reason. Essentially it is made up of a mass of wishes and strivings that conflict with other elements in the mind, above all with fears and the moral derivatives of fears. The conscious expression of these wishful impulses may be co-ordinated with a sound apprehension of reality, but only too often they are merely clothed in a mass of pseudo-rationality—of which the world around us to-day affords a striking spectacle. Nevertheless Freud himself cherished a belief in the power of reason if only it could be given a proper chance to function,

and much of his endeavour was to find ways whereby it could be freed from the compulsive influence of the irrational tendencies and thus achieve primacy.

Like the Patristic writers, Freud saw man as a creature torn in twain by inner conflicts, though his analysis of the conflicting sides was far from their simplistic concepts of ' Good ' and ' Evil '. Both of the conflicting sides are usually unconscious, the only evidence of them being quite indirect disturbances of emotion and judgement. An iron barrier, to which Freud gave the name of ' repression ', exists, which exercises an extraordinarily powerful resistance against recognition of what is going on in the unconscious mind. The strength of it can hardly be over-estimated, and it accounts not only for the opposition with which Freud's conclusions have been received, but also for the numerous attempts that since have been made to weaken and distort them.

This inner conflict is very often apparently transformed into an outer one, of which that between individualism and communism may serve as an example. The world is full enough of visible strife and conflict, apart from the larger domain of the invisible internal ones, but what is of importance here is the impossibility of adequately gauging and understanding the visible conflicts without a knowledge of the invisible ones from which they emanate.

Freud's relation to the medical profession was complicated and it contained a certain element of repudiation. He was wont to say that he was a doctor *faute de mieux*, and that he would have preferred, had it been possible, to confine himself to neurological research. On the other hand he was certainly a good doctor, which would have been impossible had he not been endowed with special cognate aptitudes and tendencies. The significance of his work for the *physician* is a double one. He enlarged the domain of medicine in two important respects. These extensions were the consequence of his life's work on the psychogenesis of the neuroses. The contributions he made here, both aetiological and therapeutic, had the effect, not only of rescuing a vast field of practice from the charlatan, but of forcing the medical profession to recognize the extent and importance of neurotic suffering in a manner they had previously eschewed. So many ways of discounting such suffering had been available—somatic camouflage, moral disapproval, etc.—that before Freud most physicians regarded neuroses as a nuisance, but fortunately a rare one. Now we hear of distinguished physicians estimating neurotic suffering as constituting

50 to 75 per cent. of the problems of general practice. Of Freud's technical contributions themselves in this field it is not necessary here to speak; they are the basis of all his other work and are the best known part of it.

The one extension of medicine had a therapeutic origin. Experience gradually showed that both Freud's theories of psychogenesis and also his psycho-analytic therapeutic method were valid over a much larger area than the familiar one of the psychoneuroses. Not only were many conditions recognized to be neurotic which previously had been otherwise regarded, but a number of other states were found to be nearly enough allied to these to allow similar therapeutic methods to be employed with them. The sexual perversions themselves formed a large field; many forms of criminality, alcoholism and drug addictions; character deformations that had previously passed as personal eccentricities, and above all the innumerable forms of marital difficulty. Even pure 'unhappiness' is now a medico-psychological problem. As a result of all this innumerable people now consult physicians who used either to suffer their troubles as best they could or to seek some form of consolation. I should be surprised to hear that Oscar Wilde ever sought medical advice for his mental condition, still less Dr. Johnson, Schopenhauer or Dean Swift; nor does Herr Hitler. Yet these, and thousands of others, would probably have had a happier life had they done so.

The second extension had a more methodological source. A peculiar difficulty of psychology has often been commented on: namely, that it is the only branch of science whose exponents are denied proper access to their own material of study. Here lies no doubt the explanation of its tardy development. Psychologists have been allowed to make philosophical generalizations on character, to examine statistically the results of uncontrolled—indeed anonymous—questionnaires, and to make detailed investigations of functions such as impersonal memory work, sense activities and the like, which could be divorced from the emotional life of the individual. Freud not only had the necessary attitude of mind to enable him to break down the barriers of discretion, but he happened to encounter in his subjects the only motive, i.e. suffering, that renders them at least partly willing to permit the exploration. Although other motives, e.g. scientific interest, have since been tested, it must be said that up to the present no adequate substitute for suffering has been discovered. It follows that only therapists have access to the intimate regions of the mind

and in all probability this will in time mean predominantly medical therapists. One may predict, therefore, that in some future time psychology will become a branch of medicine in the broadest sense of this word. Then Freud will, indirectly, have restored medical science to the place it occupied before the first priests—to a position where its exponents could guide and teach men the nature of themselves and their destiny.

The *educationalist* and *child psychologist* have already benefited extensively by Freud's work and will do so still more in the future when the prejudices against it shall have been overcome. No epithet could more fittingly be attached to all his work than 'genetic'. Critics complained of his 'reducing' complex attitudes to simple—and often 'lowly'—ones when he devoted himself to elucidating the course of development of this or the other impulse. His whole outlook was genetic in kind; he was concerned with tracing a mental process backward to its sources and with following early tendencies to their later complex products.

The greater part, though by no means all, of Freud's clinical material was derived from the symptoms and phantasy-life of neurotics. He was often reproached with the 'abnormality' of his material, but he was able to show that a neurosis originates in the same primitive mental sources as are present in all human beings and simply represents one of the several developments that may emerge from these sources. The unconscious mind is very much the same as the primitive mind of the child, which later gets, as it were, encased. Freud came to the conclusion that the primitive mind is on the one hand far more savage and 'animal' than man is willing to admit, but that on the other hand it also contains much stronger moral deterrent tendencies than he is aware of: 'The normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral.' The tracing of this mental material back to its origin in infancy forced Freud to realize that something else besides the unconscious mind existed that had previously been denied—namely, the sexual life of the child. Thanks to his work this is now a commonplace, and it is becoming hard to remember the time, thirty or forty years ago, when sexuality was, apart from a few 'abnormal' cases, believed to be something that suddenly descended from the skies at the age of puberty.

The child psychologist—and also the enlightened parent—of to-day looks at children in an entirely different way from formerly. The images of the innocent babe or unfolding plant have been replaced by

more sympathetic and living ones of creatures pathetically struggling, 'with no language but a cry', to achieve the self-control and inner security that civilized man has so far attempted in vain to attain. And the infant is urged to accomplish in five years of life what civilized adults have only imperfectly accomplished in a period ten thousand times as long. The insight Freud has afforded us into the subtleties of these conflicts, with their manifold outcome, has enormously heightened the interest of those occupied with children, and the increase in understanding has brought with it both a more sympathetic and a more helpful attitude in dealing with them. That the twentieth century is the century of the child was a saying made independently of Freud's work, but it is his work that has made it true.

The varying aspects of Freud's work, and its radiating influence, cannot of course be fully described here, but mention has been made of some of the most important points of view from which a spectator may regard it. We cannot, however, omit at least a brief reference to still other fields of work it has already fertilized. There is that of *Anthropology*, where his methods have enabled much obscure material to be interpreted and where fascinating correlations have been established with the more primitive aspects of the mind studied in clinical psychoanalysis. The same is true of the allied fields of *Mythology* and *Folklore*. In *Æsthetics* he solved the more difficult problems of wit, humour and laughter, and his interpretative method has yielded tests which the student of æsthetics may usefully employ in many forms of art. The classic example of the successful use of them is Freud's own solving of the 'Sphinx of Literature', the Hamlet problem that had baffled generations of literary critics. At the other pole from that of beauty lies the dark region of *Criminology*. Here too the application of the psychoanalytic method is full of promise for the future, both prophylactically and therapeutically, and Freud's work is having the effect of furthering the substitution of liberal and constructive attitudes for those of the panicky savage. Last, but not least, the age-old conflict between religion and science has been illuminated by Freud's contributions to the study of *Comparative Religion*. Theology, after having yielded in stern fights with astronomy, physics and biology, is now encountering the youngest child of science, psychology. Freud, though never disguising his own opinions on this great conflict, chose to investigate sympathetically various religious attitudes and beliefs and try to understand their inmost human meaning.

* * * * *

It should be of interest to try to follow in brief outline the shifting and developing of Freud's interests in the course of his psychological work. Before he came to it he was a neurologist—incidentally, a distinguished one ; in other words he was interested in the system of the body that controls and regulates the rest. On entering private practice he found, like most clinical neurologists, that neurotic cases comprised the greater part of it. A therapeutic stimulus was evidently operating at that time, for he relates how dissatisfied he was with the results, or rather absence of results, from the hydrotherapeutic and electrotherapeutic methods then obtaining. He must, however, have been fired from the start by the knowledge, gleaned from Breuer's patient Frau Anna O., that fascinatingly complex processes went on behind the familiar symptomatology of hysteria.

It is not hard to distinguish, even in their joint work, the contributions Breuer and Freud made in the *Studien über Hysterie* (1895) and, when Freud writes later of his having already been aiming at a more dynamic conception of the neuroses than Breuer was inclined to, this can only mean that he was being impressed by the importance of frustration. This soon became more specific in the form of sexual thwarting, which was one of the central points in his theory of both the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses. From it gradually developed the whole Libido Theory and the tracing of repressed libidinal wishes in an enormous variety of phenomena where their presence had not previously been suspected.

The other prominent idea from the first was that of trauma. It appeared in various forms : moral shock, precocious erotic excitation, inherited syphilis, sexual-chemical noxiæ, etc. It was an idea that had a tenacious hold on Freud's mind, since it kept recurring—sometimes unexpectedly—throughout his life. It would seem that the whole concept of trauma, and its evident relation to fear, has even yet been imperfectly analysed.

Freud combined these two main ideas in an interesting fashion. If we regard a trauma as a blow from without, equivalent to a violent intimidation, his point about it was that it becomes incorporated into the mind (the subsequent super-ego conception) and continues its action from within. Freud also made many attempts to extend this individual happening to racial events, traumas to parents producing repressive effects on their descendants (racial incorporation). He perceived, however, that the checking of instinctual impulses was seldom final and that they had a way of finding indirect expression (' return

of the repressed '). In the combination just described we have the fundamental concept of endopsychic conflict, and Freud remained more interested in this particular genesis of it (through incorporation) than in more innate causes.

On the whole it may be said that Freud's attention was first taken by the more medical trauma idea, that this held it for a couple of years, to be succeeded by the other main idea (the wish-fulfilment one). The next twenty years (1898–1918 or so) were mainly devoted to the latter—broadly speaking, to the Libido Theory and its ramifications. Just before the World War he was feeling his way towards the problems in the other side of the conflict, but was still so influenced by the thought of the Libido Theory that—in the concept of narcissism—he was temporarily held up. After the war his thoughts turned more and more to the problem of the ego and he brilliantly resuscitated the old trauma idea in the guise of the super-ego.

The years 1896–1898 (from the age of 40 to 43) were undoubtedly the most fruitful in Freud's life, and the discoveries he achieved in those couple of years were truly astounding. It was a period of such intense mental activity as is seldom vouchsafed to any man. It should be remembered that *Die Traumdeutung*—probably his greatest single work—was already written in 1898, though it was not published till two years later, and that the ' Dora ' case, with its exposition of the transference phenomena, was finished the year after, though it was published only six years later. To this period, therefore, belong the following major discoveries: the technique of psycho-analysis, the sexual theory of the neuroses and psychoneuroses, the unconscious psychology of psychoses, the observation of resistance and the theory of repression, the effect of the latter on memory (including everyday forgetfulness), the significance of unconscious phantasies of wish-fulfilment in the face of frustration, the application of this knowledge to the study of dream life and the complete solution of its innumerable riddles, sexual symbolism, the existence of infantile sexuality and the importance of the Œdipus Complex (announced then and formulated seven years later in the *Drei Abhandlungen*), castration and allied complexes, the perennial activity of endopsychic conflict and, last but not least, the discovery and detailed investigation of the Unconscious with all its peculiar and startling mechanisms. A truly majestic list of achievements, any one of which would alone have brought fame !

After these inspiriting years no really fundamental change seems to have taken place in Freud's thought and interest, except for the

further plunge into the depths he attempted in the nineteen-twenties of which we shall speak in a moment. What mainly happened was an impressive development and deepening of the ideas just adumbrated.

One could very broadly say that of the next forty years the first half was devoted to the operations of the mutinous wishes and the second half to the checking agencies; the latter, which to start with had been seen as intimidating tyrants, became later forces of law and order that functioned as defences against unruly rebels. We might perhaps be tempted to go further and rather fancifully correlate the first set of interests with an attitude of youth and the second with one of maturity.

Another broad distinction presents itself here. Although Freud's interest in clinical observation persisted through his working life, a review of his publications shows that it engaged his attention more exclusively in the first half of it than in the second when much of it passed to the study of theoretical principles. The dividing line here can be definitely placed at the period of the World War, though there is no particular reason to suppose that this was in any way responsible for it.

In the years 1904–05 a second great outburst of energy took place. In the first of them appeared *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, the first chapter of which had been published as early as 1898. In 1905 there was the *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, codifying his ideas on sexual development, in some ways his most revolutionary book and certainly the one that provoked the most opposition; the case of Dora, the first of the great classics of clinical analysis (two more followed in 1909), and *Der Witz*. This last-mentioned brilliant and stimulating study of wit, whose closeness of thought has prevented its receiving the full attention it deserves, was the direct outcome of curiosity at coming across witty passages and cognate mechanisms in dreams; in 1928 it was supplemented by an original conception of the nature of humour.

In 1908 came the first, and most disturbing, of the series of contributions to characterology, that on the anal-erotic character. It was followed two years later by the study of types of love life, three years after that by the formulation of anal sadism, two years later by the important general study of character types and as recently as 1931 by the classification of libidinal types.

In the previous year had appeared the first contribution to the study of the inner life of the artist: the fascinating Gradiva book.

The results were generalized the year after in 'Der Dichter und das Phantasieren'. Yet we must not forget that already in *Die Traumdeutung* the solution of the Hamlet enigma is given in conjunction with reflections on Shakespeare's personal life. In 1910 came the Leonardo book, in 1914 the study of Michelangelo's Moses, and in 1917 that of Goethe's childhood; the Dostoiewski essay was as late as 1928.

Freud's first essay on the problems of religion was in 1907, where he pointed out the analogies between it and neurosis that he was to amplify in the last book he wrote. In 1912 came the fundamental *Totem und Tabu*, in 1923 the 'Teufelsneurose' paper, in 1927 *Die Zukunft einer Illusion* and in 1939 the moving study of Moses and Judaism. In all these works, while consistently maintaining a free-thinking attitude of practical atheism, he acknowledged the tremendous significance of religion in human history—so much so that to try to understand it became one of his prominent interests. Here, and in the accompanying contributions to evolutionary anthropology, he placed in the foreground the idea of parricide with the subsequent reactions to it. A side excursion into the supernormal ('Das Unheimliche', 1919; 'Traum und Telepathie', 1922) led, as might have been expected, to mainly sceptical conclusions.

All this time there kept appearing a steady stream of invaluable papers on clinical problems, pathological and therapeutic, that culminated in one of Freud's most precious clinical contributions, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst* (1926). These are so well known that comment on them here would be superfluous. It may be noted, however, that interest in the psychotic problems always accompanied that in neuroses from the first contribution to them in 1894, through the pioneering work on paranoia (1911) and melancholia (1916), to the striking studies on the relationship between neurosis and psychosis (1924).

Freud's interest in psychological theory dates, as do so many of his other interests, from *Die Traumdeutung* (1900). The structure of the mind he there depicted has never been surpassed in its delicacy and profundity, nor has later work shown any need to correct or even modify the basis there laid down. With the exception of a note on the relation between the pleasure-pain principle and the reality principle (1911), little further work on theory was done until the World War. Then, starting with 'Triebe und Triebschicksale' (1915), we had a series of perspicuous essays erecting the beautiful, though not very happily named, metapsychological structure, which in 1923 was

crowned by the conception—nowadays so indispensable that we wonder how we had got on without it—of the super-ego. It went, together with a number of penetrating studies into the structure and defences of the ego, which, although expounded primarily from a clinical point of view, are of fundamental importance to general knowledge concerning the nature of the mind.

This brings us to the second half of Freud's work, which some have found the less completely satisfying of the two. His investigation of the repressed wishes in the mind led to the comprehensive Libido Theory and this could readily be expressed in biological terms, i.e. in terms of the instinctual life that man shares with other mammals; its air of completeness and finality suggests that any future modifications of it are not likely to be very far-reaching. The rest of the mind, however, that which Freud at first grouped under the provisional heading of ' ego interests ', proved to be more intractable and tested his powers to the utmost. His mind was permeated throughout with the idea of *Conflict* and here his philosophy was that of an obdurate dualist; he would have felt ill at ease in William James' pluralistic universe. His inflexibility in this respect may have conduced to his needing other than biological principles, since there seems no reason to assume that the animal world is endowed with exactly two instincts or sets of instincts.

I have elsewhere (in a paper entitled ' Psycho-Analysis and the Instincts ') described in detail the evolution of Freud's ideas on the subject of endopsychic conflict and cannot hope to do justice to such an important theme in the space at my disposal here, where, after all, we are concerned more with Freud the man than with the technical problems arising from his work. We know how he felt his way forward from his preliminary classification of sexual and ' ego ' instincts, *viâ* that of object-libido and narcissistic libido, to that of life and death instincts. During the war period narcissistic libido, a concept akin to that of self-preservation from self-love, had somehow become displaced in prominence by the idea of an inner tendency to death, to peace from the struggles of life. Within a couple of years this mute Thanatos principle became surprisingly related to the stormy aggressiveness that characterizes so much of man's phantasy and behaviour, the latter tendency being regarded as an exteriorization of the former. This correlation was a most daring imaginative feat, but how sound it was we do not yet know. Sooner or later the question will have to be raised whether it does not represent the only example in Freud's

mental life where internal resistances that had not been completely overcome may perhaps have played a part. When he told me on one occasion that my hesitancy in accepting the idea of a death instinct was due to resistance to a painful conclusion, I replied: 'On the contrary, it seems to me to need more courage to accept the idea of a primary savage trend than to explain aggressiveness as a defence against some unknown tendency to decay.' It may sound strange to suggest that Freud, the man who discovered the parricidal complex and revealed the hidden part played in our lives by hate, should possibly still have even a lingering resistance against the significance of aggressiveness in our inner life. But we should never forget that such resistances are quantitative and that the dispersing of them is in all human beings a relative matter, never an absolute one.

However all this may be, and only a future genius will be able to disclose the truth about such profound problems, there is no doubt that Freud's efforts to grapple with the innermost meaning of the deep dichotomy in the human mind represents a splendid endeavour, one marked by intense thought and bold imagination. There are few exercises more instructive, or more stimulating, than to try to follow the trail he so strenuously blazed.

* * * * *

We have now to steel ourselves to face the future bereft of the inspiring presence of our ever-pioneering leader and to make the best use we can of the gifts that have at last found finality. In doing so we cannot put from ourselves the question of how far, and in what way, Freud's decease is likely to affect the immediate future of psycho-analysis. Every analyst knows that the loss of such a significant figure may be expected to produce affective reactions, and further, that these will vary in different individuals. Freud himself was of the opinion, which he more than once expressed to me, that his death would have a beneficial effect inasmuch as various resistances that had accumulated about his personality would then have the opportunity of dispersing. Moreover, one may reckon with certain unconscious reactions of remorse, which would damp down expression of such resistances. On the other hand it is likely that resistances which had been held in check by motives of piety will now manifest themselves more freely.

Plainly a distinction has to be drawn here between the rational and the irrational, between the conscious and the unconscious reactions. Any statement coming from Freud had to have special significance

for any analyst. It would be strange if that were not so among those who had learnt so much from him ; his insight, originality and experience demanded deep respect for anything he might have to say. This is common ground, but beyond it one sees divergences. One group of analysts, fortunately an extremely small one, would seek for no other criterion of the truth of such a statement than the fact of Freud's having made it and would maintain that psycho-analysis, i.e. the study of the unconscious mind, was conterminous with Freud's writings. Then there is another group, unfortunately not a small one, with whom assertion of independent personality is conditioned by differing from Freud, again irrespective of the evidential data. Finally, there is a third group—how large I shall not venture to estimate—with whom the fact of Freud's having made a statement is a reason for investigating the matter with specially careful attention, but whose respect for probity makes their ultimate judgement depend on the evidential data alone. It is curious to reflect how much this classification appears to be related to matters of geographical propinquity, so far from free are most people from the influence of their environment.

One hope of Freud's, that of founding an independent profession, has become increasingly remote and the chances of its ever being fulfilled are likely to be unfavourably affected by his death. It would not be just to call it an ambition of Freud's : it is rather that he considered it to offer the most advantageous opportunity for progress in psycho-analytical work. Whether the idea captures one entirely or not, it is undeniably a fascinating one to all who are imbued with the profound importance of psycho-analysis. Here too one may observe a triple grouping of analysts, one remarkably similar to the previous classification. There are those who would wish to preserve trained analysts as a separate body having an attitude of guarded politeness towards the medical profession. At the other extreme are the analysts who not only regard their work as purely a branch of medicine, indeed of psychiatry, but also strive to fuse it with other departments of medicine as swiftly as possible. In between are those who think it better, though not essential, for analysts to have been medical practitioners, but are chary about their having any intimate association with other physicians until the analytical discipline is far more advanced and securely established than it is to-day. It seems likely that some of the second attitude represents a reaction to the first one, to Freud's own, and one knows of analysts who adhered to the first group when they stood in a personal relationship to him and then swung over

into the second group on removing to a distance. Now that his personal influence is withdrawn we may expect to see this happen more extensively until such reactive tendencies diminish with the passage of the years. Clearly the same remarks as those just made hold good for the vexed question of lay analysis, with which it is closely connected. It is noteworthy that England is the only country whose lay analysts have obtained a satisfactory foothold, even an officially recognized one, and no signs are visible of any other country following it in this respect.

These questions are ones of policy. Ill-health and age had for years so withdrawn Freud from the more administrative aspects of psychoanalytical work, and public events had of late so disorganized or scattered the vehicles of his influence, that it would be illusory to suppose that the disappearance of his personality will have any very important effect on what may be called the policies of analytical development. The effect of it, with the cessation of his own contributions, on the internal, technical aspects of analytical work is harder to predict. Presumably the more objectively founded of his conclusions will continue in being and any that may have had a more subjective source will become modified. It will, however, be long before any dispassionate estimate of such matters can be adequately established.

We have thus perforce to take leave of our great man, the creator and pioneer of our work. We have been deprived for ever of the joy and inspiration of his living personality. More, however, of that personality will survive his death than will pass away with it. It is permanently embedded in the hearts of all who knew him in the flesh and even in the hearts of a greater number who have known him only in the spirit. As to his work, it remains for ever as a gift to mankind, whose recognition of its value can only increase with the passage of time.

ERNEST JONES.

AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY

SIGMUND FREUD

[EDITORIAL NOTE: *We can think of no more appropriate method of honouring the memory of Sigmund Freud than by presenting our readers with a translation of one of his few unpublished writings. This work, which has been most generously placed at our disposal, was begun in July* 1938, *and was left unfinished. There is no indication of how far or in what direction the author had intended to continue it. Unlike the rest of the manuscript, that of the third chapter is only drawn up in the form of much abbreviated jottings in telegraphic style. These have here been filled out into complete sentences, but are otherwise unaltered. The title of Part I is derived from a fragmentary later version, made in October* 1938.]

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It is the aim of this brief work to bring together the doctrines of Psycho-Analysis and to state them, as it were, dogmatically—in the most concise form and in the most positive terms. It is naturally not its intention to compel belief or to establish conviction.

The teachings of Psycho-Analysis are based upon an incalculable number of observations and experiences, and no one who has not repeated those observations upon himself or upon others is in a position to arrive at an independent judgement of it.

Part I

THE NATURE OF MIND

Chapter I. The Apparatus of the Mind

Psycho-Analysis lays down a fundamental postulate,[1] the discussion of which belongs to the sphere of philosophical thought, but the justification of which lies in its results. We know two things concerning what we call our psyche or mental life: firstly, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (or nervous system), and secondly, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be more fully explained by any kind of description. Everything between these is unknown to us and there is no direct relation between the two end-points of our knowledge. If it existed, it would at the most afford an exact localization of the processes of consciousness and would give no help towards understanding them.

Our two assumptions start out from these ends or beginnings of our knowledge. The first is concerned with localization. We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several pieces—which we imagine, therefore, as being like a telescope or microscope or something of the sort. The consistent carrying through of a conception of this kind is a scientific novelty, even though some attempts in that direction have been previously made.

We have arrived at our knowledge of this apparatus of the mind by studying the individual development of human beings. To the oldest of these mental provinces or departments we give the name of *id*. It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution—above all, therefore, the instincts originating in the somatic organization, which find their first mental expression there in forms unknown to us.[2]

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[1] [It will be found that this fundamental postulate is a double-barrelled one and is sometimes referred to by the author as two separate assumptions. So, for instance, lower down on this page, and on page 39; but again as a single one on page 73.—*Editorial Note.*]

[2] This oldest portion of the mental apparatus remains the most important throughout life, and it was the first subject of the investigations of Psycho-Analysis.

Under the influence of the real external world which surrounds us, one portion of the id has undergone a special development. From what was originally a cortical layer, provided with the organs for receiving stimuli and with the apparatus for protection against excessive stimulation, a special organization has arisen which thenceforward acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. This region of our mental life has been given the name of *ego*.

The principal characteristics of the ego are these. In consequence of the relation which was already established between sensory perception and muscular action, the ego is in control of voluntary movement. It has the task of self-preservation. As regards *external* events, it performs that task by becoming aware of the stimuli from without, by storing up experiences of them (in the memory), by avoiding excessive stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and, finally, by learning to bring about appropriate modifications in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards *internal* events, in relation to the id, it performs it by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they shall be allowed to obtain satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations completely. It is governed in its activity by the consideration of the tensions produced by stimuli present within it or introduced into it. The raising of these tensions is in general felt as *unpleasure* and their lowering as *pleasure*. It is probable, however, that what is felt as pleasure or unpleasure is not the *absolute* degree of the tensions but something in the rhythm of their changes. The ego pursues pleasure and seeks to avoid unpleasure. An increase in unpleasure which is expected and foreseen is met by a *signal of anxiety*; the occasion of this increase, whether it threatens from without or within, is called a *danger*. From time to time the ego gives up its connection with the external world and withdraws into the condition of sleep, in which its organization undergoes far-reaching changes. It may be inferred from the condition of sleep that that organization consists in a particular distribution of mental energy.

The long period of childhood, during which the growing human being lives in dependence upon his parents, leaves behind it a precipitate, which forms within his ego a special department in which this parental influence is prolonged. It has received the name of *super-ego*. In so far as the super-ego is differentiated from the ego or

opposed to it, it constitutes a third force which the ego must take into account.

Thus, an action by the ego is as it should be if it satisfies simultaneously the demands of the id, of the super-ego and of reality, that is to say if it is able to reconcile their demands with one another. The details of the relation between the ego and the super-ego become completely intelligible if they are carried back to the child's attitude towards his parents. The parents' influence naturally includes not merely the personalities of the parents themselves but also the racial, national and family traditions handed on by them as well as the demands of the actual social *milieu* which they represent. In the same way, an individual's super-ego in the course of his development takes over contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents, such as teachers or prototypes of admired ideals in public life. It will be seen that, in spite of their fundamental difference, the id and the super-ego have one thing in common: they both represent the influences of the past (the id the influence of heredity, the super-ego essentially the influence of what is taken over from other people), whereas the ego is principally determined by the individual's own experience, that is to say by accidental and current events.

This general pattern of a mental apparatus may be supposed to apply equally to the higher animals which resemble man mentally. A super-ego must be presumed to be present wherever, as in the case of man, there is a long period of dependence in childhood. The assumption of a distinction between ego and id cannot be avoided.

Animal psychology has not yet taken in hand the interesting problem which is here presented.

Chapter II. The Theory of Instincts

The power of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual organism's life. This consists in the satisfaction of its innate needs. No such purpose as that of keeping itself alive or of protecting itself from dangers by means of anxiety can be attributed to the id. That is the business of the ego, which is also concerned with discovering the most favourable and least perilous method of obtaining satisfaction, taking the external world into account. The super-ego may bring fresh needs to the fore, but its chief function remains the limitation of satisfactions.

The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called *instincts*. They represent the somatic demands upon the life of the mind. Though they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are by nature conservative; the state, whatever it may be, which a living thing has reached, gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state so soon as it has been abandoned. Thus it is possible to distinguish an indeterminate number of instincts and in common practice this is in fact done. For us, however, the important question arises whether we may not be able to derive all of these various instincts from a few fundamental ones. We have found that instincts can change their aim (by displacement) and also that they can replace one another—the energy of one instinct passing over to another. This latter process is still insufficiently understood. After long doubts and vacillations we have decided to assume the existence of only two fundamental instincts, *Eros* and *the destructive instinct*. (The contrast between the instincts of self-preservation and of the preservation of the species, as well as the contrast between ego-love and object-love, falls within the bounds of Eros.) The aim of the first of these is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of the other, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so to destroy things. We may suppose that the final aim of the destructive instinct is to reduce living things to an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the *death instinct*. If we suppose that living things appeared later than inanimate ones and arose out of them, then the death instinct agrees with the formula that we have stated, to the effect that instincts tend towards a return to an earlier state. We are unable to apply the formula to Eros (the love instinct). That would imply that living substance had once been a unity but

had subsequently been torn apart and was now tending towards re-union.[3]

In biological functions the two fundamental instincts work against each other or combine with each other. Thus, the act of eating is a destruction of the object with the final aim of incorporating it and the sexual act is an aggression having as its purpose the most intimate union. This interaction of the two fundamental instincts with and against each other gives rise to the whole variegation of the phenomena of life. The analogy of our two fundamental instincts is carried over from the region of animate things to the pair of opposing forces—attraction and repulsion—which rule in the inorganic world.[4]

Modifications in the proportions of the fusion between the instincts have the most noticeable results. A surplus of sexual aggressiveness will change the lover into a sexual murderer, while a sharp diminution in the aggressive factor will make him bashful or impotent.

There can be no question of restricting one or the other of the fundamental instincts to a single region of the mind. They are necessarily present everywhere. We may picture an initial state of things by supposing that the whole available energy of Eros, to which we shall henceforward give the name of *libido*, is present in the as yet undifferentiated ego-id and serves to neutralize the destructive impulses which are simultaneously present. (There is no term analogous to ' libido ' for describing the energy of the destructive instinct.) It becomes relatively easy for us to follow the later vicissitudes of the libido ; but this is more difficult with the destructive instinct.

So long as that instinct operates internally, as a death instinct, it remains silent ; we only come across it after it has become diverted outwards as an instinct of destruction. That that diversion should occur seems essential for the preservation of the individual ; the musculature is employed for the purpose. When the super-ego begins to be formed, considerable amounts of the aggressive instinct become fixated within the ego and operate there in a self-destructive fashion. This is one of the hygienic dangers assumed by mankind on its path to cultural development. The holding-back of aggressiveness is in general unhealthy ; it leads to illness (to mortification). A person in

[3] Things of the sort have been imagined by poets, but nothing like it is known to us from the history of living substance.

[4] The portrayal of fundamental forces or instincts, which still arouses much opposition among analysts, was already a familiar one to the philosopher Empedocles of Agrigentum.

a fit of rage often demonstrates the transition from the checking of aggressiveness to self-destructiveness by turning his aggressiveness against himself: he tears his hair or beats his face with his fists—treatment which he would evidently have preferred to apply to someone else. Some portion of self-destructiveness remains permanently within, until it at length succeeds in doing the individual to death, not, perhaps, until his libido has been used up or has become fixated in some disadvantageous way. Thus it may in general be suspected that the *individual* dies of his internal conflicts but that the *species* dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world, when the latter undergoes changes of a kind that cannot be dealt with by the adaptations which the species has acquired.

It is difficult to say anything of the behaviour of the libido in the id and in the super-ego. Everything that we know about it relates to the ego, in which the whole available amount of libido is at first stored up. We call this state of things absolute, primary *narcissism*. It continues until the ego begins to cathect the presentations of objects with libido—to change narcissistic libido into *object libido*. Throughout life the ego remains the great reservoir from which libidinal cathexes are sent out on to objects and into which they are also once more withdrawn, like the pseudopodia of a body of protoplasm. It is only when someone is completely in love that the main quantity of libido is transferred on to the object and the object to some extent takes the place of the ego. A characteristic of libido which is important in life is its *mobility*, the ease with which it passes from one object to another. This must be contrasted with the *fixation* of libido to particular objects, which often persists through life.

There can be no question that the libido has somatic sources, that it streams into the ego from various organs and parts of the body. This is most clearly seen in the case of the portion of the libido which, from its instinctual aim, is known as sexual excitation. The most prominent of the parts of the body from which this libido arises are described by the name of *erotogenic zones*, though strictly speaking the whole body is an erotogenic zone. The greater part of what we know about Eros—that is, about its exponent, the libido—has been gained from the study of the sexual function, which, indeed, in the popular view, if not in our theory, coincides with Eros. We have been able to form a picture of the way in which the sexual impulse, which is destined to exercise a decisive influence on our life, gradually develops out of successive contributions from a number of component instincts, which represent particular erotogenic zones.

Chapter III. The Development of the Sexual Function

According to the popular view, human sexual life consists essentially in each person's impulse to bring his own genitals in contact with those of a person of the opposite sex. With this are associated, as accessory phenomena and introductory acts, kissing this foreign body, looking at it and touching it. This impulse, it is thought, makes its appearance at puberty, that is, at the age of sexual maturity, and serves the purposes of reproduction. Nevertheless, certain facts have always been known that fail to fit into the narrow framework of this view. (1) It is a remarkable fact that there are people who are only attracted by the persons and genitals of members of their own sex. (2) It is equally remarkable that there are people whose desires behave in every way like sexual ones, but who at the same time entirely disregard the sexual organs or their normal use; people of this kind are known as 'perverts'. (3) And finally it is striking that many children (who are on that account regarded as degenerates) take a very early interest in their genitals and show signs of excitation in them.

It may well be believed that Psycho-Analysis provoked astonishment and denials when, partly upon the basis of these three neglected facts, it contradicted all such popular opinions upon sexuality. Its principal findings are as follows:—

(*a*) Sexual life does not begin only at puberty, but starts with clear manifestations soon after birth.

(*b*) It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the concepts of 'sexual' and 'genital'. The former is the wider concept and includes many activities that have nothing to do with the genitals.

(*c*) Sexual life comprises the function of obtaining pleasure from zones of the body—a function which is subsequently brought into the service of reproduction. The two functions often fail to coincide completely.

The chief interest is naturally focused upon the first of these assertions, the most unexpected of all. It has been found that in early childhood there are signs of bodily activity to which only ancient prejudice could deny the name of sexual, and which are connected with mental phenomena that we come across later in adult love, such as fixation to a particular object, jealousy, and so on. It is further found that these phenomena which emerge in early childhood form part of a regular process of development, that they undergo a steady increase

and reach a climax towards the end of the fifth year, after which there follows a lull. During this lull, progress is at a standstill and much is unlearnt and undone. After the end of this so-called period of latency, sexual life is resumed with puberty, or, as we might say, it bursts once more into flower. Here we come upon the fact that sexual life has a *dichronous onset*; this is unknown except in man and evidently has an important bearing upon his genesis.[5] It is not a matter of indifference that, with few exceptions, the events of the early period of sexuality fall a victim to *infantile amnesia*. Our understanding of the ætiology of the neuroses and the technique of analytical therapy are derived from these views; and the tracing of the process of development in this early period has also provided evidence for yet other conclusions.

The first organ to make its appearance as an erotogenic zone and to make libidinal demands upon the mind is, from the time of birth onwards, the mouth. To begin with, all mental activity is centred upon the task of providing satisfaction for the needs of that zone. In the first instance, of course, the latter serves the purposes of self-preservation by means of nourishment; but physiology should not be confused with psychology. The baby's obstinate persistence in sucking gives evidence at an early stage of a need for satisfaction which, although it originates from and is stimulated by the taking of nourishment, nevertheless seeks to obtain pleasure independently of nourishment and for that reason may and must be described as 'sexual'.

Sadistic impulses already begin to occur sporadically during the oral phase along with the appearance of the teeth. Their extent increases greatly during the second phase, which we describe as the sadistic-anal phase, because satisfaction is then sought in aggression and in the excretory function. We justify our inclusion of aggressive impulses in the libido by supposing that sadism is an instinctual fusion of purely libidinal and purely destructive impulses, a fusion which thenceforward persists without interruption.[6]

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[5] Cf. the hypothesis that, since man is descended from mammals which reach sexual maturity at the age of five, some great external influence was brought to bear upon the species, which interrupted the straight line of development of sexuality. This may also have had to do with some other transformations in the sexual life of man as compared with that of animals, such as the suppression of the periodicity of the libido and the exploitation of the part played by menstruation in the relation between the sexes.

[6] The question arises whether satisfaction of purely destructive

The third is the so-called phallic phase, which is, as it were, a forerunner of the final shape of sexual life, and already greatly resembles it. It is to be noted that what comes in question at this stage is not the genitals of both sexes but only those of the male (the phallus). The female genitals long remain unknown : in the cnild's attempt at understanding sexual processes, he pays homage to the venerable cloacal theory—a theory which has a genetic justification.[7]

With the phallic phase and in the course of it the sexuality of early childhood reaches its height and approaches its decline. Thence-forward boys and girls have different histories. Both began by placing their intellectual activity at the service of sexual investigation ; both started off from the presumption of the universal presence of the penis. But now the paths of the sexes divide. The boy enters the Œdipus phase ; he begins to manipulate his penis, and simultaneously has phantasies of carrying out some sort of activity with it in relation to his mother ; but at last, owing to the combined effect of a threat of castration and the spectacle of women's lack of a penis, he experiences the greatest trauma of his life and this introduces the period of latency with all its consequences. The girl, after vainly attempting to do the same as the boy, comes to recognize her lack of a penis or rather the inferiority of her clitoris, with permanent effects upon the development of her character ; and, as a result of this first disappointment in rivalry, she often turns away altogether from sexual life.

It would be a mistake to suppose that these three phases succeed one another outright : one of them may appear in addition to another, they may overlap one another, they may be present simultaneously. In the earlier phases the separate component instincts set about their pursuit of pleasure independently of one another ; in the phallic phase there are the first signs of an organization which subordinates the other trends to the primacy of the genitals and signifies the beginning of a co-ordination of the general impulse towards pleasure into the

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instinctual impulses can be felt as pleasure, whether pure destruction without any libidinal component occurs. Satisfaction of what remains in the ego of the death instinct seems not to produce feelings of pleasure, although masochism represents a fusion which is precisely analogous to sadism.

[7] The occurrence of early vaginal excitations is often asserted. But it is most probably a question of excitations in the clitoris, that is, in an organ analogous to the penis, so that this would not preclude us from describing the phase as phallic.

sexual function. The complete organization is not attained until puberty, in a fourth, or genital, phase. A state of affairs is then established in which (1) many earlier libidinal cathexes are retained, (2) others are included in the sexual function as preparatory or auxiliary acts, their satisfaction producing what is known as fore-pleasure, and (3) other tendencies are excluded from the organization, and are either entirely suppressed (repressed) or are employed in the ego in some other way, forming character-traits or undergoing sublimation with a displacement of their aims.

This process is not always carried out faultlessly. Inhibitions in its development manifest themselves as the various disturbances of sexual life. Fixations of the libido to conditions at earlier phases are then present, the trend of which, moving independently of the normal sexual aim, is described as *perversion*. One example of an inhibition in development of this kind is homosexuality, if it is manifest. Analysis shews that in every case a homosexual attachment to an object was at one time present and in most cases has persisted in a latent condition. The situation is complicated by the fact that the processes necessary for bringing about a normal outcome are not for the most part either completely present or completely absent; they are as a rule *partially* present so that the final result remains dependent upon *quantitative* relations. Thus genital organization will be attained, but will be weakened in respect to those portions of the libido which have not proceeded so far but have remained fixated to pregenital objects and aims. Such weakening shews itself in a tendency, if there is an absence of genital satisfaction or if there are difficulties in the real world, for the libido to return to its earlier pregenital cathexes (i.e. to *regress*).

During the study of the sexual functions it has been possible to gain a first, preliminary conviction, or rather suspicion, of two pieces of knowledge which will later be found to be important over the whole of our field. Firstly, the normal and abnormal phenomena that we observe (that is, the phenomenology of the subject) require to be described from the point of view of dynamics and of economics (e.g. in the case we have been discussing, of the *quantitative* distribution of the libido). And secondly, the ætiology of the disturbances which we are studying is to be found in the developmental history of the individual, that is to say, in the early part of his life.

Chapter IV. Mental Qualities

We have described the structure of the apparatus of the mind and the energies or forces which are active in it, and we have followed in a striking example the way in which these energies (and principally the libido) organize themselves into a physiological function which serves the purpose of the preservation of the species. There was nothing in all this that represented the quite peculiar character of what is mental, apart, of course, from the empirical fact that this apparatus and these energies underlie the functions which we call our mental life.[8] We will now turn to the one thing which is characteristic about what is mental, and which, in fact, according to a widely held opinion, actually coincides with it to the exclusion of all else.

The starting-point for this investigation is provided by a unique fact, which defies all explanation or description—the fact of consciousness. Nevertheless, if anyone speaks of consciousness, we know immediately and from our own most personal experience what is meant by it.[9] Many people, both inside and outside the science of psychology, are satisfied with the assumption that consciousness alone is mental, and nothing then remains for psychology but to discriminate in the phenomenology of the mind between perceptions, feelings, thought processes and volitions. It is generally agreed, however, that these conscious processes do not form unbroken self-contained series; so that there is no alternative to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes which accompany the mental ones and which must admittedly be more complete than the mental series, since some of them have conscious processes parallel to them but others have not. It thus seems natural to lay the stress in psychology upon these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence of what is mental and to try to arrive at some other assessment of the conscious processes. The majority of philosophers, however, as well as many other people, dispute this position and declare that the notion of a mental thing being unconscious is nonsense.

But it is precisely this that Psycho-Analysis is obliged to assert,

[8] [An alternative version of what follows will be found printed as an Appendix.—*Editorial Note.*]

[9] Extreme lines of thought, such as the American doctrine of Behaviourism, think it possible to construct a psychology which disregards this fundamental fact.

and this is its second fundamental assumption. It explains the supposed somatic accessory processes as being what is essentially mental and disregards for the moment the quality of consciousness. It does not stand alone in this opinion. Many thinkers (such as Theodor Lipps, for instance) have made the same assertion in the same words. And the general dissatisfaction with the usual view of what is mental has resulted in an ever more urgent demand for the inclusion in psychological thought of a concept of the unconscious, though the demand has been of such an indefinite and vague nature that it could have no influence upon science.

Now it might appear as though this dispute between Psycho-Analysis and philosophy was only concerned with a trifling matter of definition—the question whether the name ' mental ' should be applied to one or another series of phenomena. Actually, however, this step has been of the greatest importance. Whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond this broken sequence of events which was obviously dependent upon something else, the other view, which held that what is mental is in itself unconscious, enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are just as unknowable as those dealt with by the other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example ; but it is possible to establish the laws which those processes obey and to follow over long and unbroken stretches their mutual relations and interdependences—in short, to gain what is known as an understanding of the sphere of natural phenomena in question. This cannot be effected without making fresh assumptions and creating fresh concepts ; but these are not to be despised as evidence of our embarrassment but must on the contrary be valued as enriching science. We can claim for them the same value as approximations as belongs to the corresponding intellectual auxiliary constructions in other natural sciences and we look forward to their being modified, corrected and more precisely determined as more experience is accumulated and sifted. So too it will be entirely in accordance with our expectations if the fundamental concepts and principles of the new science (instinct, nervous energy, etc.) remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc.).

Every science is based upon observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our mental apparatus. But since our science has as its object that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here. We make our observations through the medium of the same perceptual

apparatus, precisely by the help of the breaks in the series of mental events, since we fill in the omissions by plausible inferences and translate them into conscious material. In this way we build, as it were, a conscious complement for the unconscious mental processes. The relative certainty of our mental science rests upon the binding force of these inferences. Anyone who goes deeply into the subject will find that our technique holds its ground against every criticism.

In the course of our work the distinctions which we denote as mental qualities force themselves on our attention. There is no need to characterize what we call conscious : it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of everyday opinion. Everything else that is mental is in our view the unconscious. We are soon led to make an important division in this unconscious. Many processes become conscious easily, they may then cease to be conscious, but can become conscious once more without any trouble : as people say, they can be reproduced or remembered. This reminds us that consciousness is in general a very highly fugitive state. What is conscious is only conscious for a moment. If our perceptions do not confirm this, the contradiction is only an apparent one. It is explained by the fact that the stimuli of perception can persist for some time, so that in the course of it the perception of them can be repeated. The whole position can be clearly seen from the conscious perception of our thought processes ; it is true that these persist, but they can just as easily pass in a flash. Everything unconscious that behaves in this way, that can easily exchange the unconscious state for the conscious one, is therefore better described as capable of becoming conscious, or as *preconscious*. Experience has taught us that there are hardly any mental processes, even of the most complicated kind, which cannot on occasion remain preconscious, although as a rule they press forward, as we say, into consciousness.

There are other mental processes or mental material which have no such easy access to consciousness, but which must be inferred, discovered and translated into conscious form in the manner that has been described. It is for such material that we reserve the name of the true unconscious. Thus we have attributed three qualities to mental processes : they are either conscious, preconscious or unconscious. The division between the three classes of material which have these qualities is neither absolute nor permanent. What is preconscious becomes conscious, as we have seen, without any activity on our part ; what is unconscious can, as a result of our efforts, be made

conscious, though in the process we may have an impression that we are overcoming what are often very strong resistances. When we make an attempt of this kind upon someone else, we ought not to forget that the conscious filling up of the breaks in his perceptions—the construction which we are offering him—does not so far mean that we have made conscious in him the unconscious material in question. All that is so far true is that the material is present in his mind in two versions, first in the conscious reconstruction that he has just received and secondly in its original unconscious state. By persistent efforts we usually succeed in bringing it about that this unconscious material becomes conscious to him himself, as a result of which the two versions come to coincide. The amount of effort needed, by which we estimate the resistance against the material becoming conscious, varies in size in each individual case. For instance, what in an analytic treatment comes about as the result of our efforts can also occur spontaneously: material which is ordinarily unconscious can transform itself into preconscious and then into conscious material—a thing that happens upon a large scale in psychotic states. From this we may infer that the maintenance of certain internal resistances is a *sine quâ non* of normality. A lowering of resistances of this sort, with a consequent pressing forward of unconscious material, takes place regularly in the state of sleep and thus brings about a necessary condition for the formation of dreams. On the other hand, preconscious material can become temporarily inaccessible and cut off by resistances, as on occasions of passing forgetfulness, or a preconscious thought can actually be temporarily pushed back into an unconscious condition, as seems to be necessary in the case of jokes. We shall see that a similar turning back of preconscious material or processes into an unconscious condition plays a great part in the causation of neurotic disorders.

The theory of the three qualities of mental events, as described in this generalized and simplified manner, seems likely to be a source of endless confusion rather than a help to clarification. But it must not be forgotten that it is properly not a theory at all, but a first attempt at a stock-taking of the facts of our observations, that it keeps as close as possible to those facts and does not seek to explain them. The complications which it reveals may bring into relief the peculiar difficulties with which our investigation has to contend. It seems likely however that we shall learn more about the subject if we follow out the relations between the mental qualities and the provinces or

departments which we have postulated in the mental apparatus—though these relations too are far from being simple.

The act of becoming conscious is above all linked with the perceptions which our sensory organs receive from the external world. From the topographical point of view, therefore, it is a phenomenon which occurs in the outermost cortex of the ego. Besides this, however, we receive conscious information from the inside of the body—the feelings—which actually exercise a more peremptory influence upon our mental life than the external perceptions; moreover, in certain circumstances the sensory organs themselves transmit feelings, sensations of pain, in addition to the perceptions which are specific to them. Since, however, these sensations (as we call them, in contrast to conscious perceptions) also emanate from the terminal organs, and since we regard all of these as prolongations or offshoots of the cortex, it is still possible to maintain the assertion made above. It need only be said by way of distinction that, as regards the terminal organs of sensation and feeling, the body itself takes the place of the external world.

Conscious processes on the periphery of the ego and everything else in the ego unconscious—such would be the simplest state of affairs that we might picture. And such may in fact be the conditions in animals. But in men there is an added complication owing to which internal processes in the ego may also acquire the quality of consciousness. This complication is produced by the function of speech, which brings the material in the ego into a firm connection with the memory-traces of visual and more particularly of auditory perceptions. Thenceforward the perceptual periphery of the cortex of the ego can be stimulated to a much greater extent from inside as well; internal events such as sequences of ideas and thought processes can become conscious; and a special apparatus becomes necessary in order to distinguish between the two possibilities—that is, what is known as *reality-testing*. The equation 'perception = reality (external world)' no longer holds. Errors, which can now easily arise and do in fact habitually arise in dreams, are called *hallucinations*.

The inside of the ego, which comprises above all the thought processes, has the quality of the preconscious. This is characteristic of the ego and belongs to it alone. It would not be right, however, to assert that a connection with the memory-traces of speech is a pre-requisite of the preconscious state. On the contrary, that state does not depend upon any such pre-requisite, although the presence of

speech gives a safe clue to the preconscious nature of a process. The preconscious state, which is characterized on the one hand by having access to consciousness and on the other hand by being linked with the speech-traces, is nevertheless something peculiar, the nature of which is not exhausted by these two characteristics. The proof of this is that large portions of the ego, and in particular of the super-ego, which cannot be denied the characteristic of being preconscious, none the less remain for the most part unconscious in the phenomenological sense of the word. We do not know why this must be so. We shall attempt later on to attack the problem of the true nature of the preconscious.

The unconscious is the sole quality that rules in the id. Id and unconscious are as intimately united as ego and preconscious ; indeed, the former connection is even more exclusive. If we look back at the developmental history of the individual and of the apparatus of his mind, we shall be able to make an important distinction in the id. Originally, of course, everything was id ; the ego was developed out of the id by the continual influence of the external world. In the course of this slow development certain material in the id was transformed into the preconscious state and was thus taken into the ego. Other material remained unaltered in the id, as its hardly accessible nucleus. But during this development the young and feeble ego dropped and pushed back into the unconscious state certain material which it had already taken in, and behaved similarly in regard to many new impressions which it might have taken in, so that these were rejected and were able to leave traces only in the id. In consideration of its origin, we term this portion of the id the repressed. It is of little importance that we are not always able to draw a sharp distinction between these two categories of material in the id. They coincide approximately with the division between what was originally present and what was acquired during the development of the ego.

Having now decided upon the topographical division of the mental apparatus into an ego and an id, with which the difference in quality between preconscious and unconscious runs parallel, and having agreed that this quality is only an indication of the distinction and does not constitute its essence, we are faced by a further question. What is the true nature of the state which is disclosed in the case of the id by the quality of the unconscious and in the case of the ego by that of the preconscious, and in what does the distinction between them consist ?

But of this we know nothing ; and the profound obscurity of our

ignorance is scarcely illuminated by a glimmer or two of light. For here we have approached the still shrouded secret of the nature of mind. We assume, as the other natural sciences have taught us to expect, that in mental life some kind of energy is at work ; but we have no data which enable us to come nearer to a knowledge of it by the analogy of other forms of energy. We seem to recognize that nervous or mental energy exists in two forms, one mobile and the other, by contrast, bound ; we speak of cathexes and hyper-cathexes of the material of the mind and even venture to suppose that a ' hyper-cathexis ' constitutes a sort of synthesis of different processes in which free energy is transformed into bound energy. Further than this we have been unable to go. Nevertheless, we hold firmly to the view that the distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious state also lies in dynamic relations of this same kind, which would explain how it is that, whether spontaneously or with our assistance, the one can be changed into the other.

But behind all of these uncertainties there lies one new fact, the discovery of which we owe to psycho-analytical research. We have learnt that processes in the unconscious or in the id obey different laws from those in the preconscious ego. We name these laws in their totality the *primary process*, in contrast to the *secondary process* which regulates events in the preconscious or ego. Thus the study of mental qualities has after all proved not unfruitful in the end.

Chapter V. Dream-Interpretation as an Illustration

The investigation of normal, stable states, in which the frontiers of the ego are safeguarded against the id by resistances (or anti-cathexes) and have held firm and in which the super-ego is not distinguished from the ego because they work together harmoniously—an investigation of this kind would teach us little. The only thing that can help us are states of conflict and rebellion, in which the material in the unconscious id has a prospect of forcing its way into the ego and into consciousness and in which the ego arms itself afresh against the invasion. Only under such conditions can we make observations which will confirm or correct our views upon the two partners. But our nightly sleep is precisely a state of this sort, and consequently our activity during sleep, which we perceive as dreams, is the most favourable object of our study. In this way, too, we avoid the familiar reproach that we base our constructions of the normal life of the mind upon pathological findings, since dreams are regular events in the life of normal men, however much their characteristics may differ from the productions of our waking existence. Dreams, as everyone knows, can be confused, unintelligible or positively senseless, their contents may contradict all that we know of reality, and we behave in them like insane people, since, so long as we are dreaming, we attribute objective reality to the material of our dreams.

We can find our way towards understanding (or ' interpreting ') dreams, if we assume that what we recollect as the dream after we have woken up is not the true dream-process but only a façade behind which that process lies concealed. Here we see our distinction between *manifest* dream-material and *latent* dream-thoughts. The process which produces the former out of the latter is described as *dream-work*. The study of dream-work affords us an excellent example of the way in which unconscious material from the id—originally unconconscious and repressed unconscious alike—forces itself upon the ego, becomes preconscious and, owing to the efforts of the ego, undergoes the modifications which we call *dream-distortion*. There are no features of the dream which cannot be explained in this fashion.

It is best to begin by pointing out that the formation of dreams can be provoked in two different ways. Either, on the one hand, an instinctual impulse which is as a rule suppressed (that is, an unconscious wish) finds enough strength during sleep to make an impression

upon the ego, or, on the other hand, a desire left over from waking life, a preconscious thought-process with all the conflicting impulses belonging to it, obtains reinforcement during sleep from an unconscious element. In short, dreams may arise either from the id or from the ego. The mechanism of dream-formation is the same in both cases and so is the necessary dynamic precondition. The ego shows its origin from the id by occasionally ceasing its functions and permitting a return to an earlier state of things. It duly brings this about by breaking off its relations with the external world and withdrawing its cathexes from the sensory organs. We may justly assert that at birth an instinct arises to return to the abandoned intra-uterine life, an instinct to sleep. Sleep is a return of this kind to the womb. Since the waking ego controls motility, that function is paralyzed in sleep and accordingly a great part of the inhibitions imposed upon the unconscious id becomes superfluous. The withdrawal or diminution of these ' anti-cathexes ' thus allows the id what is now a harmless degree of liberty. The evidence of the share taken by the unconscious id in the formation of dreams is abundant and convincing. (*a*) Memory is far more comprehensive in dreams than in waking life. Dreams bring up recollections which the dreamer has forgotten, which are inaccessible to him when he is awake. (*b*) Dreams make an unlimited use of speech symbols, the meaning of which is for the most part unknown to the dreamer. Our experience, however, enables us to establish their sense. They probably originate from earlier phases in the development of speech. (*c*) Memory very often reproduces in dreams impressions from the dreamer's early childhood of which we can definitely assert not only that they had been forgotten but that they had become unconscious owing to repression. This is the explanation of the help—usually indispensable—afforded to us by dreams when, in the course of the analytic treatment of the neuroses, we attempt to reconstruct the early life of the dreamer. (*d*) Beyond this, dreams bring to light material which could not originate either from the dreamer's adult life or from his forgotten childhood. We are obliged to regard it as part of the *archaic heritage* which a child brings with him into the world, before any experience of his own, as a result of the experiences of his ancestors. We find elements corresponding to this phylogenetic material in the earliest human legends and in surviving customs. Thus dreams offer a source of human pre-history which is not to be despised.

But what makes dreams so invaluable for giving us knowledge is

the circumstance that, when the unconscious material forces its way into the ego, it carries along with it its own methods of working. That is to say, the preconscious thoughts in which the unconscious material has found its expression are treated in the course of dream-work as though they were unconscious portions of the id; and, in the case of the other method of the formation of dreams, the preconscious thoughts which have reinforced themselves with an unconscious instinctual impulse are reduced to the unconscious condition. It is only in this way that we can discover the laws that govern unconscious processes and the respects in which they differ from the rules that are familiar to us in waking thought. Thus dream-work is in its essence a case of an unconscious working-over of preconscious thought-processes. To take an analogy from History: invading conquerors govern a conquered country, not according to the judicial system which they found in force there, but according to their own. But it is undeniable that the product of dream-work is a compromise. The ego-organization is not yet entirely paralyzed, and its influence is to be seen in the distortion imposed upon the unconscious material and in what is often a vain attempt at giving to the total result a shape that shall be not too unacceptable to the ego (by means of a secondary working-over or *secondary elaboration*). In our analogy this would be represented as evidence of the continued resistance of the conquered people.

The laws governing unconscious processes, which come to light in this manner, are remarkable enough and suffice to explain the greater part of what seems strange to us about dreams. Above all there is a striking tendency to *condensation*, an inclination to form fresh unities out of elements which in our waking thoughts we should certainly have kept separate. As a consequence of this, a single element of the manifest dream often stands for a whole number of latent dream-thoughts, as though it were a combined allusion to all of them; and in general the dimensions of a manifest dream are extraordinarily small in comparison with the wealth of material from which it has sprung. Another peculiarity of dream-work, which is not completely divorced from the one already mentioned, is the ease with which mental intensities (or cathexes) are *displaced* from one element to another, so that it often happens that an element which was of no consequence in the dream-thoughts appears to be the clearest and accordingly the most important feature of the manifest dream, and, *vice versâ*, that essential elements of the dream-thoughts are repre-

sented in the manifest dream by only the faintest allusions. Moreover, as a rule the existence of the most insignificant points in common between two elements is enough to enable the dream-work to replace one by the other for every other purpose. It will easily be imagined how greatly the difficulty of interpreting a dream and of revealing the relations between the manifest dream and the latent dream-thoughts can be increased by these mechanisms of condensation and displacement. From the evidence of the existence of these two tendencies towards condensation and displacement our theory infers that in the unconscious id the energy is in a condition of free mobility and that the possibility of draining off quantities of excitation is of more importance than anything else to the id ;[10] and our theory makes use of these two peculiarities in defining the character of the primary process which we have ascribed to the id.

The study of dream-work has taught us many other equally remarkable and important characteristics of the processes in the unconscious ; but we can only mention a few of them here. The governing laws of logic have no sway in the unconscious ; it might be called the Kingdom of the Illogical. Impulses with contrary aims exist side by side in the unconscious without any call being made for an adjustment between them. Either they have no effect whatever upon each other, or, if they do, no decision is made, but a compromise comes about which is senseless since it embraces mutually exclusive elements. Similarly, contraries are not kept apart from each other but are treated as though they were identical, so that in the manifest dream any element may also stand for its contrary. Certain philologists have found that the same holds good in the oldest languages, and that contraries such as ' strong-weak ', ' light-dark ', ' high-deep ' were originally expressed by the same roots, until two different modifications of the primitive word separated the two meanings. Remains of this original double meaning seem to have survived even in such a highly-developed language as Latin in the use of words like *altus* (' high ' and ' deep ') and *sacer* (' holy ' and ' accursed ').

In view of the complication and multiplicity of the relations between the manifest dream and the latent material lying behind it, it may of course justly be asked how it is at all possible to deduce the

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[10] An analogy is afforded by the non-commissioned officer who accepts a reprimand from his superior in silence but vents his anger upon the first innocent private whom he happens to meet.

one from the other and whether we rely upon lucky guesses, helped perhaps by a translation of the symbols that occur in the manifest dream. It can be said in reply that in the great majority of cases the problem can be satisfactorily solved, but only with the assistance of the associations provided by the dreamer himself to the elements of the manifest material. Any other procedure is arbitrary and can give no certain result. But the dreamer's associations bring to light the intermediate links which we can then insert in the gap between the two and with the help of which we can recover the latent material of the dream and 'interpret' it. It is not to be wondered at that this work of interpretation (acting in a direction opposite to that of the dream-work) fails occasionally to find a completely certain conclusion.

It remains for us to give a dynamic explanation of why it is in the first instance that the sleeping ego takes upon itself the task of dream-work. That explanation is fortunately easy to find. Every dream in the making lays, with the help of the unconscious, a claim upon the ego for the satisfaction of an instinct (if it originates from the id) or for the solution of a conflict, the removal of a doubt or the making of a decision (if it originates from a residue of preconscious activity in waking life). The sleeping ego, however, is focused upon the wish to maintain sleep; it regards this claim as a disturbance and seeks to get rid of the disturbance. The ego achieves this by what appears to be an act of compliance: it meets the claim with what is in the circumstances the innocent fulfilment of a wish and thus disposes of the claim. This replacement of a claim by the fulfilment of a wish remains the essential function of dream-work. It is perhaps worth while to illustrate this by three simple examples—a hunger dream, a dream of convenience and a dream arising out of sexual desire. During his sleep a need for food stirs in the dreamer. He has a dream of a delicious meal and sleeps on. The choice, of course, was open to him of either waking up and eating something or continuing his sleep. He decided in favour of the latter and satisfied his hunger by means of the dream: at all events for the time being—since if his hunger had persisted he would have had to wake up all the same. Here is the second example. The sleeper must wake up in order to be in time for his work at the hospital. But he sleeps on, and has a dream that he is at the hospital—but as a patient, who has no need to get up. Or again, a desire arises during the night for the enjoyment of a forbidden sexual object—a friend's wife. The sleeper dreams of sexual intercourse—not, however, with this particular person but with someone

else of the same name to whom he is in fact quite indifferent ; or it may be that his reaction against the desire finds expression in his having a mistress who remains completely anonymous.

Naturally every case is not so simple. Especially in those dreams that arise from residues of the day before which have not been dealt with and which have merely reinforced themselves in the sleeping state from the unconscious, it is often hard to detect the unconscious motive force and its wish-fulfilment ; but we may assume that it is always there. The assertion that the dream is a wish-fulfilment will easily arouse scepticism when it is remembered how many dreams have a positively painful content or even wake the sleeper with anxiety, quite apart from the numerous dreams without any definite feeling-tone. But the objection based upon anxiety dreams cannot be sustained against analysis. It must not be forgotten that dreams are invariably the product of a conflict, a kind of compromise-formation. Something that is a satisfaction for the unconscious id may for that very reason be a cause of anxiety for the ego.

As the dream-work proceeds, at one time the unconscious makes its way forward more successfully, while at another time the ego defends itself with greater energy. Anxiety dreams are mostly those whose material has undergone least distortion. If the claim made by the unconscious is too great, so that the sleeping ego is not in a position to ward it off by the means at its disposal, it abandons the wish to sleep and returns to waking life. We shall be taking all our observations into account if we say that every dream is an *attempt* to put aside a disturbance of sleep by means of a wish-fulfilment. The dream is thus the guardian of sleep. This attempt can be more or less completely successful ; it can also fail—in which case the sleeper wakes up, apparently aroused by the dream itself. So, too, there are occasions when that excellent fellow the night-watchman, whose business it is to guard the little township's sleep, has no alternative but to sound the alarm and rouse the sleeping townspeople.

We shall conclude these remarks with a statement that will justify the long time we have spent over the problem of the interpretation of dreams. It has proved that the unconscious mechanisms which we discovered from our study of dream-work and which gave us an explanation of dream-formation also help us to understand the puzzling symptom-formations which attract our interest to neuroses and psychoses. A coincidence of such a kind cannot but excite high hopes in us.

Part II

THE PRACTICAL TASK

Chapter VI. The Technique of Psycho-Analysis

A dream, then, is a psychosis, with all the absurdities, delusions and illusions of a psychosis. No doubt it is a psychosis which has only a short duration, which is harmless and even performs a useful function, which is brought about with the subject's consent and is ended by an act of his will. Nevertheless it *is* a psychosis, and we learn from it that even so deep-going a modification of mental life as this can be undone and can give place to normal functioning. Is it bold, then, to hope that it must also be possible to submit the dreaded spontaneous illnesses of the mind to our control and bring about their cure?

We already possess much knowledge preliminary to such an undertaking. We have postulated that it is the ego's task to meet the demands of the three forces upon which it is dependent—reality, the id and the super-ego—and meanwhile to preserve its own organization and maintain its own autonomy. The necessary condition for the pathological states we have mentioned can only be a relative or absolute weakening of the ego owing to which it is unable to perform its tasks. The severest demand upon the ego is probably the keeping down of the instinctual claims of the id, and for this end the ego is obliged to maintain great expenditures of energy upon anti-cathexes. But the claims made by the super-ego, too, may become so powerful and so remorseless that the ego may be crippled, as it were, for its other tasks. We may suspect that, in the economic conflicts which now arise, the id and the super-ego often make common cause against the hard-pressed ego, which, in order to retain its normal state, clings on to reality. But if the other two are too strong, they may succeed in loosening the organization of the ego and altering it so that its true relation to reality is disturbed or even abolished. We have seen it happen in dreams: when the ego is detached from the reality of the external world, then, under the influence of the internal world, it slips down into psychosis.

Our plan of cure is based upon these views. The ego has been weakened by the internal conflict; we must come to its aid. The

position is like a civil war which, it is hoped, will be decided by the help of an ally from without. The analytical physician and the weakened ego of the patient, basing themselves upon the real external world, are to combine against the enemies, the instinctual claims of the id and the moral claims of the super-ego. We form a pact with each other. The patient's sick ego promises us the most complete candour, promises, that is, to put at our disposal all of the material which his self-perception provides; we, on the other hand, assure him of the strictest discretion and put at his service our experience in interpreting material that has been influenced by the unconscious. Our knowledge shall compensate for his ignorance and shall give his ego once more mastery over the lost provinces of his mental life. This pact constitutes the analytic situation.

No sooner have we taken this step than we meet with a first disappointment, a first warning against complacency. If the patient's ego is to be a useful ally in our common work, it must, however hard it may be pressed by the hostile powers, have retained a certain degree of coherence, a fragment at least of understanding for the demands of reality. But this is not to be expected from the ego of a psychotic; it cannot carry out a pact of this sort, indeed it can scarcely engage in it. It will very soon toss us away and the help we offer it, to join the portions of the external world that no longer mean anything to it. Thus we learn that we must renounce the idea of trying our plan of cure upon psychotics—renounce it for ever, perhaps, or only for the moment, until we have discovered some other plan better suited for this purpose.

But there is another class of psychological patients who evidently resemble the psychotics very closely, the immense number of sufferers from severe neuroses. The causes of their illness as well as their pathogenic mechanisms must be the same or at least very similar. Their ego, however, has proved more resistant and has become less disorganized. Many of them, in spite of their troubles and of the inadequacy caused by them, are none the less able to maintain their position in real life. It may be that these neurotics will show themselves ready to accept our help. We will confine our interest to them and see how far and by what means we can 'cure' them.

We conclude our pact then with the neurotics: complete candour on one side, strict discretion on the other. This looks as though we were aiming at the post of a worldly father confessor. But there is a great difference, for what we want to hear from our patient is not only

what he knows and conceals from other people, but what he does *not* know. With this end in view we give him a more detailed definition of what we mean by candour. We impose upon him the *fundamental rule* of analysis, which is henceforward to govern his behaviour to us. He must tell us not only what he can say intentionally and willingly, what will give him relief like a confession, but everything else besides that his self-observation presents him with—everything that comes into his head, even if it is *disagreeable* to say it, even if it seems *unimportant* or positively *meaningless*. If he can succeed after this injunction in putting his self-criticism out of action, he will provide us with a mass of material—thoughts, ideas, recollections—which already lie under the influence of the unconscious, which are often its direct derivatives, and which thus put us in a position to conjecture the nature of his repressed unconscious material and to extend, by the information we give him, his ego's knowledge of his unconscious.

But nothing could be further from the truth than that his ego is content to play the part of obediently and passively bringing us the material we require and of believing and accepting our translation of it. Very different things happen in fact, some of which we might have foreseen but others of which are bound to astonish us. The most remarkable is this. The patient is not satisfied with regarding the analyst in the light of reality as a helper and adviser who, moreover, is remunerated for the trouble he takes and who would himself be content with some such rôle as that of an Alpine guide on a difficult climb ; on the contrary, the patient sees in his analyst the return—the reincarnation—of some important figure out of his childhood or past, and consequently transfers on to him feelings and reactions that undoubtedly applied to this model. It soon becomes evident that this fact of transference is a factor of undreamt-of importance—on the one hand an instrument of irreplaceable value and on the other a source of serious dangers. This transference is *ambivalent* : it comprises positive and affectionate as well as negative and hostile attitudes towards the analyst, who, as a rule, is put in the place of one or other of the patient's parents, his father or his mother. So long as it is positive it serves us admirably. It alters the whole analytic situation and side-tracks the patient's rational aim of becoming well and free from his troubles. Instead of it there emerges the aim of pleasing the analyst, of winning his applause and his love. This becomes the true motive-force for the patient's collaboration ; the weak ego becomes strong ; under the

influence of this aim the patient achieves things that would otherwise be beyond his power ; his symptoms disappear and he seems to have recovered—all of this simply out of love for his analyst. The analyst must shamefacedly admit to himself that he set out upon a difficult undertaking without any suspicion of the extraordinary powers that would be at his command.

Moreover, the relation of transference carries with it two further advantages. If the patient puts the analyst in the place of his father (or mother), he is also giving him the power which his super-ego exercises over his ego, since his parents were, as we know, the origin of his super-ego. The new super-ego now has an opportunity for a sort of *after-education* of the neurotic ; it can correct blunders for which his parental education was to blame. But at this point a warning must be given against misusing this new influence. However much the analyst may be tempted to act as teacher, model and ideal to other people and to make men in his own image, he should not forget that that is not his task in the analytic relationship, and indeed that he will be disloyal to his task if he allows himself to be led on by his inclinations. He will only be repeating one of the mistakes of the parents, when they crushed their child's independence, and he will only be replacing one kind of dependence by another. In all his attempts at improving and educating the patient the analyst must respect his individuality. The amount of influence which he may legitimately employ will be determined by the degree of inhibition in development present in the patient. Many neurotics have remained so infantile that in analysis too they can only be treated as children.

Another advantage of transference is that in it the patient produces before us with plastic clarity an important part of his life-history, of which he would otherwise have probably given us only an unsatisfactory account. It is as though he were acting it in front of us instead of reporting it to us.

And now for the other side of the question. Since transference reproduces the patient's relation with his parents, it takes over the ambivalence of that relation as well. It almost inevitably happens that one day his positive attitude towards the analyst changes over into a negative and hostile one. This too is as a rule a repetition of the past. His obedience to his father (if it is his father that is in question), his wooing his father's favour, have their roots in an erotic wish directed towards him. Some time or other this demand will press its way up in the transference as well and insist upon satisfaction. But in the

analytic situation it must necessarily meet with frustration. Real sexual relations between patients and analysts are impossible, and even subtler methods of satisfaction, such as favours, intimacy, and so on, will be only sparingly granted by the analyst. A humiliation of this kind is taken as the occasion for the change-over ; the same thing probably occurred in the patient's childhood.

Therapeutic successes that take place under the sway of the positive transference are under the suspicion of being of a *suggestive* nature. If the negative transference gains the upper hand they are blown away like spray before the wind. We perceive with horror that all our trouble and labour hitherto have been vain. Indeed, even what we had taken for a permanent intellectual gain by the patient, his understanding of Psycho-Analysis and his reliance upon its efficacy, suddenly vanishes. He behaves like a child who has no power of judgement of his own but blindly believes whoever he loves and no one else. The danger of these states of transference evidently consists in the possibility of the patient misunderstanding their nature and taking them for fresh real experiences instead of reflections of the past. If he (or she) perceives the strong erotic desire that lies concealed behind the positive transference, he believes that he has fallen passionately in love ; if the transference changes over, then he feels himself insulted and neglected, he hates the analyst as an enemy and is ready to abandon the analysis. In both of these extreme cases he has forgotten the pact into which he entered at the beginning of the treatment and has become disqualified for continuing the common work. It is the analyst's task to tear the patient away each time from the menacing illusion, to show him again and again that what he takes to be new real life is a reflection of the past. And to prevent him from falling into a state in which he will be inaccessible to all evidence, the analyst takes care that neither the love nor the hostility reach extreme heights. This is achieved by forewarning the patient in good time of these possibilities and by not overlooking the first signs of their appearance. Careful handling of the transference is as a rule richly rewarded. If we succeed, as we usually can, in persuading the patient of the true nature of the phenomena of transference, we have struck a powerful weapon out of the hand of his resistance and have converted dangers into gains. For the patient never forgets again what he has experienced in the form of transference ; it has a greater force of conviction for him than anything that he can acquire in other ways.

It is a most undesirable thing if the patient *acts* outside the transference instead of remembering. The ideal conduct for our purposes would be that he should behave as normally as possible outside the treatment and express his abnormal reactions only in the transference.

The method by which we strengthen the patient's weakened ego starts by increasing his self-knowledge. No doubt this is not the whole story, but it is a first step. The loss of such knowledge means for the ego a surrender of power and influence ; it is the first tangible sign that the ego is being constricted and hampered by the demands of the id and of the super-ego. Thus the first part of the help we have to offer is an intellectual effort on our side and a request for collaboration on the part of the patient. We are aware that this first kind of activity must pave the way to another more difficult problem. We shall not lose sight of the dynamic side of that problem even during our preliminary work. We obtain our material from a variety of sources—from what is provided by the information given by the patient and by his free associations, from what he shows us in his transferences, from what we gather by interpreting his dreams and from what he betrays by slips or *parapraxes*. All of this material helps us to make constructions in regard to what happened to him but has been forgotten, as well as in regard to what is now happening in him without his understanding it. But we never fail in all this to make a severe distinction between our knowledge and his knowledge. We avoid telling him at once things that we have often discovered quite early, or we avoid telling him the whole of what we think we have discovered. We consider carefully the moment at which we shall impart the knowledge of our constructions to him ; we wait for what seems to be a suitable occasion—a judgement which it is not always easy to make. As a rule we put off telling him of a construction or explanation until he himself has so nearly arrived at it that only a single step remains to be taken, though that step is in fact the decisive synthesis. If we proceeded in another way and overwhelmed him with our interpretations before he was prepared for them, our information would either produce no effect or it would arouse a violent outbreak of *resistance* which would make the further progress of our work more difficult or might even threaten to stop it altogether. But if we have prepared everything properly, it often happens that our patient will immediately confirm our construction and himself recollect the internal or external event which he had forgotten. The more exactly the construction coincides with the details of what has been forgotten the

easier will be his assent. As regards this particular matter our knowledge will then have become his knowledge as well.

With the mention of resistance we have reached the second and more important part of our task. We have already heard that the ego protects itself against the incursion of undesirable elements from the unconscious and repressed id by means of anti-cathexes, which must remain intact if it is to function normally. The more hardly the ego feels itself pressed, the more convulsively it clings (in terror, as it were) to these anti-cathexes, in order to protect what remains of it from further irruptions. But such defensive trends do not by any means harmonize with the aims of our treatment. We desire, on the contrary, that the ego, emboldened by the certainty of our help, shall dare to take the offensive in order to reconquer what has been lost. And it is at this point that we become aware of the strength of these anti-cathexes in the form of *resistances* against our work. The ego shrinks from undertakings that seem dangerous and threaten unpleasure; it must be constantly spurred on and soothed down if it is not to fail us. This resistance, which persists through the whole treatment and is renewed with every fresh piece of work, has been named, though not quite correctly, *repression-resistance*. We shall hear that it is not the only kind of resistance that meets us. It is interesting to notice that in this situation the allegiance of the different parties is in a sense reversed: for the ego is struggling against our appeal, while the unconscious, which is in general our opponent, comes to our help, since it has a natural 'upward drive' and desires nothing better than to press forward across its ordained frontiers into the ego and into consciousness. The struggle which develops, if we gain our point and can persuade the ego to overcome its resistances, is carried through under our direction and with our assistance. Its outcome is a matter of indifference: whether it results in the ego accepting, after having made a fresh examination, an instinctual demand which it has hitherto repudiated, or whether it once more rejects it, this time finally. In either case a permanent danger has been disposed of, the compass of the ego has been extended and a wasteful expenditure of energy has been made unnecessary.

The overcoming of resistances is the part of our work which requires the greatest time and the greatest trouble. But it is worth while, since it brings about a favourable modification of the ego which will be maintained whatever the fate of the transference and will persist through the patient's life. And we have at the same time

worked in the direction of undoing the modification which had been brought about under the influence of the unconscious ; for whenever we have been able to detect its derivatives in the ego, we have drawn attention to their illegitimate origin and have urged the ego to eject them. It will be remembered that one of the essential conditions of our pact of assistance was that modifications of the ego of this kind, due to the intrusion of unconscious elements, should not have gone beyond a certain degree.

The further our work proceeds and the deeper our knowledge of the mental life of neurotics penetrates, the more clearly two new factors force themselves upon our notice which demand the closest attention as sources of resistance. Both of them are completely unknown to the patient, neither of them could be taken into account when our pact was made ; nor do they arise from the patient's ego. They can both be included under the one description of ' need to be ill ' or ' need to suffer ' ; but they are of different origins, though in other respects of a similar nature. The first of these two factors is the feeling of guilt or sense of guilt as it is called, in disregard of the fact that the patient does not feel it and is not aware of it. It is evidently the portion of the resistance contributed by a super-ego that has grown peculiarly severe and cruel. The patient must not be healthy, he must remain ill, for he deserves no better. This resistance does not actually interfere with our intellectual work, but it makes it ineffective ; indeed, it often allows us to remove one form of neurotic suffering but is ready to replace it at once by another one, or perhaps by an organic illness. The sense of guilt also offers an explanation of the cure or improvement of severe neuroses which we sometimes observe after real accidents : all that matters is that the patient should be wretched —in what way is of no consequence. The uncomplaining resignation with which such people often put up with their hard fate is most remarkable but also most revealing. In dealing with this resistance we are obliged to restrict ourselves to making it conscious and attempting the gradual demolition of the hostile super-ego.

It is not so easy to demonstrate the existence of yet another form of resistance, our means of combating which are especially inadequate. There are some neurotics in whom, to judge by all their reactions, the instinct of self-preservation has actually been reversed. They seem to have nothing in view but self-injury and self-destruction. It is possible that people who in the end do in fact commit suicide belong to this group. It must be supposed that in such people far-reaching

defusions of instinct have taken place, as a result of which there have been set free excessive quantities of the destructive instinct directed inwards. These patients cannot tolerate the possibility of being cured by our treatment and fight against it with all their force. But it must be confessed that these are cases which we have not yet succeeded in explaining completely.

Let us once more glance over the situation which we have reached in our attempt at bringing help to the patient's neurotic ego. That ego is no longer able to fulfil the task set to it by the external world (including human society). It has not access to all of its experiences, a large proportion of its fund of memories have escaped it. Its activity is inhibited by the strict prohibitions of the super-ego, its energy is consumed in vain attempts at fending off the claims of the id. Beyond this, as a result of the constant inroads of the id, its organization is impaired, it is internally split apart; it is no longer capable of any proper synthesis, it is torn by discordant impulses, unappeased conflicts and unsolved doubts. To begin with, we induce the patient's thus enfeebled ego to take part in the purely intellectual work of interpretation, which aims at provisionally filling the gaps in his mental resources, and to transfer to us the authority of his super-ego ; we stimulate it to take up the struggle upon each individual demand made by the id and to defeat the resistances which arise in this connection. At the same time, we restore order in his ego, by detecting the material and impulses which have forced their way in from the unconscious, and expose them to criticism by tracing them back to their origin. We serve the patient in various functions as an authority and a substitute for his parents, as a teacher and educator ; and we have done the best for him if, as analysts, we raise the mental processes in his ego to a normal level, transform what had become unconscious and repressed into preconscious material and thus return it once more to the possession of his ego. On the patient's side certain rational factors operate in our favour, such as the need for recovery which arises from his sufferings and the intellectual interest that we may awaken in him in the theories and revelations of Psycho-Analysis ; but of far greater force is the positive transference with which he meets us. On the other side there are fighting against us the negative transference, the ego's repression-resistance (that is, the unpleasure felt by it at undertaking the severe work imposed upon it), the sense of guilt arising from its relation to the super-ego, and the need to be ill caused by deep-going modifications in its instinctual economy.

Whether we regard a case as slight or severe depends upon the share taken by the last two of these factors. Apart from these, there are a few other factors that may be mentioned as having a favourable or unfavourable influence. A particular kind of psychological inertia, a sluggishness of the libido, which is unwilling to abandon its fixations, is by no means welcome to us ; the patient's capacity for sublimating his instincts plays an important part and the same is true of his capacity for rising superior to the crude life of the instincts as well as the relative power of his intellectual functions.

We shall not be disappointed, but on the contrary we shall find it entirely intelligible, if we are led to the conclusion that the final outcome of the struggle which we have engaged in depends upon quantitative relations, upon the amount of energy which we can mobilize in the patient to our advantage, in comparison with the amount of energy of the forces working against us. Here once more God is on the side of the big battalions. It is true that we do not always succeed in winning, but at least we can usually see why it is that we have not won. Those who have been following our discussion only out of therapeutic interest will perhaps turn away in contempt after this admission. But we are here concerned with therapy only in so far as it works by psychological methods ; for the time being we have none other. The future may teach us how to exercise a direct influence, by means of particular chemical substances, upon the amounts of energy and their distribution in the apparatus of the mind. It may be that there are other undreamt-of possibilities of therapy. But for the moment we have nothing better at our disposal than the technique of Psycho-Analysis, and for that reason, in spite of its limitations, it is not to be despised.

Chapter VII. An Example of Psycho-Analytical Work

We have formed a general picture of the apparatus of the mind, of the parts, organs and institutions of which it is composed, of the forces which operate in it, and of the functions which its different portions perform. The neuroses and psychoses are states in which disturbances in the functioning of the apparatus come to expression. We have chosen the neuroses as the subjects of our study because they alone seem to be accessible to the psychological methods of our approach. While we are endeavouring to influence them, we collect observations which give us a picture of their origin and of the manner in which they arise.

We will state in advance one of our principal findings. The neuroses have not, like, for instance, infectious diseases, specific determinants. It would be idle to seek in them for exciting causes of the disease. They shade off into what is described as the normal by a series of transitional steps; and on the other hand there is scarcely any condition generally recognized as normal in which it would not be possible to demonstrate neurotic traits. Neurotics have approximately the same innate predispositions as other people, they have the same experiences and they have the same problems to solve. Why, then, do they live so much worse and with so much greater difficulty and suffer in the process so many more feelings of unpleasure, anxiety and pain?

We have no need to feel at a loss for an answer to this question. It is *quantitative disharmonies* that must be held responsible for the inadequacies and sufferings of neurotics. The determining causes of all the varying forms of the mental life of men are indeed to be looked for in the interplay between inherited predispositions and accidental experiences. Now it may happen that one particular instinct is innately too strong or too weak, or that one particular capacity is stunted or insufficiently developed in life—and on the other hand it may happen that external impressions and experiences may make stronger demands upon one individual than upon another; and what the constitution of one person can deal with proves an unmanageable task for another. These quantitative differences are what will determine the variety of results.

It will very soon be said, however, that this explanation is unsatisfactory. It is too general, it explains too much. The ætiology that has been put forward applies to every case of mental suffering, misery

and disablement, but not every such state can be called neurotic. The neuroses have specific characteristics, they are misery of a particular sort. So we must after all expect to find specific causes for them. Or we might suppose that, among the tasks with which mental life has to deal, there are some in which it can especially easily fail ; so that the peculiarity of the phenomena of neurosis, which are often so very remarkable, might follow from that fact, without any necessity for withdrawing our earlier assertions. If it remains true that the neuroses do not differ in any essential respect from the normal, their study promises to afford us useful contributions to our knowledge of the normal. It may be that we shall thus discover the ' weak points ' in a normal organization.

The supposition we have just made finds confirmation. Analytic experiences teach us that there actually is one instinctual demand the effort at dealing with which most easily fails or meets with only partial success and that there is one period of life which comes into consideration exclusively or predominantly in connection with the origin of neuroses. These two factors—the nature of the instinct and the period of life—require to be treated separately although they are often enough interconnected.

We can speak with a fair degree of certainty about the part played by the period of life. It seems that neuroses are only acquired during early childhood (up to the sixth year), even though their symptoms may not make their appearance until much later. The infantile neurosis may become manifest for a short time or may be overlooked. In every case the subsequent neurotic illness follows on from the prelude in childhood. It is possible that so-called traumatic neuroses (brought about by excessive fright or severe somatic shocks such as railway collisions, explosions, etc.) are an exception ; their relation to the infantile factor has hitherto eluded investigation. It is easy to account for this preference for the first period of childhood. Neuroses are, as we know, disorders of the ego ; and it is not to be wondered at that the ego, while it is weak, immature and incapable of resistance, should fail in dealing with problems which it could later manage with the utmost ease. (Instinctual demands from within operate as ' traumas ' no less than excitations from the external world, especially if they are met half-way by certain predispositions.) The helpless ego fends off these problems by attempts at flight (by *repressions*), which turn out later to be ineffective and which involve permanent hindrances to further development. The damage inflicted upon the ego by its

first experiences may seem disproportionately great; but we have only to take as an analogy the difference in the effects produced by the prick of a needle upon a mass of germ-cells during segmentation (as in Roux's experiments) and upon the complete animal which eventually develops out of them. No human individual is spared such traumatic experiences; none escapes the repressions to which they give rise. These hazardous reactions on the part of the ego may perhaps be indispensable for the attainment of another aim, which is attached to the same period of life. In a few short years the little primitive must grow up into a civilized human being; he must pass through an immensely long stretch of human cultural development in an almost uncannily abbreviated form. This is made possible by hereditary predisposition; but it can scarcely ever be achieved without the additional help of education, of parental influence, which, as a precursor of the super-ego, restricts the activity of the ego by means of prohibitions and punishments and facilitates or compels the setting-up of repressions. We must not forget, therefore, to include the influence of civilization among the determinants of neuroses. It is easy, as we can see, for a barbarian to be healthy: for a civilized man the task is a hard one. The desire for a powerful and uninhibited ego may seem to us intelligible, but, as is shown by the times we live in, it is in the profoundest sense antagonistic to civilization. And since the demands of civilization are represented by family education, we must also remember to find a place in the ætiology of the neuroses for this biological character of the human species—the prolonged period of its childhood dependence.

As regards the other point—the specific instinctual factor—we come upon an interesting discrepancy between theory and experience. Theoretically there is no objection to supposing that any sort of instinctual demand whatever could occasion these same repressions and their consequences; but our observation shows us invariably, so far as we can judge, that the excitations that play this pathogenic part arise from the component instincts of sexual life. The symptoms of neuroses are exclusively, it might be said, either a substitutive satisfaction of some sexual impulse or measures to prevent such a satisfaction, and are as a rule compromises between the two of the kind that arise according to the laws operating between contraries in the unconscious. The gap in our theory cannot at present be filled; and our decision is made more difficult by the fact that most of the impulses of sexual life are not of a purely erotic nature but arise from alloys of the erotic

instinct with components of the destructive instinct. But it cannot be doubted that the instincts which manifest themselves physiologically as sexuality play a prominent and unexpectedly large part in the causation of neuroses—whether an exclusive one, remains to be decided. It must also be borne in mind that in the course of cultural development no other function has been so energetically and extensively repudiated as precisely the sexual one. Theory must rest satisfied with a few hints that betray a deeper connection—the fact that the first period of childhood, during which the ego begins to be differentiated from the id, is also the period of early sexual flowering which is brought to an end by the period of latency, that it can hardly be a matter of chance that this momentous early period subsequently falls a victim to infantile amnesia, and finally that biological modifications in sexual life (such as its double-phased onset to which we have just referred, the disappearance of the periodic character of sexual excitement and the transformation in the relation between female menstruation and male excitement)—that these innovations in sexuality must have been of high importance in the evolution of animals into men. It is left for the science of the future to bring together these isolated data into a new understanding. It is not psychology but biology that is responsible for this gap. We shall not be wrong, perhaps, if we say that the weak point in the organization of the ego lies in its behaviour towards the sexual function, as though the biological opposition between self-preservation and the preservation of the species had there found psychological expression.

Since analytic experience has convinced us of the complete truth of the frequent assertion that the child is father to the man and that the events of his first years are of paramount importance for his whole subsequent life, we should be especially interested if there were something that could be described as the central experience of this period of childhood. Our attention is first attracted by the effects of certain influences which do not apply to all children, though they are common enough—such as the sexual abuse of children by adults, their seduction by other children (brothers or sisters) slightly their seniors, and, what is unexpected, the impression produced by seeing or overhearing sexual behaviour between adults (their parents) mostly at a time at which one would not have thought they could either be interested in or understand any such impressions or be capable of remembering them later. It is easy to observe the extent to which a child's susceptibility is aroused by such experiences and how his own sexual impulses are

thus forced into certain channels which they can never again leave. Since these impressions undergo repression, either immediately or as soon as they seek to return in the form of memories, they constitute a precondition for a neurotic compulsion which will subsequently make it impossible for the ego to control the sexual function and will probably cause it to turn away from that function permanently. The latter reaction will result in a neurosis; if it is absent, various perversions will emerge, or the function—vastly important as it is not only for reproduction but for the entire shaping of life—will become wholly unmanageable.

However instructive such cases may be, our interest will be still more attracted by the influence of a situation which every child is fated to pass through and which follows inevitably from the factor of the length of the dependency of childhood and of life with the parents. I am thinking of the *Œdipus complex*, so named because its essential subject is found in the Greek myth of King Œdipus, which our good fortune has preserved for us in a version from the hand of a great dramatist. The Greek hero killed his father and married his mother. That he did so unknowingly, since he did not recognize them as his parents, constitutes a deviation from the analytical subject-matter which is easily intelligible and indeed inevitable.

At this point we must give a separate account of the development of boys and girls (of men and women), since it is now that the difference between the sexes finds psychological expression for the first time. We are faced here by the great enigma of the biological fact of the duality of the sexes: for our knowledge it is something ultimate, it resists every attempt to trace it back to something else. Psycho-Analysis has made no contribution towards solving this problem, which clearly falls entirely within the province of biology. In mental life we find only reflections of this great antithesis; and their interpretation is made more difficult by the fact, long suspected, that no individual is limited to the methods of reaction of a single sex but always finds some room for those of the opposite one, just as his body frequently bears, alongside the developed organs of one sex, the stunted and often useless rudiments of the other. For the purpose of distinguishing between male and female in mental life we assert an equivalence which is clearly insufficient, empirical and conventional: we call everything that is powerful and active male and everything that is weak and passive female. The fact of psychological bisexuality embarrasses all that we have to say on the subject and makes it more difficult to describe.

A child's first erotic object is the mother's breast that feeds him and love grows upon the prop of a satisfied need for food. To begin with, the child certainly makes no distinction between the breast and his own body ; when it has to be separated from his body and shifted to the '*outside*' because he misses it so often, it carries with it as an '*object*' part of the original narcissistic cathexis. This first object subsequently becomes completed into the whole person of the child's mother, who not only feeds him but also looks after him and thus arouses in him many other physical sensations pleasant and unpleasant. By her care of the child's body she becomes his first seducer. In these two relations lies the root of a mother's importance, unique, without parallel, laid down unalterably for a whole life-time, as the first and strongest love-object and as the prototype of all later love-relations—for both sexes. The phylogenetic foundation has so much the upper hand in all this over accidental personal experience that it makes no difference whether a child has really sucked at the breast or has been brought up on the bottle and never enjoyed the tenderness of a mother's care. His development takes the same path in both cases ; it may be that in the latter event his later longing is all the greater. And for however long a child is fed at his mother's breast, he will always be left with a conviction after he is weaned that his feeding was too short and too little.

This preface is not without its uses, for it will prepare our minds for the intensity of the Œdipus complex. When a boy, from about two or three years' old, enters upon the phallic phase of his libidinal development, feels pleasurable sensations in his sexual organ and learns to procure these at will by manual stimulation, he becomes his mother's lover. He desires to possess her physically in the ways which he has divined from his observations and intuitive surmises of sexual life, he tries to seduce her by showing her the male organ of which he is the proud owner. In a word, his early awakened masculinity makes him seek to assume, in relation to her, the place belonging to his father, who has hitherto been an envied model on account of the physical strength which he displays and of the authority in which he is clothed. His father now becomes a rival who stands in his way and whom he would like to push aside. If when his father is absent he is able to share his mother's bed and if when his father returns he is once more banished from it, his gratification when his father vanishes and his disappointment when he reappears are deeply felt experiences. This is the subject of the Œdipus complex, which Greek legend translated

from the imaginary world of childhood into a pretended reality. Under the conditions of our civilization it is invariably doomed to a terrible end.

The boy's mother understands quite well that his sexual excitement refers to her. Sooner or later she thinks to herself that it is wrong to allow this state of things to continue. She believes she is acting rightly in forbidding him to manipulate his genitals. The prohibition has little effect and at the most brings about some modification in his method of self-gratification. At last his mother adopts the severest measures : she threatens to take away from him the thing he is defying her with. As a rule, in order to make the threat more terrifying and more credible, she delegates its carrying out to the boy's father, saying that she will tell him and that he will cut the penis off. Strangely enough, this threat only operates if another condition is fulfilled, either before or afterwards. In itself it seems quite inconceivable to the boy that anything of the sort could happen. But if when he is threatened he is able to recall the appearance of female genitals, or if shortly afterwards he has a glimpse of them—of genitals, that is to say, which really lack this supremely valued part—then he takes what he has heard seriously and, coming under the influence of the castration complex, experiences the severest trauma of his youthful existence.[11]

The effects of the threat of castration are many and incalculable ; they affect the whole of a boy's relations with his father and mother and subsequently with men and women in general. As a rule the child's masculinity is unable to stand up against this first shock. In order to preserve his sexual organs he gives up possession of his mother

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[11] Castration occurs, too, in the Œdipus legend, for the blinding with which Œdipus punishes himself after the discovery of his crime is, by the evidence of dreams, a symbolic substitute for castration. The possibility cannot be excluded that a phylogenetic memory-trace may contribute to the extraordinarily terrifying effect of the threat—a memory-trace from the prehistory of the human family, when the jealous father would actually rob his son of his genitals if the latter interfered with him by his rivalry for a woman. The primæval custom of circumcision, another symbolic substitute for castration, is only intelligible if it is an expression of subjection to the father's will. (Compare the puberty rites of primitive peoples.) No investigation has yet been made of the form taken by the events described above among races and in civilizations which do not suppress masturbation among children.

more or less completely; his sexual life often remains permanently under the weight of the prohibition. If a strong feminine component, as we put it, is present in him, its strength is increased by the threat to his masculinity. He falls into a passive attitude to his father, of a kind such as he ascribes to his mother. It is true that as a result of the threat he has given up masturbation, but not the activities of his imagination accompanying it. On the contrary, since they are now the only form of sexual gratification remaining to him, he practises them more than ever, and in these phantasies, while he continues as before to identify himself with his father, he also does so, simultaneously and perhaps predominantly, with his mother. Derivatives and modified products of these early masturbatory phantasies usually make their way into his later ego, and play a part in the formation of his character. Apart from this encouragement of his femininity, fear and hatred of his father gain greatly in intensity. The boy's masculinity withdraws, as it were, into a defiant attitude towards his father, which in a compulsive fashion dominates his later behaviour in human society. A residue of his erotic fixation to his mother is often left in the form of an excessive dependence upon her, and this persists as subjection towards women. He no longer ventures to love his mother, but he cannot risk not being loved by her, since in that case he would be in danger of being betrayed by her to his father and handed over to castration. The whole experience with all its antecedents and consequences, of which our account has only been able to give a selection, undergoes a highly energetic repression, and, as is made possible by the laws governing the unconscious id, all of the contending emotional impulses and reactions then set going are preserved in the unconscious, ready to disturb the later development of the ego after puberty. When the somatic process of sexual maturity puts new life into the old libidinal fixations which had apparently been surmounted, sexual life will be disclosed as inhibited, incoherent and fallen apart into mutually conflicting impulses.

It is no doubt true that the impact of the threat of castration upon a boy's budding sexual life does not always have these dreadful consequences. Once again it will depend upon quantitative relations how much damage is done and how much avoided. The whole occurrence, which may no doubt be regarded as the central experience of the years of childhood, the greatest problem of early life and the most important source of later inadequacy, is so completely forgotten that its reconstruction during the work of analysis is met by the adult's

most determined scepticism. Indeed the objection to it is so great that it is sought to silence any mention of the tabooed subject and the most obvious reminders of it are met with the strangest intellectual blindness. For instance, one hears the objection made that the legend of King Œdipus has in fact no connection with the construction made by analysis: the case was quite a different one, since Œdipus did not know that it was his father whom he killed and his mother whom he married. What is overlooked in this is that a distortion of this kind is unavoidable if an attempt is made at a poetic handling of the material, and that there is no addition of foreign subject-matter but merely a skilful employment of the factors present in the theme. The ignorance of Œdipus is a legitimate representation of the unconsciousness into which, for adults, the whole experience has fallen; and the doom of the oracle which makes or should make the hero innocent is a recognition of the inevitability of the fate which has condemned every son to live through the Œdipus complex. Again, it was pointed out by supporters of Psycho-Analysis that the enigma of another hero of drama, Shakespeare's procrastinator, Hamlet, can be solved by a reference to the Œdipus complex, since he came to grief over the task of punishing someone else for what coincided with the subject of his own Œdipus wishes—whereupon the general lack of comprehension displayed by the literary world showed how ready the mass of mankind is to hold fast to its infantile repressions.[12]

Yet more than a century before the birth of Psycho-Analysis the French philosopher Diderot gave evidence of the importance of the Œdipus complex by expressing the difference between the primitive and civilized worlds in the following sentence: 'Si le petit sauvage était abandonné à lui-même qu'il conserva toute son imbécillité et qu'il réunit au peu de raison de l'enfant au berceau la violence des passions de l'homme de trente ans, il tordrait le cou à son père et coucherait avec sa mère.'[13] I venture to assert that, if Psycho-

[12] The name 'William Shakespeare' is most probably a pseudonym behind which there lies concealed a great unknown. Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, a man who has been regarded as the author of Shakespeare's works, lost a beloved and admired father while he was still a boy, and completely repudiated his mother, who contracted a new marriage soon after her husband's death.

[13] ['If the little savage were left to himself, keeping all his foolishness and adding to the small sense of a suckling the violent passions of a man of thirty, he would strangle his father and lie with his mother.']

Analysis could boast of no other achievement than the discovery of the repressed Œdipus complex, that alone would give it a claim to be counted among the precious new acquisitions of mankind.

The effects of the castration complex upon little girls are more uniform and not less profound. A female child has, of course, no need to fear the loss of a penis ; she must, however, react to the fact of not having received one. From the very first she envies boys its posesssion ; her whole development may be said to take place under the influence of her envy of the penis. She begins by making vain attempts to do the same as boys and later, with greater success, makes efforts to compensate herself for the defect—efforts which may lead in the end to a normal feminine attitude. If during the phallic phase she attempts to get pleasure like a boy by the manual stimulation of her genitals, it often happens that she fails to obtain sufficient gratification and extends her judgement of inferiority from her stunted penis to her whole self. As a rule she soon gives up masturbating, since she does not wish to be reminded of the superiority of her brother or playmate, and turns away from sexuality altogether.

If a little girl adheres to her first wish—to grow into a boy—in extreme cases she will end as a manifest homosexual ; otherwise she will show markedly masculine traits in the conduct of her later life, will choose a masculine vocation, and so on. The other road leads by way of an abandonment of her beloved mother : the daughter, under the influence of her envy of the penis, cannot forgive her for having sent her into the world so insufficiently equipped. In her resentment she gives her mother up and puts someone else in place of her as the object of her love—her father. If one has lost a love-object, the most obvious reaction is to identify oneself with it, to replace it, as it were, from within by means of identification. This mechanism now comes to the little girl's assistance. Identification with her mother can take the place of attachment to her mother. The little girl puts herself in her mother's place, as she has always done in her games ; she tries to take her place with her father and begins to hate the mother whom she has hitherto loved, and from two motives : from jealousy as well as from mortification over the penis she has been denied. Her new relation to her father may begin by having as its content a wish to have his penis at her command ; but it culminates in another wish—to have a baby from him as a present. The wish for a baby takes the place of the wish for a penis or at all events branches off from it.

It is an interesting thing that the relation between the Œdipus

complex and the castration complex should be so different—should, indeed, be just the opposite—in the case of women and of men. In men, as we have seen, the threat of castration brings the Œdipus complex to an end ; in women, on the contrary, we see that it is the effect of their lack of a penis that drives them into their Œdipus complex. It does little harm to a woman if she remains in her feminine Œdipus attitude. (The name of ' Electra complex ' has been proposed for it.) She will in that case choose her husband for his paternal characteristics and will be ready to recognize his authority. Her longing to possess a penis, which is in fact unappeasable, may be satisfied if she can succeed in completing her love for the organ by extending it to the man who bears it, just as earlier she progressed from her mother's breast to her mother as a whole.

If we ask an analyst what from his experience are the mental formations which in his patients have proved least accessible to influence, the answer will be : in a woman, the desire for a penis, in a man, the feminine attitude towards his own sex, which has, of course, as its precondition, the loss of his penis.

Part III

THE THEORETICAL YIELD

Chapter VIII. The Apparatus of the Mind and the External World

All of the general views and postulates which were brought forward in our first chapter were, of course, arrived at by laborious and patient detailed work of the sort of which we have given an example in the previous section. We may now feel tempted to make a survey of the increases in knowledge that we have achieved by work of this kind and to consider what paths lie open to us for further advances. In this connection we may be struck by the fact that we have so often been obliged to venture beyond the frontiers of the science of psychology. The phenomena with which we have had to deal do not belong only to psychology; they have also an organic and biological aspect, and accordingly in the course of our efforts at building up Psycho-Analysis we have also made important biological discoveries and have not been able to avoid making new biological assumptions.

But let us for the moment keep to psychology. We have found that it is not scientifically feasible to draw a line of demarcation between what is psychologically normal and abnormal; so that that distinction, in spite of its practical importance, possesses only a conventional value. We have thus established our right to arrive at an understanding of the normal life of the mind by studying its disorders —which would not be admissible if these pathological states, neuroses and psychoses, had specific causes, operating like foreign bodies.

The study of a mental disorder occurring during sleep, which is transient and harmless and which indeed performs a useful function, has given us the key to an understanding of the diseases of the mind which are permanent and injurious to life. And we may now venture to assert that the psychology of consciousness was no better able to understand the normal functioning of the mind than to understand dreams. The data of conscious self-perception, which were alone at its disposal, have proved themselves in every respect inadequate to fathom the profusion and complexity of the processes of the mind, to reveal their interconnections and so to arrive at the determining causes of disturbances of those processes.

We have adopted the hypothesis of a mental apparatus, extended in space, appropriately constructed, developed by the exigencies of life, which gives rise to the phenomena of consciousness only at one particular point and under certain conditions. This hypothesis has put us in a position to establish psychology upon foundations similar to those of any other science, such as physics. In our science, as in the others, the problem is the same: behind the characteristics (i.e. qualities) of the object under investigation which are directly given to our perception, we have to discover something which is more independent of the particular receptivity of our sense organs and which approximates more closely to what is supposed to be the real state of things. There is no hope of our being able to reach the latter itself, since it is clear that everything new that we deduce must nevertheless be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which it is simply impossible for us to set ourselves free. But in this lies the nature and limitation of our science. It is as though, in physics, we said: 'If we could see clearly enough, we should find that what appear to be solid objects are made up of particles of such and such shape and size, occupying such and such relative positions.' So we endeavour to increase the efficiency of our sense organs as far as possible by artificial aids; but it is to be expected that such efforts will fail to affect the ultimate result. Reality will always remain 'unknowable'. What scientific work elicits from our primary sensory perceptions will consist in an insight into connections and interdependences which are present in the external world, which can somehow or other be reliably reproduced or reflected in the internal world of our thoughts, and the knowledge of which enables us to 'understand' something in the external world, to foresee it and possibly to alter it. Our procedure in Psycho-Analysis is exactly similar. We have discovered technical methods of filling up the gaps in the phenomena of our consciousness, and we make use of those methods just as a physicist makes use of experiment. In this manner we deduce a number of processes which are in themselves 'unknowable' and insert them among the processes of which we are conscious. And if, for instance, we say: 'At this point an unconscious memory intervened', what this means is: 'At this point something occurred of which we are totally unable to form a conception, but which, if it had entered our consciousness, could only have been described in such and such a way.'

Our justification for making such inferences and interpolations

and the degree of certainty attaching to them of course remain open to criticism in each individual instance; and it is not to be denied that it is often exceedingly difficult to arrive at a decision—a fact which finds expression in the lack of agreement among analysts. The novelty of the problem is partly to blame for this, that is to say, lack of training. But there is besides this a special factor inherent in the subject itself; for in psychology, unlike physics, we are not always concerned with things which can only arouse a cold scientific interest. Thus we shall not be so very greatly surprised if a woman analyst who has not been sufficiently convinced of the intensity of her own desire for a penis also fails to assign an adequate importance to that factor in her patients. But such sources of error, arising from the personal equation, have, when all is said and done, no great significance. If one looks through old text-books upon the use of the microscope, one is astonished to find the extraordinary demands which were placed upon the personality of those who made observations with that instrument while its technique was young, and of which there is no question to-day.

We cannot undertake in this place to attempt a complete picture of the apparatus of the mind and of its functions; amongst other things we should find ourselves hindered by the circumstance that Psycho-Analysis has not yet had time to study all of those functions with equal attention. We shall therefore be content to give a detailed recapitulation of our account in the opening section.

The core of our being, then, is formed by the obscure id, which has no direct relations with the external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only through the medium of another department of the mind. Within this id the organic *instincts* operate, which are themselves composed of fusions of two primal forces (Eros and Destruction) in varying proportions and are differentiated from one another by their relation to organs or systems of organs. The one and only endeavour of these instincts is towards satisfaction, which it is hoped to obtain from certain modifications in the organs by the help of objects in the external world. But an immediate and regardless satisfaction of instinct, such as the id demands, would often enough lead to perilous conflicts with the external world and to extinction. The id knows no precautions to ensure survival and no anxiety; or it would perhaps be more correct to say that, though it can produce the sensory elements of anxiety, it cannot make use of them. The processes which are possible in and between the supposed mental

elements in the id (the *primary process*) differ largely from those which are familiar to us by conscious perception in our intellectual and emotional life ; nor are they subject to the critical restrictions of logic, which repudiates some of these processes as invalid and seeks to undo them.

The id, which is cut off from the external world, has its own world of perception. It detects with extraordinary clarity certain changes in its interior, especially oscillations in the tension of its instinctual needs, which become conscious as sensations in the pleasure-unpleasure series. It is, to be sure, hard to say by what means and with the help of what sensory terminal organs these perceptions come about. But it remains certain that self-perceptions—general feelings and sensations of pleasure-unpleasure—govern events in the id with despotic force. The id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle. But not the id alone. It seems as though the activity of the other departments of the mind are able only to modify the pleasure principle but not to nullify it ; and it remains a question of the greatest theoretical importance, and one that has not yet been answered, when and how it is ever possible for the pleasure principle to be overcome. The consideration that the pleasure principle requires a reduction or perhaps ultimately the extinction of the tension of the instinctual needs (that is, a state of *Nirvana*) leads to problems that are still unexamined in the relations between the pleasure principle and the two primal forces, Eros and the death instinct.

The other department of the mind, which we appear to know the best and in which we recognize ourselves the most easily, what is known as the *ego*, was developed out of the cortical layer of the id, which, being adapted for the reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact with the external world. Starting from conscious perception, it has brought under its influence ever larger regions and ever deeper layers of the id ; and, in the persistence with which it maintains its dependence upon the external world, it bears the indelible stamp of its origin (as it might be ' Made in Germany '). Its psychological function consists in raising the processes in the id to a higher dynamic level (perhaps by transforming freely mobile into bound energy, such as corresponds to the preconscious condition of things) ; its constructive function consists in interposing between the demand made by the instinct and the action that satisfies it, a thinking process which, after considering the present state of things and weighing up earlier experiences, endeavours by means of experimental actions to

calculate the consequences of the proposed line of conduct. In this way the ego comes to a decision whether the attempt to obtain satisfaction is to be carried out or postponed or whether it may not be necessary for the demand of the instinct to be altogether suppressed as being dangerous. (Here we have the *reality principle*.) Just as the id is directed exclusively to obtaining pleasure, so the ego is governed by considerations of safety. The ego has set itself the task of self-preservation, which the id appears to neglect. It makes use of sensations of anxiety as a signal to give a warning of dangers threatening its integrity. Since memory-traces can become conscious just as much as perceptions, especially through their association with verbal residues, the possibility thus arises of a confusion which would lead to a mistaking of reality. The ego guards itself by establishing a function for *testing the reality of things*, which can be allowed to fall into abeyance in dreams on account of the conditions governing the state of sleep. In its efforts to preserve itself in an environment of overwhelming mechanical forces, the ego is threatened by dangers that come in the first instance from external reality, but not from there alone. Its own id is a source of similar dangers and that for two different reasons. In the first place, an excessive strength of instinct can damage the ego in the same way as an excessive ' stimulus ' from the external world. It is true that such an excess cannot destroy it ; but it *can* destroy its characteristic dynamic organization, it can turn the ego back into a portion of the id. In the second place, experience may have taught the ego that the satisfaction of some instinctual demand that is not in itself unbearable would involve dangers in the external world, so that an instinctual demand of that kind itself becomes a danger. Thus the ego is fighting on two fronts : it has to defend its existence both against an external world that threatens it with annihilation and against an internal world that makes excessive demands. It adopts the same methods of protection against both, but its defence against the internal foe is particularly inadequate. As a result of having been originally identical with this enemy and of having lived with it since upon the most intimate terms, the ego has the greatest difficulty in escaping from the internal dangers. They persist as threats, even if they can be temporarily held in check.

We have heard how the weak and immature ego of the first phase of childhood is permanently damaged by the strain put upon it in the effort to ward off the dangers that are peculiar to that period of life. Children are protected against the dangers threatening them from the

external world by the care of their parents ; they pay for this security by a fear of *losing their parents' love*, which would deliver them over helpless to the dangers of the external world. This factor exercises a decisive influence upon the outcome of the conflict when a boy finds himself in the situation of the Œdipus complex, and the threat aimed against his narcissism by castration, reinforced from primæval sources, takes possession of him. Driven by the combined power of these two influences, of the immediate real danger and of the remembered phylogenetic one, the child embarks upon its attempts at defence (repressions), which are effective for the moment but nevertheless turn out to be inadequate when the later re-animation of sexual life brings a reinforcement to the repudiated instinctual demands. From the biological standpoint, then, it may be said that the ego fails in the task of mastering the excitations of the first sexual period, at a time when its immaturity made it incompetent to do so. We recognize the essential pre-condition of neuroses in this lagging of ego development behind libidinal development ; and we cannot escape the conclusion that neuroses could be avoided if the child's ego were spared this task, that is, if the child's sexual life were allowed free play, as happens among many primitive races. It may be that the ætiology of neurotic illnesses is more complicated than we have here described ; if so, we have at least brought into the foreground an essential part of the ætiological complex. Nor should we forget the phylogenetic influences, which are present somehow in the id in forms that we are not yet able to grasp, and which must certainly operate more forcibly upon the ego during the early period that is in question than later. On the other hand we begin to perceive that such an early attempt at damming up the sexual instinct, such a decided partiality of the young ego for the external as opposed to the internal world, arising from the prohibition of infantile sexuality, cannot be without its effect upon the individual's later readiness for cultural growth. The instinctual demands, being forced aside from direct satisfaction, are compelled to take new directions which lead to substitutive satisfaction, and in the course of these *détours* they may become desexualized and their connection with their original instinctual aims may become looser. And at this point we can anticipate the idea that much of our most highly valued cultural heritage has been acquired at the cost of sexuality and by the restriction of sexual motive forces.

We have been obliged repeatedly to emphasize the fact that the ego owes its origin as well as the most important of its acquired

characteristics to its relation to the real external world; and we are thus prepared to assume that the pathological states of the ego—those in which it most approximates once again to the id—are founded upon a cessation or slackening of that relation to the external world. This is in complete agreement with the clinical experience that the occasion for the outbreak of a psychosis is either that reality has become intolerably painful or that the instincts have become extraordinarily intensified—both of which, in view of the rival claims made by the id and the external world upon the ego, must produce the same effect upon it. The problem of psychoses would be simple and intelligible if the withdrawal of the ego from reality could be carried through completely. But that seems rarely if ever to happen. Even in conditions so far removed from the reality of the external world as hallucinatory confusional states, one learns from patients after their recovery that at the time in some corner of their minds, as they express it, there was a normal person hidden, who watched the hubbub of the illness go past, like a disinterested spectator. I do not know if we may assume that this is so in general, but I can report the same of other psychoses with a less tempestuous course. I recollect a case of chronic paranoia in which after each attack of jealousy a dream conveyed to the analyst a correct picture of the cause, free from any trace of delusion.[1] An interesting contrast was thus brought to light: for, while we are accustomed to discover from the dreams of neurotic patients jealousies which are alien to their waking lives, in the present psychotic case the delusion which dominated the patient's day-time existence was corrected by a dream. We may probably take it as being generally true that what occurs in all such cases is a *split* in the mind. Two mental attitudes have been formed instead of a single one—one, the normal one, which takes account of reality, and another which under the influence of the instincts detaches the ego from reality. The two exist alongside each other. The issue depends upon their relative strength. If the second is or becomes the stronger, the necessary condition for a psychosis is present. If the relation is reversed, then there is an apparent cure of the delusional disorder. Actually it has only retreated into the unconscious, as indeed we are driven to conclude from numerous observations showing that a delusion has existed ready-made for a long time before its manifest outbreak.

The view which postulates that in all psychoses there is a *split in the ego* could not demand so much notice, if it were not for the fact that it turns out to apply also to other conditions more like the neuroses

and, finally, to the neuroses themselves. I first convinced myself of this in cases of *fetishism*. This abnormality, which can be counted as one of the perversions, is, as is well known, based upon the patient, who is almost always male, not recognizing the fact that women have no penis, which is exceedingly distasteful to him because of the evidence it affords of the possibility of his being castrated himself. He therefore rejects the perception of his own senses, which showed him the absence of a penis in women's genitals, and holds fast to the opposite conviction. The rejected perception, however, does not remain entirely without effects, for, in spite of everything, the patient has not the courage to assert that he really saw a penis. He snatches hold of something else instead—a part of the body or some other object —and attributes to it the rôle of the penis which he cannot do without. It is usually something that he actually saw at the moment at which he saw the woman's genitals, or it is something which can suitably serve as a symbolic substitute for the penis. Now it would not be right to describe this process which accompanies the formation of a fetish as a split in the ego ; it is a compromise-formation aided by displacement, such as we have been familiar with in dreams. But our observations show us still more. The fetish was created with the intention of destroying the evidence for the possibility of castration, so that fear of castration could be avoided. If women, like other living creatures, possess a penis, there is no need to tremble for the further possession of one's own penis. Now we come across fetishists who have developed the same dread of castration as non-fetishists and re-act to it in the same way. Their behaviour, therefore, simultaneously expresses two contrary pre-suppositions. On the one hand they are denying the fact that they have perceived that there is no penis in women's genitals ; and on the other hand they are recognizing the fact that women have no penis and are drawing the right conclusions from it. The two attitudes persist side by side through their whole lives without affecting each other. Here is what may rightly be called a *split in the ego*. This circumstance also enables us to understand how it is that fetishism is so often only partially developed. It does not govern the choice of object exclusively but leaves room for a greater or lesser degree of normal sexual behaviour ; sometimes indeed it retires into a modest position or is limited to a mere hint. The fetishist, therefore, has never completely succeeded in detaching his ego from the reality of the external world.

It must not be thought that fetishism constitutes an exceptional

case in exhibiting a split in the ego ; it is merely a particularly favourable subject for study. We must return to our statement that the infantile ego, under the domination of the external world, disposes of undesirable instinctual demands by means of the so-called repressions. We can now supplement this by a further assertion that, during the same period of life, the ego often enough finds itself in the position of warding off some claim from the external world which it feels as painful, and that this is effected by *denying* the perceptions that bring to knowledge such a demand on the part of reality. Denials of this kind often occur, and not only with fetishists ; and whenever we are in a position to study them, they turn out to be half-measures, incomplete attempts at detachment from reality. The rejection is always supplemented by an acceptance ; two contrary and independent attitudes always arise and this produces the fact of a split in the ego. The issue once more depends upon which of the two can command the greater intensity.

The facts concerning this split in the ego which we have just described are neither so new nor so strange as they may at first appear. It is indeed a universal characteristic of the neuroses that there are present in someone's mental life, as regards some particular behaviour, two different attitudes, contrary to each other and independent of each other ; in that case, however, one of them belongs to the ego and the opposing one, which is repressed, belongs to the id. The difference between the two cases is essentially a topographical or structural one and it is not always easy to decide in the individual case with which of the two possibilities one is dealing. But they have something important in common, and it is this. Whatever defensive efforts the ego makes in warding off dangers, whether it is repudiating a portion of the external world or whether it seeks to reject an instinctual demand from the internal world, its success is never complete or unqualified ; there result always two opposing attitudes, of which the defeated, weaker one, no less than the other, leads to psychological complications. Finally, it is only necessary to remark what a small proportion of all these processes become known to us through our conscious perceptions.

Chapter IX. The Internal World

We have no way of conveying knowledge of a complicated set of simultaneous processes except by describing them successively; and thus it happens that all our accounts err in the first instance in the direction of one-sided simplification and must wait till they can be supplemented, reconstructed and so set right.

The picture of an ego which mediates between the id and the external world, which takes over the instinctual demands of the former in order to bring them to satisfaction, which perceives things in the latter and uses them as memories, which, intent upon its self-preservation, is on guard against excessive claims from both directions, and which is governed in all its decisions by the injunctions of a modified pleasure principle—this picture actually applies to the ego only up to the end of the first period of childhood, till about the age of five. At about that time an important change has taken place. A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been given up as an object and instead, by means of identification, taken into the ego—that is, has become an integral part of the internal world. This new department of the mind continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the corresponding people in the external world: it observes the ego, gives it orders, corrects it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken. We call this department the *super-ego* and are aware of it, in its judicial functions, as our *conscience*. It is a remarkable thing that the super-ego often develops a severity for which no example has been provided by the real parents, and further that it calls the ego to task not only on account of its deeds but just as much on account of its thoughts and unexecuted intentions, of which it seems to have knowledge. We are reminded that the hero of the Œdipus legend too felt guilty for his actions and punished himself, although the compulsion of the oracle should have made him innocent in our judgement and in his own. The super-ego is in fact the heir to the Œdipus complex and only arises after that complex has been disposed of. For that reason its excessive severity does not follow a real prototype but corresponds to the strength which is used in fending off the temptation of the Œdipus complex. Some suspicion of this state of things lies, no doubt, at the bottom of the assertion made by philosophers and believers that the moral sense is not instilled into men by education or acquired by them

in the course of social life, but is implanted in them from a higher source.

So long as the ego works in complete agreement with the super-ego, it is not easy to distinguish between their manifestations ; but tensions and estrangements between them become very plainly visible. The torments caused by the reproaches of conscience correspond precisely to a child's dread of losing its parents' love, which has been replaced in him by the moral function. On the other hand, if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something that would be objectionable to the super-ego, it feels its self-respect raised and its pride increased, as though it had made some precious acquisition. In this way the super-ego continues to act the rôle of an external world although it has become part of the internal world. During the whole of a man's later life it represents the influence of his childhood, of the care and education given to him by his parents, of his dependence on them—of the childhood which is so greatly prolonged in human beings by a common family life. And in all of this what is operating is not only the personal qualities of these parents but also everything that produced a determining effect upon them themselves, the tastes and standards of the social class in which they live and the characteristics and traditions of the race from which they spring. Those who have a liking for generalizations and sharp distinctions may say that the external world, in which the individual finds himself exposed after being detached from his parents, represents the power of the present ; that his id, with its inherited trends, represents the organic past ; and that the super-ego, which later joins them, represents more than anything the cultural past, of which the child has to pass through, as it were, an after-experience during the few years of his early childhood. It is scarcely likely that such generalizations can be wholly correct. Some of the cultural acquisitions have undoubtedly left a deposit behind in the id ; much of what is contributed by the super-ego will awaken an echo in the id ; many of the child's new experiences will be intensified because they are repetitions of some primæval phylogenetic experience. (' Was Du ererbt von Deinen Vätern hast, erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.' [' What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, acquire it to make it thine.']) Thus the super-ego takes up a kind of intermediate position between the id and the external world ; it unites in itself the influences of the present and of the past. In the process of establishing the super-ego we experience, as it were, an example of the way in which the present is changed into the past. . . .

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APPENDIX

[*There is an alternative and subsequent version of the discussion at the beginning of Chapter IV* (*dated October* 1938), *which we here reproduce in part.*]

. . . And now comes the remarkable thing. Everyone—almost everyone—was agreed that what is mental really has a common quality in which its essence is expressed ; and that is the quality of *consciousness*, unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious would thus be mental and, conversely, all that is mental would be conscious : this, it was asserted, is self-evident and to contradict it would be nonsense. Now it cannot be maintained that this decision threw much light upon the nature of what is mental ; for consciousness, one of the fundamental facts of our life, meets our researches like a blank wall : they can find no path to lead them further. Moreover the equation of what is mental with what is conscious had the unwelcome result of divorcing mental processes from the general context of events in the universe and of setting them in complete contrast to all others. But this would not do, since it could not long escape notice that mental phenomena are to a large extent dependent upon physical influences and have on their side the most powerful effects upon somatic processes. If ever human thought found itself in an *impasse* it was here. To find a way out, the philosophers at least were obliged to assume that there were organic processes parallel to the conscious mental ones, related to them in a manner which it was hard to explain, which acted as intermediaries in the reciprocal relations between ' body and mind ', and served to reinsert what is mental into the texture of life. But this solution remained unsatisfactory.

Psycho-Analysis escaped such difficulties as these by energetically denying the equation between the mental and the conscious. No ; consciousness cannot be the essence of what is mental. It can only be a *quality* of what is mental, and a transitory quality at that—one which is far more often absent than present. The essentially mental—whatever its nature may be—is unconscious and probably of a similar kind to all the other natural processes of which we have obtained knowledge. . . .

We regard the question of the relation of the conscious to the mental as now settled. Consciousness is only a quality of the mental

and moreover a transitory one. But there is one further objection with which we have to deal. We are told that, in spite of the facts that have been mentioned, it is not necessary to abandon the identity between what is conscious and what is mental; the so-called unconscious mental processes are the long recognized organic processes parallel to the mental ones. This, of course, would reduce our problem to an apparently indifferent question of definition. Our reply is that it would be unjustifiable and inexpedient to make a breach in the unity of mental life for the sake of propping up a definition, since it is after all clear that consciousness can only offer us an incomplete and broken series of phenomena. And it can scarcely be a matter of chance that it was not until the change had been made in the definition of mental that it became possible to construct a comprehensive and coherent theory of mental life.

Nor need it be supposed that this alternative view of the mental is an innovation due to Psycho-Analysis. A German philosopher, Theodor Lipps, declared with the greatest precision that the mental is in itself unconscious and that the unconscious is the truly mental. The concept of the unconscious has long been knocking at the gates of psychology and asking to be let in. Philosophy and literature have often toyed with it, but science could find no use for it. Psycho-Analysis has seized upon the concept, has taken it seriously and has given it a new content. By its researches it has led to a knowledge of characteristics of the unconscious mental which have hitherto been unsuspected and it has discovered some of the laws which govern it. But none of this implies that the quality of consciousness has lost its importance for us. It remains the one light which illuminates our path and leads us through the darkness of mental life. In consequence of the special character of our discoveries, our scientific work in psychology will consist in translating unconscious processes into conscious ones, and thus filling in the gaps in conscious perception . . .

ABSTRACTS

General

J. C. Flugel. 'Feeling and the Hormic Theory.' *Character and Personality*, 1939, Vol. VII, No. 3, pp. 211–229.

The value of the threefold classification of mental processes into the categories of cognition, affection and conation is generally approved, and one problem concerning their relations is singled out, namely, which comes first, feeling or striving.

Psychological hedonism puts feeling first, and the hormic theory the reverse; it implies that we possess certain drives which impel us to attain certain ends, and maintains that feeling is dependent on these.

The arguments for and against the hormic theory are discussed from the intellectual, æsthetic and sensory points of view, and the conclusion is drawn that it is unlikely that the theory of psychological hedonism, which once made such vast claims and is now reduced to the doubtful tenure of one tiny fraction of its original territory, will hold out permanently even here.

R. A. Macdonald.

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Ives Hendrick. 'The Ego and Defence Mechanism: A Review and Discussion.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1938, Vol. XXV, No. 4, pp. 476–497.

The author disagrees with Anna Freud chiefly in some of her formulations about adolescence.

(1) He questions the idea that adolescent genital activity in its ruthlessness and jilting shows fundamental incapacity for object relations. May it not be due rather to the attempt to escape strong genital anxiety?

(2) He questions whether fear of instinctual strength is due to increased instinctual strength. May it not become excessive in adolescence because the gratification of some specific impulse has been denied?

(3) Does ego development proceed with greater ease at the end of adolescence solely because of the diminishing of instinctual drive? Its more efficient development may be directly due to the experience of adolescence. The repeated attempts at differentiating phantasy from reality should teach the ego; and probably erotic tension is less apparent in maturity because the real object is more sharply distinguished from the phantasy.

(4) The real fallacy in Anna Freud's point of view lies in considering strength of the ego and strength of defences against instinct as identical.

There are executive functions of the ego as well as defensive functions. The executive ones secure instinctual gratification through real relationships. The neglect of the executive side of the ego leads Anna Freud into comparing adolescence and incipient psychosis.

Clara Thompson.

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D. K. Henderson. 'The Nineteenth Maudsley Lecture: A Revaluation of Psychiatry.' *Journal of Mental Science*, 1939, Vol. LXXXV, pp. 1–21.

This lecture is an attempt, twenty years after Maudsley's death, to reformulate the position of psychiatry in Great Britain. The province of psychiatry should embrace not only the psychoses, but every failure of the psycho-biological adaptive processes—psycho-neuroses, psychopathic states, deficiencies, delinquencies, etc. Within this province all relevant schools of thought (including the psycho-analytical) should share their interests, however legitimate their preferences. During the nineteenth century the pioneers of the Humane Period were succeeded by a number of enlightened physicians, who advocated a biological approach to psychiatric problems in the interests of mental hygiene. Meanwhile the influence of Kraepelin began to foster the development of clinical, as well as classificatory, interest. In the twentieth century physiological and pathological investigation has been accompanied by intensive psychological research on the part of Freud and Ernest Jones no less than Adolf Meyer and others. The distinctive aim of modern psychiatry is to help the individual to reach a better understanding of himself in the interests of adaptation; and for this we must chiefly thank (1) the analytical interpretative methods of Freud, and (2) the 'reaction type' formulations of Adolf Meyer. It is to psycho-analysis that psychiatry owes the discoveries, (1) that mental symptoms, which formerly seemed so meaningless, can be understood in terms of wish-fulfilment, as attempts to allay guilt, as protections against dangers, and even as expressions of nature's attempt to heal, (2) that mental disorder is due to a lesion in the unconscious bound up with a failure of the ego to deal with endopsychic conflicts largely centring round the sexual life, (3) that through 'fixation' and 'regression' the potential neurotic or psychotic has never successfully passed a given stage of infantile development. The Meyerian concepts are much less specialized, but practically more useful and more closely related to the problems of general medicine. Grave exception must be taken to superficial psycho-therapists, who seek to establish an artificial frontier between the realm of psycho-therapeutic practice and that of psychiatry; and, in this connection, 'the sophistry of T. A. Ross' is to be deprecated. The neurologist is still regarded as more respectable than

either the psychiatrist or the psycho-therapist and is himself loth to give up the treatment of neurotics ; but his training only qualifies him for the exclusion of organic lesions. By contrast psycho-analysis minimises the constitutional factor unduly. Medicine is thus less likely to progress through the introjection of psycho-analysis than through the adoption of wider psycho-biological principles. These principles form the groundwork of clinical psychiatry ; and, whilst not invalidating special forms of treatment, they constitute the foundation upon which all treatment should be based.

W. R. D. Fairbairn.

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H. Crichton-Miller. ' Resultant and Purposive in Psychiatry.' *Journal of Mental Science,* 1939, Vol. LXXXV, pp. 82–95.

The supreme need in psychiatry is the co-ordination of biological and psychological views—a synergic ætiology. In no field of medicine is there a greater conflict between the respective demands of scientific explanation and therapeutic aims. The appeal of pure causality leads many to prefer a false causality to a vague and complex conditionalism. It is a paradox that the most subjective of therapeutic techniques, i.e. psycho-analysis, should be based on a theory claiming complete objective validity. At the same time, in the illusory pursuit of scientific validity, the Freudian school renounces multiple ætiology, which involves not only the synergy of organic and psychic, but also the synergy of resultant and purposive factors. Thus, in his attempt to explain the phenomena of migraine in Chapter III of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life,* Freud seeks to preserve the integrity of the psychic sequence apart from the conditioning organic sequence, which he nevertheless recognizes. Similarly Ernest Jones seeks, in his classic work, to explain the nightmare categorically as ' an expression of a mental conflict over an incestuous desire ', although he apparently recognizes the possible influence of conditioning organic stimuli. By contrast, the author's own clinical experience leads him to regard the nightmare as essentially the result of somatic disturbance, whilst recognizing its content as the expression of affective and conative psychical patterns. He considers that a similar synergy of resultant and teleological factors must be recognized in the ætiology of all psychopathological conditions.

W. R. D. Fairbairn.

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Karl A. Menninger. ' The Psychological Factor in Disease.' *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic,* 1939, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 14–19.

The author discusses the reasons for the aversion of medical men to

the discussion of psychological concepts of disease. He points to the experimental evidence for the existence of physiological mechanisms by which psychological activity may result in organic damage, and he adds psychological and empirical evidence. He reiterates that there can be no such thing as a psychogenic illness, but equally there can be no such thing as a physiogenic or chemogenic or bacteriogenic illness. He sees the human being and his environment as a totality of interacting functions.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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Paul Schilder. 'The Psychology of Schizophrenia.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, pp. 380–398.

Ideas about the nature of perceptual, intellectual and emotional difficulties in schizophrenia are reviewed. The author is of the opinion that schizophrenia is an organic process of great lability continually modified by psychogenic sequences. The nature of the conflicts which possibly produce it is not proved, but it seems that an early threat of annihilation is important. The organic confusional states appearing during and after insulin shock and metrazol belong to another order from the states found in schizophrenia. The 'death threat' referred to by Jelliffe has its origin in organic occurrences, and the previous psychotic experiences seem of no importance to the patient. He gains objective but no psychodynamic insight from the experience and psychological help does not seem essential for the immediate curative effect. These organic methods of treatment seem at present more effective than psychological methods.

Clara Thompson

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Clinical

Melitta Schmideberg. 'The Rôle of Suggestion in Analytic Therapy.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, pp. 219–229.

There is a prejudice against the idea that suggestion is a part of psychoanalytic therapy. This prejudice may obscure the evaluation of the facts. There is probably a great variation in the use of suggestion by different analysts. Freud's view is that changes in the ego occur as a result of the transference, i.e. the influence of the analyst. The analyst's tolerant attitude towards instinctual manifestations influences through suggestion. Even analysts who rigidly avoid any verbal suggestion may by their detached impersonal manner be using affective suggestion, for the greater the atmosphere of unreality and mystery attaching to a person, the more suitable he is as a super-ego. The correctness of an interpretation

does not exclude its suggestive value. Patients often have a fear of suggestion and, therefore, it is more effective in an indirect form. Suggestive influence is harmful only if it prevents the freeing of impulses or if the analyst feels guilt for using it and tries to undo it. Implied suggestion appears in the analyst's standards of normality, belief in his method, etc. Most important is inexact interpretation. For example, if the defensive function of an act is pointed out before its libidinal and aggressive significance, we reassure the patient. Inexact interpretation may increase repression by minimizing or displacing to an unreal plane. It is important to realize that the influence of suggestion cannot be excluded since the relationship is a therapeutic factor.

Clara Thompson.

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Melitta Schmideberg. ' " After the Analysis . . ." ' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, Vol. VII, pp. 122–142.

The aims, rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious, of those seeking psycho-analytic treatment and the various phantasies concerning expected therapeutic results are discussed with illustrative case material. The analyst is warned to beware of his own unconscious aims, phantasies and attitudes, lest the sometimes amazing phenomena delude him with ideas of his own grandeur. The analyst should keep clearly in view that the purpose of analysis is a better self-adjustment and not necessarily extensive changes in the personality as a whole.

Lucile Dooley.

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C. P. Oberndorf. ' Psychoanalysis of Married Couples.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1938, Vol. XXV, No. 4, pp. 453–475.

One method frequently used as an attempt for the cure of a neurosis is marriage. Since marriage involves the situations which formed the basis of the original conflicts, it is not successful as a cure. On the contrary, it demands a capacity for self-denial and long-continued love ; and the neurotic's desire for inordinate attention for himself makes this impossible. The paper is based on the analysis of nine married couples. All nine couples had suffered from marital disharmony dating from soon after marriage. One couple sought treatment three years after marrying ; one as late as sixteen years after marriage. In only one couple was there marked discrepancy in age. There was no uniformity in the reaction to their parents in these individuals. Nine of the eighteen considered themselves disfavoured children. Five considered themselves favourite children. In eight of the nine couples there was no discrepancy in religious training. In six of the nine the social background of the husband and

wife were similar. Psycho-sexual problems proved to be the most powerful single factor of disharmony in the nine couples.

The technical problems of analysing both husband and wife are discussed. The importance of absolute neutrality is stressed. The fact that each partner will attempt to enlist the analyst's allegiance and at times consider him the enemy is brought out. It is thought that the problem is no more difficult than it is when there are two analysts and there is an attempt to pit the analysts against each other.

Clara Thompson.

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Michael Bálint. 'A Contribution to the Psychology of Menstruation.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1937, Vol. VI, pp. 346–352.

Menstruation may be interpreted as a conversion symptom uniting in itself opposing wishes and instinctual impulses, which may be described as genital-sexual excitation and defence against it. Material from case histories illustrates the interplay of these ambivalent impulses.

Lucile Dooley.

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H. Flanders Dunbar. 'Psychoanalytic Notes Relating to Syndromes of Asthma and Hay Fever.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, Vol. VII, pp. 25–68.

Certain similar characteristics were found to coincide with the syndromes of asthma and hay fever in the cases of one woman and two men who were analysed. These characteristics were: (1) disturbances of sexuality involving refusal of the female rôle in the woman, and feminine identifications in the men; (2) marked predominance of anal and oral sadistic material with sexualization of the respiratory function and increased olfactory interests; (3) protective rituals and phobias occurring during the periods of freedom from somatic symptoms and almost disappearing when the latter symptoms reappeared; (4) intense hostility with a tendency to overt expression of aggressiveness; (5) weak ego organization with poorly assimilated super-ego. A review of the literature of the past four years and a comprehensive bibliography are given.

Lucile Dooley.

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Ralph M. Crowley. 'Psychoanalytic Literature on Drug Addiction and Alcoholism.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, pp. 39–54.

Contributions to the understanding of drug addiction and alcoholism are summarized, for the most part in chronological order. Beginning with

Freud's first suggestions in 1905, certain aspects of the problem were discussed by various authors. Since Rado's paper in 1926, there have been more systematic attempts to deal with the problem of addiction in its own right. Modifications of psycho-analytic methods for its treatment have also been suggested by several authors in recent years. A comprehensive bibliography is appended.

Clara Thompson.

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I. Latif. 'Some Ætiological Factors in the Pathology of Stammering.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1938, Vol. XVII, pp. 307–318.

The differing ætiological factors as observed by the author in two cases of stammering are enumerated. Treatment based on these factors is reported to have been successful in both instances, giving further weight to a contention, derived from previous material, that claims to one universal ætiology or treatment of stammering are unjustifiable.

R. A. Macdonald.

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Aubrey Lewis. 'States of Depression: Their Clinical and Ætiological Differentiation.' *British Medical Journal*, October 29, 1938, No. 4060, pp. 875–878.

This paper is a survey of the present position in regard to the classification of states of depression. The general confusion prevailing in this matter is commented upon and to some extent explained. Glover's suggested classification is dismissed as an example of classification epitomizing theory and worthless to others. Psycho-analytical work in the field of depression during the last few years (for example, Schilder and Klein) has shed as little light on the topic of this discussion as have published studies in heredity, psychology or somatic pathology.

David Matthew.

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Children

Therese Benedek. 'Adaptation to Reality in Early Infancy.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, Vol. VII, pp. 200–215.

In the newborn, psychology and physiology cannot be separated. Because of the immaturity of the nervous system and the lack of development of inhibitions, the motor excitability of early infancy is greater than that of later life. The author describes the steps by which the patterns of response and narcissistic and libidinal cathexes develop in relation to the

care and attention received by the infant. For an understanding of the problem of providing the best environmental conditions there is great need for an analysis of the many and interdependent environmental factors, such as is suggested by this study.

Lucile Dooley.

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William G. Barrett. 'A Childhood Anxiety.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1937, Vol. VI, pp. 530–535.

A three-and-a-half-year-old boy developed an anxiety which was traced through the following stages: (1) A jealous and angry desire to bite in relation to his mother's pregnancy and his father's penis; (2) an obsessive interest in and fear of cutting instruments; (3) concern over his sister's lack of a penis; (4) a focussing of castration anxiety around his father's penis and a transformation of this into a fear of a wolf, or a hairy, biting animal. Spontaneous play and certain revealing experiences with his parents brought resolution of this specific fear, but a year and a half later new evidences of anxiety indicated that childhood fears must be allayed not once only but over and over again as they arise in many and varied forms.

Lucile Dooley.

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John Bowlby. 'The Abnormally Aggressive Child.' *The New Era*, September-October, 1938, pp. 230–234.

This is a popular exposition of modern psycho-analytical theories of excessive aggression. After remarking that some degree of aggression is normal, emphasis is laid on the importance of unconscious aggression springing from early situations such as privation, jealousy of a younger child or of parents. The rest of the article is given to a discussion of the defensive aggression arising from anxiety and guilt under the four headings: (1) Destruction following despair. (2) Aggression as defence against retaliation. (3) Aggression as a provocation. (4) Aggression as a result of making another child the scapegoat.

Author's Abstract.

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John Bowlby. Substitute Homes.' *Mother and Child*, April, 1939, pp. 3–7.

This paper, originally read at the Child Guidance Conference, 1939, is a psychological examination of the placement of children in foster homes, schools or institutions. It is emphasized that to take a child from its own home is a major psychological operation and not to be undertaken lightly. The emotional importance of the child's own home is discussed and

examples given of the disastrous effect on children under three of being removed from their mother to a foster mother. Practical conclusions derived from Child Guidance experience are: (1) That no small child should be placed away from his parents unless the mother has died or is actively cruel. (2) That, if a child has to be placed, the greatest care should be taken to see that the placement is final. (3) That in institutions an adult looking after children should not be changed. The psychological problems met with in foster homes are then discussed under (*a*) the foster parents' emotional difficulties, and (*b*) the foster child's emotional difficulties. It is pointed out that the majority of foster children, especially if small, are in a very disturbed emotional condition which needs understanding, if it is not to become chronic. No deep study of the psychopathology involved is attempted.

Author's Abstract.

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Eugene Eisner. ' Phantasy in Mal-adjusted Children as Observed in Three Cases at the Southard School.' *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, 1939, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 27–34.

Phantasy is defined as ' an imaginative expression of the emotional life, *conscious* for the most part, but characterized by a symbolic investiture and a cathartic function ' (reviewer's italics). The paper is concerned with the day-dreams of three difficult children and an attempt to understand them in terms of reaction to environmental deprivation; of confusion between reality, phantasy and dreams; of attempts to bridge the gap between ego-strivings and the reality situation, etc.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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Applied

Lawrence S. Kubie. ' The Fantasy of Dirt.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1937, Vol. VI, pp. 388–425.

The author describes the complex system of phantasies related to the reality of dirt which manifest themselves both in the structure of neuroses and in many significant aspects of normal adult life. The following subject headings show the scope of the discussion: The body as a dirt factory; Protection of the outsides from the insides; The unconscious hierarchies of dirt; The taboo on the apertures; Compulsive cosmetic compensations in woman; The forbidden interest in excretory functions; The relation to unreality feelings in women; Genitals as excrement; Sociological significance: the stratification of society; Family pride and shame; Critical review of the treatment of the concept of dirt in psycho-analytic literature; Redescription of the development of excretory habits and

attitudes; The significance of the change from the diaper to the pot; The significance of the warning against excrement for the evolution of the dirt phantasy; Dirt phantasies *v.* mutilation phantasies in the development of obsessional traits; Anthropological theory; The psychosexual implications of the dirt phantasy; Relation to social inhibitions. There is a bibliography of twenty-six titles.

Lucile Dooley.

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Otto Fenichel. 'The Drive to Amass Wealth.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, Vol. VII, pp. 69–95.

The drive to amass wealth exists only in certain definite social epochs. It is an instinctual drive which proceeds from the continual reciprocal action between external reality and the instinctual structure modified by it. The drive may be normal or abnormal in character; its absence in a person in our present society is considered abnormal. The motives leading to the amassing of wealth may be classified as: (1) rational motive; (2) the will to power; (3) the will to possess; (4) the sociological source. These motives are discussed in terms of the psycho-analytical theory of anal erotism and anal repressions, but with attention drawn to the sociological influences modifying these.

Lucile Dooley.

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Gregory Zilboorg. 'The Sense of Immortality.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, Vol. VII, pp. 171–199.

After discussing the general beliefs in and attitudes towards immortality and the peculiarities manifested in the conception of immortality, the author raises the questions: 'What are the instinctual forces which enter into play as soon as the problem of life and death is faced and finally solved in favour of immortality?' and 'Which topological units of the human personality play the decisive rôle in the solution of the problem?' He answers by an analysis of examples of behaviour in the presence of death, in which the interaction of ego and super-ego are evident. He concludes that the primitive ideal of immortality has evolved in the course of thousands of years into a sense of immortality, and this sense, acting as if it were a powerful independent impulse, plays a major rôle in the elaboration of our theories of social salvation and in the altruistic aspects of our communal life. In neuroses and psychoses the influence of the sense of immortality is indirect, making a kind of short circuit between its infantile residues and the impulses which it generates in our purely social adaptation.

Lucile Dooley.

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E. Kris and E. Gombrich. ' The Principles of Caricature.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1938, Vol. XVII, Parts 3 and 4, pp. 319–342.

This paper is based on an article by E. Kris, ' The Psychology of Caricature,' published in this JOURNAL, 1936, Vol. XVII. It deals with the historical problems of caricature from a psychological point of view.

Portrait-caricature is a surprisingly recent achievement in art. We have no evidence that it was practised before the late sixteenth century when it makes its appearance in the orbit of the Bolognese ' Academicians ', viz. the Carraccis. The comic type has, of course, a much older history, which leads back to the fertility demons of primitive cults. In the same way the derisive picture depicting an opponent hanging on the gallows contains an unveiled remnant of image-magic. But mocking distortion of individual physiognomy, without giving up the sense of likeness, is not used in the field of either comic or aggressive art before the rise of caricature in the period about 1600.

The first part of the paper is devoted to an attempt at explaining this fact. It cannot have been a lack of skill which made previous periods of unchallenged artistic fame shrink from the simple art of caricature. Nor is a sociological explanation satisfactory, because in writing the most witty personal satire was used long before caricature in the modern sense was introduced.

A psychological insight into the mechanism of caricature helps to clear the ground. The principles of caricature coincide with those of verbal wit as defined by Freud. In both cases the mechanisms of the primary process are used to bring about those changes which satisfy the aggressive impulse. In the same way as the verbal material, the images are subjected to condensation (e.g. with features of an animal), or reduced to mere ' tabs of identity '. Caricature is, in fact, nothing but a graphic joke. We are thus faced with the question : ' Why is it that so primitive a mechanism makes so late an appearance in pictorial art ? ' The answer must necessarily be a psychological one. If one examines the state of art in the period when caricature originated, *one* trait seems prominent : the concept of art has radically changed. It no longer means perfect craftsmanship, but vision. Platonic art theory helps to emphasize this point, and caricature has been described in platonic terms as a realization of a perfect deformity which reality could only hint at. But the changed notions concerning the aims and functions of art make themselves felt wherever art plays its part. Sociologically they help to free the artist and to raise him to the level of the privileged minds of scholars and poets. They give him freedom, since the artist is no longer bound to portray reality : he is entitled to give *his* vision of it. Even patterns are no longer regarded as mere ornamental fillings. They are turned to ' dreamwork ', bearing witness to the artist's

creative phantasy. Caricature easily fits into this framework. It is free play with the elements of reality.

This change in the social function of art in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century is interpreted in this paper as giving evidence of a decrease in the magic meaning of images. So long as this belief was valid, caricature, i.e. the transformation of an individual through vision, was taboo. Caricature, however, is still connected with this sphere of magic action. It is magic on a higher level. In transforming the likeness the artist has transformed the person for his public. He bewitches the mighty ones in delivering them to laughter.

Clinical experience tends to support this explanation. There are people who shrink from caricaturing because of anxiety of its implicit aggressive dangers; others who do not readily enjoy its humour because they lack the faculty of letting themselves down and indulging in the primitive pleasure of childish scribbling and cannot share in the regression to which the caricaturist invites them.

E. Kris.

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W. R. D. Fairbairn. 'The Ultimate Basis of Æsthetic Experience. *British Journal of Psychology*, 1938, Vol. XXIX, pp. 167-181.

Having considered the significance of the work of art as a product of artistic activity in a previous paper, the author now proceeds to consider the significance of the work of art as a source of æsthetic experience. For this purpose the so-called 'found objects' of the Surrealist are chosen as the starting-point of investigation. These 'found objects' are objects in which the Surrealist discovers a hidden symbolic significance dependent on the fact that they represent for him a union between the outer world of reality and the inner world of wish-fulfilment. Such a discovery is accompanied by an æsthetic experience, which leads the discoverer to isolate and preserve the symbolically significant object and so to effect a transition from the rôle of beholder to that of artist. In conformity with this transition, the 'found object' itself must be regarded as just a work of art and no more. There are reasons for concluding (1) that the historical origin of art is to be traced to the discovery of 'found objects' by prehistoric man, who subsequently made these the nuclei of works of art in the accepted sense, (2) that even the most developed forms of artistic creation merely represent an elaboration of the process whereby symbolically significant objects are discovered and perpetuated.

When we consider the æsthetic experience afforded by a 'found object' in isolation from the urge to perpetuate it as a work of art, we seem justified in concluding that *æsthetic experience is a specific emotional reaction occurring in the beholder when he discovers an object which functions*

for him symbolically as a means of satisfying his total unconscious emotional needs. The essential character of this experience remains unaffected, whether the ' found object ' belongs to the world of nature, where such objects are incidental, or the world of art, which is composed specifically of such objects. Where the contemplation of works of art is concerned, æsthetic experience depends upon the capacity of the beholder to identify himself with the artist and so to share the artist's discovery. Nevertheless the beholder may fail to identify himself with the artist either (1) because the artist's super-ego imposes so great a need for disguise that the symbolic reference of the work of art becomes completely obscured and no appeal is made to the beholder's repressed impulses (over-symbolization), or (2) because the artist's super-ego imposes so little need for disguise that the work of art barely reaches the stage of becoming symbolic at all and so fails to satisfy the demands of the beholder's super-ego (under-symbolization). In either case the work of art lacks sufficient symbolic significance to enable it to present itself to the beholder as a ' found object ' and æsthetic experience is precluded. In conformity with the author's previous conclusion that the creation of a work of art represents a restitution of objects menaced by the artist's repressed destructive impulses, it is further implied in the identification of the beholder with the artist that the æsthetic appeal of a work of art depends upon its capacity to present itself to the beholder, not only as a ' found object,' but also as a ' *restored object* '.

Author's Abstract.

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Erik Homburger-Erikson. ' Observations on Sioux Education.' *Journal of Psychology*, 1939, Vol. VII, pp. 101–156.

1. *The Trauma of Historical Change :* The Sioux Indians were hunters who followed the buffalo over the vast plains. They were accustomed to an abundance of game which became a legend overnight. The immigration of foreign people, the death of the buffalo and soil erosion destroyed the livelihood of the Indians, who learned to become dependent upon a feeding government. When the buffalo died, the Sioux died. They refused to identify themselves with the conquerors and found themselves as powerless in their situation as children are in the hands of frustrating adults. They dreamed the dreams of restoration and did not realize that the white man was going to stay in their country.

2. *Cultural Conscience on the Defensive :* The Indians refused the ' American Dollar Civilization '. The idea of storage is strange, money is distasteful to them. The white teachers complain : ' The Indian parents not only let their children masturbate, they teach them to masturbate.' This is answered by the Indians : ' The whites not only let their babies

cry, they teach them to cry.' This signifies the correspondence between prejudices and group virtues. Neurotic conflicts and symptoms are not present among the Indians because the white teacher has never really been accepted and does not represent in any way the parent's philosophy or the child's conscience. Indian children can live for years without open rebellion or any signs of inner conflict between two standards which are further apart than are those of any two generations or two classes in our culture. They show passive resistance, do not show neurotic tension or ' bad conscience '. The basic psychological problem of Indian education by whites is the strange inner security and inner personal harmony of the Indians which makes it possible for them to submit to white supervision without surrendering to it.

3. *The Training of the Sioux Child :* The only neurotic child which could be observed in the Sioux tribe was the child of an Indian who had spent most of his life in Germany. The Indian baby is nursed whenever he whimpers, day or night, and the father is not allowed to interfere with the baby's right to be suckled. Sexual intercourse between the parents is prohibited during the suckling period, even when, as happens very frequently, the child is nursed for three to five years. There is no systematic weaning in our sense. Probably the *child* succeeds in weaning the *mother*. The only thing which the mother objects to, by pushing the child away, is the child's attempt to bite the mother's breast. There is no thumb sucking among Indian children, but they like to click things against their teeth, which is probably in connection with the repression of oral sadism. Indian parents seldom threaten their children, and then only in one form: ' the white man will come and get you.' In regard to bowel and bladder training, the Indian children are allowed to attain spontaneously to a gradual compliance with the rules of modesty. So far as sexual education is concerned strict taboos are introduced when the sixth year is reached. From that time brothers and sisters may not speak to one another any more.

4. *Conclusion :* This anachronistic system of child training is the perpetual source of inner peace under desperate communal conditions. The Sioux Indian can wait for restitution. The Indian child is allowed to be an individualist while quite young : contrary to the educational system of the white man, who allows his child, but only after mechanical socialization, to develop into a rugged individualist.

Martin Grotjahn.

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Pryns Hopkins. ' Religious Beliefs and Practices in the Land of the Incas.' *Religions*, January, 1938.

This article, which was originally delivered as a public lecture at University College, London, in 1937, is based partly on the author's own

observations in Peru and partly on facts supplied by Dr. Salaman's articles in the *Journal of the Royal Horticultural Society*, and other sources. Among these Dr. Hopkins stresses a number which point to mechanisms with which the psycho-analyst is familiar, such as phallic symbols, myths which are birth-stories, survivals of totemism and expressions of neurotic anxiety. As an example of the first are notable the figurines of potato deities in which the eyes of the potato, realistically associated with that vegetable's fertility, are exaggerated, mutilated and treated grotesquely. The famous ' stone which cried blood ' is as phallic as the Kaaba at Mecca ; and the adjacent miles-long tunnel to the Temple of the Sun is remarkably like an oviduct. Birth myths crystallize around many Inca origins. Heroes spring out of a three-windowed temple, are planted by the sun-god on an island in Lake Titicaca or found a city on the spot where with one stroke they can drive a gold wedge into the earth. Among totem-animals the llama, so useful as a beast of burden, must prehistorically have been one ; and we have an ancient description by the Spaniard, Cieza de Leon, of a gorgeous procession and a ceremony of spilling the creature's warm blood over potatoes. Tsudi, as late as 1847, tells how men divided in parties to fight so that the women might collect blood to inter in the fields. But there were no human sacrifices. Salaman had noted that ' the native mentality seems to be one in which fear, suspicion, cruelty, melancholy and resignation are the guiding forces.' He could only suppose that it was a heritage of times when their ancestors immigrated *viâ* the lowlands and were ' moulded by the terrors of the jungle '. But the analyst will suspect other sources of neurotic anxiety.

Author's Abstract.

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H. S. Darlington. ' The Meaning of Head Hunting : An Analysis of a Savage Practice and Its Relationship to Paranoia.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, pp. 55–68.

A description of the customs of the head hunters of Northern Assam is given, with psycho-analytical interpretations in terms of sexual symbolism. The head of the enemy is symbolically a soul which insures the fertility of the fields and the woman. The ceremony of placing the head against the headtree in the centre of the village reproduces the act of coitus, and, at the same time, expresses identification with the father—the headtree, etc. All of the villages in the region live in a state of suspicion of each other. This is based on the real persecution which goes on. Each community hopes, by acquiring heads from the other communities, to take into itself all the values and power of the others. The mechanism is similar to that of paranoia.

Clara Thompson.

BOOK REVIEWS

Civilization, War and Death. Selections from three Works by Sigmund Freud. (The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1939. Pp. 102. Price 3*s.* 6*d.*)

This attractive little volume contains a selection from Freud's essay, 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', written during the last war, a long extract from *Civilization and its Discontents* and his letter to Einstein on the subject of 'Why War?' None of Freud's writings could be more appropriately re-issued at the present time. He was not a man to offer consolations, but the effect of reading his wise reflections must fortify the soul of anyone who is facing the grim realities of our times.

E. J.

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The Problem of Anxiety. By Sigmund Freud. Translated from the German by Henry Alden Bunker, M.D. (The Psychoanalytic Quarterly Press and W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1936. Pp. 165. Price $2.00.)

This book is an American translation of Freud's *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.* Many of us regard this book as the most valuable clinical one written by Freud in the last thirty years and we welcome the appearance of a translation of it. It is not appropriate to review here the contents of the book itself, which was published in 1926, since it should by now be familiar to every analyst. But we should like to congratulate the translator on his careful rendering of the original.

E. J.

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Thalassa. By Sándor Ferenczi. Translated by Henry Alden Bunker. (The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., New York, 1938. Pp. 110. Price $1.75.)

This is a translation of Ferenczi's well-known work *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie.* It is a work that many will consider displays most vividly some of Ferenczi's most valuable and least valuable qualities. One cannot deny that it has the quality of originality and daring, but whether that of critical power is as prominent is very much open to question. It is certainly good to see it translated for those who do not already know it and we shall hope that the stimulating elements in it may fall on fruitful soil.

E. J.

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Frigidity in Women. By Eduard Hitschmann, M.D., and Edmund Bergler, M.D. Translated by Polly Leeds Weil. (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., Washington and New York, 1936. Pp. 76. Price $2.00.)

This is a translation of a brochure, *Die Geschlechtskälte der Frau*, published in Vienna in 1934. It is written for a larger circle of physicians and is intended to introduce to them the fundamental idea of frigidity as a complex condition for the most part of psychological origin. This aim it fulfils admirably and we hope the book will be widely read.

After narrating what is known of the development of female sexuality, the authors describe eighteen distinct types of frigidity and also give an account of two analysed cases. Psycho-analytical considerations are in such a book naturally presented in broad outline without any attempt to discuss their extreme complexity. The authors are of opinion that a prognosis in such cases, when psycho-analytically treated, is good, but they unfortunately omit to discuss the difficult problem of refractory cases that are from time to time met with.

E. J.

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Psychotherapy. By Paul Schilder, M.D., Ph.D. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1938. Pp. 344. Price 15*s*.)

Dr. Schilder is well known as an exceptionally able psychiatrist and in this book he presents a work of considerable usefulness. Its chief value lies in its breadth of approach. The author writes in a masterly fashion on such matters as psycho-physiological relations and the symptomatology of organic disease.

The treatment of psycho-analysis is less satisfactory and is evidently portrayed from the outside. The description of the technique in itself betrays this. One is supposed to start an analysis by asking the patient to tell the history of his life. The next sentence to this contains the incompatible remark that ' the basic rule of free association has, of course, to be told to him at first.' We are told that ' in acute situations the analyst should refrain as much as possible from giving advice ', but we are not told whether this applies to acute situations only. Dr. Schilder's attitude in general towards psycho-analysis is a cool one. He writes : ' In practising psycho-analysis one has to keep in mind the fact that the method has still not been tried on a sufficiently large number of cases. The present technique is cumbersome, expensive, and is very often handled with an unnecessary rigidity.' Thirty years' work on the patients of hundreds of psycho-analysts has not made any deep impression on the author. This remark, however, is followed, in the usual ambivalent fashion, by another which says : ' However, the method is indispensable and Freud's

work is the basis of every psycho-therapeutic approach. Much of what is valid in modern psycho-therapy goes back to him and his co-workers.' The obvious ' most ' was presumably weakened to ' much ' in the last moment.

Dr. Schilder thinks little of Jung : ' I do not know whether Jungian psycho-therapy deserves the name of a psycho-therapeutic system and has any place in the treatment of specific cases.'

The most regrettable part of the book is the series of six questionnaires which the author suggests should be used in psycho-therapy. They contain an amazing number of extremely detailed leading questions, the application of which would effectually destroy any spontaneity : ' Do you like the smell of urine ? Do you want to be alone on the toilet ? Are fæces poisonous ? Do you ever want to cut off breasts ? Are you afraid that your testicles may get hurt ? Do you think there is something missing in the female organs ? How do you feel about worms ? What do you think about your buttocks ? Did you think your father was strong ? Did you ever wish to kill your father ? Did your father ever touch your anus ? '

E. J.

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Psychosomatic Medicine. Vol. I, No. 1. (National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 1939.)

We welcome this new Quarterly, which is published under the sponsorship of the Committee on Problems of Neurotic Behaviour of the National Research Council, Washington. It is devoted to the interesting and important borderland between the mental and somatic aspect of disease, with the inter-action of these aspects on each other.

The first number begins with a broad review by Alexander on the Psychological Aspects of Medicine. It contains a number of other papers, among which may be singled out two valuable studies on hypothalamic functioning ; the second one of these, by W. R. Ingram, is documented to the extent of 399 bibliographical references. Three studies on Essential Hypertension, by Alexander, Leon Saul and Edward Weiss respectively, also deserve special mention.

E. J.

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Sexual Freedom. By René Guyon. Translated from the French by Eden and Cedar Paul, with an introduction by Norman Haire, Ch.M., M.B. (John Lane, The Bodley Head, London, 1939. Pp. xiv + 344. Price 15*s.*)

M. Guyon is an able exponent of the extreme left wing of sexual reform.

He approaches the problems of sex from the point of view of 'integral rationalism', according to which sexual pleasure is healthy and desirable and therefore legitimately obtainable in any and every form, provided there is no interference with the rights of others; any attempt to curtail the opportunities for such pleasure, whether on religious, moral or legal grounds, being an unwarrantable interference with the liberty of the individual, which should be resisted by all who realize the immense importance of adequate sexual satisfaction for physical and mental well-being. The thesis is attractive in virtue of its bold and stark simplicity, and a reading of M. Guyon's book provides us with a salutary stimulus, inasmuch as it is calculated to make us realize very forcibly the tremendous gulf that exists between our actual attitude to sex, determined as this is by centuries of superstition and taboo, and the attitude that might ensue from a rational hedonism—an attitude such as might consistently have been adopted by some of the nineteenth-century hedonists, but which they would certainly have lacked the courage to advocate.

The purely rationalistic approach requires, however, to be supplemented by the psychological one, and it is here that M. Guyon's treatment, for all its brave discarding of the lumber of tradition, is apt to appear a little naïve. True, he sometimes recognizes that the power of the individual rationalist, even as regards the conduct of his own life, is limited, as when he says: 'The social organism is powerfully dominated by the taboo, and for the larger part of the time sexual freedom is an empty shibboleth. A strong head is needed if a man is to impose his own concept of sexual activity on a refractory world. . . . The person who thinks he has freed himself will find he has made a mistake, for he will discover that he is faced by a society organized to secure the supremacy of the taboo.' (p. 13). More often, however, he seems to consider that the effects of moral conflict and social disapproval can all be overcome by rational insight and a deliberate act of will: 'One who has whole-heartedly accepted the principle of legitimacy will lead a full, natural and happy sexual life, free from obsessions and anxiety. . . . He needs no effort to rid himself of the idea of sexual immorality, his enfranchisement in this respect having been the spontaneous outcome of his faith in legitimacy. . . . His mind is at ease from the moment he has conquered repression and the censorship.' (p. 57). Psycho-analysis has surely shown that it needs more than 'a trifling effort to achieve the conquest of repression' (p. 55), and we ourselves have to realize—with a sigh of resignation or relief, according to our attitude—that M. Guyon is somewhat over-optimistic as to the chances of our becoming 'integrally rationalistic', because he has failed to understand that repression is an unconscious process immune to the direct action of the will.

A similar ambiguity is found in the treatment of historical and socio-

logical data. From some passages the reader might be led to infer that sexual taboos are a feature only of western civilization and of the ' Judeo-Christian tradition ', and that in the east and in primitive societies there reigns, or reigned before the advent of the whites, a delightful freedom much nearer to the rationalist's ideal; but elsewhere we are told that ' the history of primitive communities is overlaid with taboos ' and that sparsely populated areas at all levels of culture are ' hotbeds of unceasing chit-chat ', where the degree of sexual freedom compares very unfavourably with the relative liberty enjoyed in contemporary London or Paris (p. 79). It would seem that M. Guyon's treatment suffers throughout from his failure to make a real effort to understand the rôle that repression and taboos have played in human life, both in the development of the individual and the growth and function of societies. As a social reformer his effort is like that of a psychotherapist who is content to point out to a patient the unreasonable nature of his fears and to draw attention to the satisfaction that would be within his grasp if he were free of them.

Even from the purely rational point of view, however, M. Guyon's exposition is diminished in value by the fact that he deals with sexual activity almost exclusively as the manifestation of a felt need and not as a biological or sociological function, such matters as birth control, the family, venereal disease, eugenics, population problems and economic conditions being scarcely mentioned, although they have a very obvious bearing both upon his general principle of sexual freedom and upon the special views he advocates in this book by way of application of these principles. To take two examples of the latter. He deprecates the adoption by women of spheres of work and professions which had till lately been the prerogatives of men, though this adoption is clearly to a large extent the result of economic factors, the repercussion of which on sexual life and sexual ethics needs to be considered before we pass judgement on the change in question. Again, he is eloquent in his praise of the advantages accruing from variety of sexual experience and frequent change of sexual partner—which, incidentally, he considers especially desirable in the case of psychologists (p. 300); but to the sociologist it is scarcely possible to discuss the merits of promiscuity without some consideration of its bearing upon the institution of the family and the care and upbringing of children, some methods of distributing the latter responsibility being, as Plato long ago realized, much more easily compatible with a polygamous standard of conduct than are others.

In all such matters, however, we must suspend judgement on M. Guyon's position, for the present volume is only the second in a projected series of six, in which he proposes to expound his whole system of sexual ethics. (The first volume appeared in its English edition, entitled *Sex Life and Sex Ethics*, in 1933, and was reviewed in the fifteenth volume of

this JOURNAL.) We are indeed promised a discussion in later volumes of the wider bearings of the principles enunciated in the two books that have so far appeared, and we shall await this discussion with much interest; though from the point of view of propaganda we might question the advisability of publishing what will inevitably appear to many readers as extreme views without any indication of how the more obvious objections to such views are to be met. So for the present we must content ourselves with enjoying M. Guyon's pungent and attractive exposition (for attractive much of it undoubtedly is in Eden and Cedar Paul's excellent translation) for the sake of its bravely consistent hedonism and for the healthy shock it is likely to administer to our prejudices and complacencies.

This volume, like its predecessor, belongs to the International Library of Sexology and Psychology, edited by Dr. Norman Haire, who contributes an Introduction in which he contrasts the present somewhat gloomy position of sexual reform (which, he points out, has regressed, more particularly in Germany, but to some extent in European countries generally) with the comparatively rosy prospects that existed in 1932 when the present book was written.

J. C. F.

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The Adrenal Cortex and Intersexuality. By L. R. Broster, Clifford Allen, H. W. C. Vines, Jocelyn Patterson, Alan W. Greenwood, G. F. Marrian and G. C. Butler. (Chapman and Hall, London, 1938. Pp. 245. Price 15*s.*)

The book is a symposium, by distinguished workers, on the various aspects of the subject. Part I, Section (a), by L. R. Broster, is devoted to the clinical study of the adreno-genital syndrome, described as 'the appearance of male secondary sex characters in the female, accompanied by a retrogression in the female secondary sex characters and sex function.' Its main symptoms are hypertrichosis and masculine distribution of hair, changes in bodily contours (tendency towards masculine forms), and changes in the female genitalia (diminution of size of external genitals, enlargement of clitoris, ovarian and uterine atrophy). There are several clinical types.

It was found that patients suffering from this syndrome present enlarged adrenal glands. Consequently, unilateral adrenalectomy has been performed in cases which did not respond to organotherapy. Thirty-three cases submitted to this operation are studied. Improvement is shown, in the form of a tendency towards disappearance of the acquired male characters and a return to feminine form and functions.

Section (b) of Part I, by Clifford Allen, is devoted to a psychological study of sexuality. It deals with the changes observed in the sexual

instinct after the operation. Some cases where homosexuality was present have changed into heterosexuals. In others an increased sexuality is observed. There are some, however, where no change occurs, which incidentally shows the complexity and multiplicity of the factors determining the psychological attitude to the sexes.

Part II is a scientific study of the syndrome. In Section (a) H. W. C. Vines deals with the histo-pathological side. He has attempted to find a feature common to all cases showing a reactivation of latent male characters due to hyperfunction of the adrenal cortical cells. The Ponceau-Fuchsin stain provided this common feature. In 34 out of 36 cases of adrenalectomy for clinical virilism, this method revealed the presence of ' a vivid red granular material . . . in the cytoplasm of cortical cells '. The reaction, thus, seems to be a specific one for the syndrome.

Then follows a detailed study of the adrenal gland from fœtal life onwards, and of its influence on virilism. The normal sexual mechanisms are analysed and the corresponding influence of the pituitary and adrenal glands. ' It is suggested that in the normal mechanism of sexual development the adrenal cortex plays the part of a bisexual accessory sex-gland . . . and that it secretes both androgenic and œstrogenic hormones under the control of the pituitary. At puberty the gonad-pituitary mechanism is superimposed on the adreno-pituitary mechanism.' ' The common type of pseudo-hermaphroditism is a sex inversion of the female due to a cortical androgenic hyperfunction occurring before the end of the fifth month of fœtal life.' ' Pituitary basophilism is an example of adreno-pituitary imbalance in which the pituitary is most probably at fault, the adrenal cortex being involved secondarily.'

Section (b) is a biochemical study of the syndrome, by Jocelyn Patterson, Alan W. Greenwood, G. F. Marrian, and G. C. Butler. In 11 out of 14 cases of adrenal virilism, there was revealed the presence in the urine of ' free ' male hormone, which is absent in the urine of normal females. The removal of one adrenal gland brings about a diminution or total disappearance of the ' free ' male hormone.

From this and other interesting findings the authors develop a theory ' to account for the presence of both male and female hormones in the urine of the two sexes '.

Finally, G. F. Marrian and G. C. Butler discuss the chemical constitution of the hormones of the adrenal cortex. From the urine of cases of virilism they have isolated a new substance, pregnane 3–17–20 triol.

It is, in fact, an extremely interesting book : one which contains very valuable work, representing a positive contribution towards the understanding of this complex problem.

Ignacio Matte Blanco.

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The Generations. By Emanuel Miller. (Faber and Faber, London, 1938. Pp. 276. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a book designed for the average intelligent reader. Its scope is clearly given in the first chapter, as follows : ' This study of the generations will attempt to make clear, not only the way in which the psychology of husband and wife as individuals affects their lives as parents, and how parents react upon their children, but, what is still more important, how the psychology of the child unfolds itself.'

Dr. Miller succeeds very well in this attempt, and has produced a book which should be helpful and stimulating to the lay reader. He has, on the whole, steered successfully between the Scylla of technicality on the one hand, and the Charybdis of superficiality on the other. There is a tendency to repetition, perhaps inevitable in any ' cyclical ' study, and this gives a slight impression of lack of sequence. It is difficult to understand, for instance, why there should be two separate chapters, one headed ' The Development of Child Character ' and the other ' The Development of Child Character in the Family '. If, however, these two chapters are taken together, they form a good description of the growth of the male and female personalities. This follows mainly psycho-analytic theory, and is put in such a way as to make it comparatively easy for the non-scientific reader to follow.

The book begins with a short, and necessarily selective, history of human marriage, and goes on to discuss temperament in men and women. Development is then traced through infancy, childhood, puberty and adolescence, until in its turn the child becomes a parent. Finally, there are two chapters devoted respectively to prophylaxis and to the future of the family.

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The Psychology of Early Growth. By Gesell and Thompson. (The Macmillan Co., New York. Price $4.00.)

This book is a continuation and elaboration of the studies of infancy reported in a previous publication in 1934, *Infant Behavior, its Genesis and Growth.* It combines the features of a monograph and handbook. Dr. Gesell states its purpose to be to furnish definite methods of behaviour examination in infants, and to provide norms of certain aspects of developmental behaviour which can be used in the analytic appraisal of behaviour for purposes of genetic research or for clinical diagnosis.

One hundred and seven infants were studied and reported on and 524 examinations were made. Twenty-four of these babies (12 boys and 12 girls) were examined consecutively at fifteen age levels, four to fifty-six months, to determine ' growth of behaviour '.

Part One describes in detail methods of selecting a homogeneous

group of babies. Their parents were of middle socio-economic status. Physical traits were considered, but character types and the emotional maturity of the parents as important stimulus factors in all post-natal reactions of the infant were not regarded. Careful description of the testing situation at the clinic is given, the approach to the child, the way in which stimulus material is presented (rings, bells, cubes and other inanimate objects). Anthropometric examination at the various age levels is made according to precise specifications.

Part Two brings together in elaborate tabulations the results of the examinations. Most valuable of these for the practical purpose of estimating gross behaviour deviations is the maturity level summary which gives the average behaviour at four-week intervals during the first year of life. The special items of behaviour considered are head, arm and leg posture and control, regard, prehension, vocalization and social response.

Part Three is a discussion of precautions to be considered in the diagnostic and prognostic use of the determined norms.

Dr. Gesell's point of view seems to be that mental growth and differentiation is determined predominantly by hereditary factors within the organism. The part played by parental activity or nurture in eliciting developmental behaviour and luring it to full expression is not considered. That the full and repeated use of the various sequences of behaviour is an important factor in later development is also not stressed. Motility seems to be regarded from the point of view of mature adaptations and not as various forms of instinctive striving towards the goal of self development.

The book contains valuable studies of certain phases of motor and perceptual behaviour and of tendencies to explore *inanimate* reality. One cannot help feeling surprise that with so much carefully controlled material at hand such highly important behaviour manifestations as (1) the establishment and course of sucking, (2) crying behaviour, both in relation to the stabilization of breathing on the physiological side and as an emotional expression, (3) elimination behaviour, and (4) responses to presence or absence of the mother, are left out or only casually mentioned.

For the diagnosis of latent brain disease or mechanical trauma the behaviour norms are of distinct value. For indications of instability which may be detrimental to good personality development they are not particularly helpful. This type of examination of infant behaviour is much like the performance tests given to older children to determine intelligence. The main criticism of it would be, particularly for the infant, that it gives so little consideration to the instinctual and emotional life whose full expression is always evidence of mental health.

Margarethe A. Ribble.

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Babies are Human Beings. By C. Anderson Aldrich and Mary M. Aldrich. (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1938. Pp. 124. Price $1.75.)

This little book contains some valuable information on infant development written in a pleasing and popular style for the modern parent. Its chief purpose seems to be to reassure the average adult as to the wisdom of the baby's ' way of doing things ' and to discourage rigid schedules and set standards of behaviour for the first months of life. The instinctual life and its course of development are not discussed, as such, so that the relationship of the various phases of behaviour dealt with is somewhat confused.

The authors develop an interesting idea about the smile of the infant, which they find becomes evident about the fourth week of life. The baby, who up to this time they consider as ' a frightened, serious, impulsively self-protecting ' individual, begins his first step toward psychic adjustment by smiling at his mother. He soon discovers that he can please his mother by smiling and with this first friendly contact he ' begins to use his brain '. The smile is closely linked up with vocalizing and the development of speech.

For parents who have not outstanding neurotic difficulties this book may be useful. For those who have to cope with anxiety in themselves and the child's reaction to it there are no suggestions.

Margarethe A. Ribble.

*

The Five Sisters : A Study in Child Psychology. By William E. Blatz. (William Morrow & Co., New York, 1938. Pp. 209. Price $2.50.)

This little book contains an interesting account of the life history of the Dionne Quintuplets but fails to supply the data and interpretation which the scientific psychologist eagerly seeks. It is fully illustrated with excellent photographs taken at various ages and in revealing situations. Nineteen charts and tables give information on physical variations such as identification marks, illnesses, motor development and mental and social progress, but we look in vain for information which might account for the differences developed by the members of this unparalleled group.

The daily routine of these children is modelled after the better type of nursery school with a great deal of planned play activity. Spontaneous play is provided for only in brief intervals and is evaluated more as an aid to motor co-ordination than as the expression of the instinctual problems of the child and as one of the best clues to his mental development. The philosophy expressed in this connection by the author is that the busy child is the happy child.

There is disappointingly little specific information about the first year

of life, no consideration of sucking activities or of sex interests or practices which might be of value in correlation to the individual emotional and intellectual development. In discussing eating and toilet training this statement is made : ' The secret of discipline is to expect a child to fit into a routine rather than worry about how to make him do it.'

The most interesting chapter from a psychological point of view is that entitled ' Clouds and Sunshine ', where emotion is discussed. The idea is well expressed that emotions have biologically a ' survival ' value, and that a close connection exists between emotion and learning. Temper tantrums are well discussed as regards superficial handling, likewise objective fear. Anxiety is not mentioned. Strangest of all is the fact that the love responses of these children are not considered. The impression is given that any positive emotional attachment cannot decently be mentioned.

The most obvious fact in this readable story is that these five children survived not only because of the professional wisdom of Dr. Dafoe and Madame de Kiriline, but because of remarkable instinctual and emotional traits in these two people which enabled them to act in the capacity of parent substitutes as well as of scientific directors.

Margarethe A. Ribble.

OBITUARY

EUGEN BLEULER

With the death in 1939 of Professor Bleuler, who, like Professor Freud, attained the age of eighty-three, there passes away not only a very distinguished psychiatrist but one of the few remaining links with the early days of Psycho-Analysis, in which he played a not unimportant part. In 1898 he succeeded his old chief Forel as head of the famous Burghölzli Asylum and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Zurich, a post which he held for thirty years. About 1905–6 he became interested in Freud's writings, stimulated at first by his assistant Jung whom he then encouraged to pursue his investigations into Psycho-Analysis. He was present at the first International Psycho-Analytical Congress in 1908, two years after he had written his pioneering work on *Affectivity, Suggestibility and Paranoia.* He was co-editor with Jung of the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische Forschungen,* the first psycho-analytical periodical. In 1910 he published his massive defence of Psycho-Analysis, but in 1914, before the German Society for Psychiatry, he read a paper full of criticism of it ; in the same year came his description of ' ambivalency ', one of the valuable concepts we owe to him. After this he drifted away from psycho-analytical circles and concentrated on his important studies of schizophrenia, a term we also owe to him. Many paradoxes in his work and personality become comprehensible if we suppose that his discovery of ambivalency arose from endopsychic perception. Thus it may be said that no psychiatrist has done more than Bleuler to inculcate the psychological point of view in the study of schizophrenia ; yet he maintained to the last that it was an essentially organic disorder. His description of autistic thinking was an original and classical contribution to psychopathology.

I saw much of Bleuler in those early days and we also participated together in the opening exercises of the Phipps Clinic and, a quarter of a century later, in those of the New York State Psychiatric Institute. He gave the impression of an earnest, puritanical and somewhat eccentric person, with a rather gentle loveableness. Like his predecessor Forel, he was an ardent prohibitionist. He was a man of much determination and originality. He broke away early from the German traditions in psychiatry, developed biological and psycho-

logical lines of thought that have now become generally accepted and he ranked latterly as a doyen of psychiatry in the world. Psycho-Analysis will remember him as one who supported Freud's work at a critical stage, the first academic teacher to do so, and who gave us several invaluable concepts.

E. J.

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OTTO RANK

Otto Rank died in New York in September 1939 at the early age of fifty-five. With him passes one of the most brilliant figures in the history of Psycho-Analysis, but also one of the tragic ones. From 1909 to 1924 he was, deservedly so, one of the most prominent figures in psycho-analytical circles. He presented himself one day to Professor Freud, bringing with him his first book *Der Künstler*, and at once made an impression of a keen and promising mind. Work of a secretarial kind was found for him, in Freud's private library, in the Vienna Society and, later, in the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; in all these capacities he displayed the utmost zeal and devotion. The Verlag was founded by a sum of money left by Dr. Anton von Freund, which Rank and I managed to smuggle into security during the chaos of 1919. For a few years Rank was the Verlag; without any assistance he saw personally to the printing (buying type, paper, etc.), publishing, editing and even the despatch of the parcels. What he achieved in this connection remains as a permanent possession of our libraries; his work there culminated in the publication of Freud's *Gesammelte Schriften*.

During these years Rank found time to publish himself an immense quantity of most valuable contributions to Psycho-Analysis, many of which are among the best known of our literature. I refer here to his writings on the 'family romance', the saving phantasy, the Doppelgänger, narcissism, symbolism, nudity, the folkloristic parallels to infantile sexual theories, and his many contributions to dream analysis. Then there was his fascinating *Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften*, written together with Hanns Sachs, his *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung* and above all his masterpiece *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage*, which appeared as early as 1912—an astonishing scholarly achievement for a young man of twenty-eight. It may truly be said that many of these contributions belong to the best classics of psycho-analytical writings.

Among other striking qualities Rank had a superlative facility, one hardly equalled, for interpreting unconscious material, especially in literary and mythical products; the ease of it actually bored him. Then he possessed a most remarkably wide knowledge of literature and mythology; to be complimented by him on the recondite sources of material was a compliment indeed. His grasp of the dynamic aspects of human nature, however, was more precarious and as soon as he began to deal directly with clinical material—he was perhaps the first lay analyst to treat adults—troubles arose.

Before the war Rank was a man of youthful appearance with an air of timid deference. Certain digestive symptoms decided him to come to England for analysis, but he was prevented by the outbreak of war. I did not see him again until it was over and found him an entirely changed person, a man of ruthless competency and resolute character—the type of a 'hard business man'. It fell to my lot to interpose objections to his plans of unfairly using England and America for the benefit of German scientific activities, laudable as this purpose was, and his reactions were such that they compelled me to realize he was a sick man. In 1924 he published, together with Ferenczi, their *Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse*, and, although the latter temporarily repudiated the lapse, it was becoming evident that both were destined to abandon the basic tenets of Psycho-Analysis. This conclusion was confirmed by the exaggerations of Rank's *Das Trauma der Geburt*, which appeared in the same year. He put in a momentary appearance at the Salzburg Congress of that year, but it was the end of his connection with Psycho-Analysis. The melancholia that was to cloud his later years had already begun and he spent the rest of his life—in Paris and New York—alternating between feverish endeavours to find some short and efficient form of psychotherapy and moods of apathetic depression. It was a sad close to a fruitful career, one so full of further promise, but at this time one can think only of our indebtedness to this brilliant person who for years showed such devoted zeal in his work for Psycho-Analysis and enriched that science with his brilliant gifts.

E. J.

*

HAVELOCK ELLIS

Havelock Ellis, the distinguished writer and social philosopher, died in 1939 at the age of eighty. This is not the place to speak of his many-sided activities in the service of science and culture, but

among them there were a few important contacts with Psycho-Analysis. He will be specially remembered in its history for two things. He was perhaps the first person in England to call attention to Freud's contributions to psychopathology, and also it was to him that we mainly owe the familiar terms ' auto-erotism ' and ' narcissism '.

The pioneer work that Havelock Ellis did in the investigation of sexual phenomena is well known. His remarkable shyness denied him direct access to clinical material, all his data being obtained by correspondence. His work, therefore, valuable as it was, hardly rose above the level of description and collation ; he was not able to throw much new light on the inner significance of the data he collected. To an analyst it was evident that he suffered from inhibitions that could not be overcome, and that his insight into the importance of Freud's work, which in a sense was in competition with his own, remained a partial one. This fact came more and more to expression as the laudations of Freud in his earlier writings were accompanied later on with increasingly sweeping modifications.

E. J.

*

WILFRED TROTTER

Mr. Wilfred Trotter, the distinguished surgeon and author, died in November 1939 at the age of sixty-seven. He was one of the first two or three in England to appreciate the significance of Freud's work, which I came to know through him. He was one of the rapidly diminishing group who attended the first International Congress at Salzburg in 1908. Though he followed the development of Psycho-Analysis to the end of his life (he revised the translation of the Moses book, for instance), he took no active part in it. He was himself, among many other things, an amateur psychologist of distinction and his endeavour to make out a case for the biological basis of the herd instinct aroused much attention. He was a member of the Council of the Royal Society that conferred their Honorary Membership on Professor Freud and he attended him medically after his removal to England.

E. J.

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MONROE A. MEYER

Dr. Monroe A. Meyer died in February 1939 in his forty-seventh year, having been born in New York in 1892. He graduated in 1916

and held an important post in the neuro-psychiatric division of one of the American base hospitals in France during the last war. In 1921–22 he studied with Freud in Vienna, and returned to practise in New York. From 1932 onwards he devoted himself to the work of building up the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. The following sentences are quoted from the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, 1939, pp. 139–140: 'His death takes from the New York Psychoanalytic Institute the man who more than any one else had given to it his time and thought and energy. It was his incessant watchfulness which made the Institute function smoothly and effectively. During the last seven years of his life, the major portion of his time had gone into the exacting task of guiding it in its growth from a small, informal unit with a dozen students to a highly organized teaching institution with seventy students. Those of his colleagues who had had an opportunity to know the depth of his analytic penetration and learning often regretted that during those years his scientific energies were not freer from the burden of these administrative responsibilities. He himself felt so keenly, however, that it was important to set the Institute firmly on its feet, that no personal sacrifice seemed to him too great to make. . . . His colleagues will hold him in grateful and affectionate remembrance always.'

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ALICE BÁLINT

It was with deep regret that members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society heard of the death at Manchester, in August 1939, of Mrs. Alice Bálint.

Her brief career—she was barely forty-one at the time of her death—began soon after the end of the last war in Berlin, where she was elected an associate of the German Psycho-Analytical Society in 1923. She later returned to her native Hungary and continued her training under Ferenczi, whose ideas and methods exercised a profound influence on her all through her life. In 1926 she became a member of the Hungarian society and was shortly afterwards elected to its Training Committee. Thereafter her activities were uninterrupted. Her scientific work, much of which was published in the various psycho-analytical periodicals, had a special bias in the direction of ethnological and educational interests. An Austrian colleague writes that 'she was especially well-known and appreciated in the countries

of Central Europe. The close contact of the Budapest group with those in Prague and Vienna would scarcely have been conceivable without her initiative and activity.'

She was elected a member of the British society in July 1939. Her colleagues in the country of her adoption had begun to learn something of the charm and liveliness of her personality and had looked forward to a future in which she would make many valuable contributions to their common work.

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STEFF BORNSTEIN-WINDHOLZOVA

We regret to record the death of Mrs. Steff Bornstein at Prague in July 1939. She had been a member of the German Psycho-Analytical Society until 1933, when she joined the Vienna society. She took an important part in building up the Psycho-Analytical group in the Czechoslovak Republic and also worked actively in the Seminar for Child Analysis at the Vienna Institute. Her published work was mainly concerned with child analysis and education.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIETIES

[The General Secretary regrets that, owing to circumstances arising from the War, the Reports from some Societies have not reached him in time for inclusion in the present Bulletin.]

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

1939

May 8 *to* 11. Dr. F. Alexander: 'Further Contributions concerning Specific Emotional Factors in Different Organ Neuroses.'

Dr. F. Deutsch: 'The Problem of the Choice of the Organ in Neuroses.'

Drs. T. Benedek and B. Rubinstein (by invitation): 'Correlations between Ovarian Activity and Psychodynamic Processes.'

Dr. L. E. Tower: 'Clinical Study of Two Analysed Cases of Psychogenic Amenorrhea.'

Dr. J. E. Finesinger: 'Psychoanalytic Notes in a Case of Pseudo-Hermaphroditism.'

Dr. A. Greig: 'Analysis of a Child with Chorea of Six Years' Duration.'

Dr. O. Fenichel: 'The Counter-Phobic Attitude.'

Dr. A. Reich: 'The Primitive Ego and its Relationship to Objects.'

Dr. H. I. Weinstock: 'Contribution to the Problem of Morbid Jealousy.'

Session on 'Schizophrenia':

Dr. F. Fromm-Reichmann: 'Transference Problems in Schizophrenias.'

Dr. H. Deutsch: 'Emotional Disturbances and their Relationship to Schizophrenia.'

Dr. M. R. Kaufman: 'Religious Delusions in Schizophrenia.'

Dr. K. Eissler: 'Contribution to the Psychoanalysis of the "Influence Machine".'

Drs. T. M. French and J. Kasanin: 'A Psychodynamic Study of the Recovery of a Few Schizophrenic Cases.'

Joint Session with the Section on Psychoanalysis of the American Psychiatric Association:

Dr. J. O. Chassell: 'Results of Psychoanalytic Therapy in a Mental Hospital.'

Dr. K. A. Menninger: 'Somatic Suicide—Total and Partial.'

Dr. S. Blanton: 'Analytic Study of a "Cure" at Lourdes.'

Joint Session with the Section on Psychoanalysis of the American Psychiatric Association :

Dr. S. Rado : ' Progress in the Psychoanalytic Treatment of the Neuroses.'

Dr. Leon J. Saul : ' Utilization of Early Current Dreams in Formulating Psychoanalytic Cases.'

Dr. R. Fliess : ' The Counter Transference.'

Dr. E. Simmel : ' Psychoanalytic Interpretation of a Court Case of Incendiarism.'

Dr. C. P. Oberndorf : ' Co-Conscious Mentation.'

Dr. F. Redl : ' A Few Contributions to the Psychoanalysis of Group Emotion and Leadership.'

Dr. B. Berliner : ' Libido and Reality in Masochism.'

Round Table Discussion : ' Rôle of the Psychoanalyst as an Advisor in Sexual and Marital Adjustment.'

L. S. Kubie.

THE BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1939

March 4. Dr. F. Wittels : ' Unconscious Phantom Formation in Neurotics.'

May 31. Dr. H. Deutsch : ' Emotional Disturbances and their Relationship to Schizophrenia.'

J. M. Murray.

THE CHICAGO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1938

October 15. Dr. H. B. Levey : ' A Metapsychological Hypothesis concerning Inspiration and Artistic Creation.'

October 29. Dr. R. Fuerst : ' A Case of Actual Incest with the Mother.'

November 12. Dr. L. J. Saul : ' Electroencephalograms and the Psychological Organization of the Personality.' Dr. R. Grinker : ' Studies on Corticohypothalamic Relations.'

December 3. Dr. M. Grotjahn : ' Dream Observations on a Two-Year-Four-Months-Old Baby.'

December 17. Dr. M. Grotjahn : ' Psychoanalytic Investigation of a Seventy-One-Year-Old Man with Senile Dementia.'

1939

January 7. Dr. G. Zilboorg : ' Ambulatory Schizophrenias.'

January 31. Dr. B. Kamm : ' The Analysis of a Case of Stuttering.'

February 17. Dr. P. Kramer : ' A Problem of Reality Adaptation.'

March 4. Short Communications : Dr. J. Kasanin : ' A Clinical Note on Misidentification.' Dr. L. J. Saul : ' A Note on the Nose as a

Feminine Symbol.' Dr. H. V. McLean: 'Remarks on Levin's "The Old Bunch" and Farrell's "Studs Lonigan".'

March 18. Dr. R. Sterba: 'The Significance of Theatrical Performance.' Dr. C. Bacon: 'An Incident of Pain of the Ulcer Type.'

April 22. Dr. W. H. Gantt (by invitation): 'Experimental Neuroses in Animals.'

May 20. Dr. J. Steinfeld: 'Contribution to Twin Psychology.'

June 5. Dr. A. Meyer: 'Correlations between Emotions and Changes in Carbohydrate Metabolism in a Case of Diabetes Mellitus.'

June 17. Dr. H. S. Lippman: 'Application of Psychoanalysis to Child Guidance Work.' Dr. M. Finley: 'The Results of a Play Period between Problem Children and their Parents.'

G. J. Mohr.

THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1938

October 18. Dr. R. Fliess: 'Review of Freud's "Analysis Terminable and Interminable".'

October 25. Dr. A. Kardiner: 'Analytic Observations on the Culture of the Marquesas Islands.'

November 15. Dr. R. Fliess: 'Review of Freud's "Analysis Terminable and Interminable",' continued.

November 29. Dr. F. Cohn (by invitation): 'Practical Approach to the Problem of Narcissistic Neuroses.'

December 20. Dr. S. Lorand: 'The Result of the Female-Penis Fantasy in Male Character Formation.'

1939

January 17. Dr. B. Mittelmann and Dr. H. Wolfe (by invitation): 'Further Investigations on Affect and Skin Temperature.'

January 31. Dr. J. H. W. Van Ophuijsen: 'Identification in Delinquency.'

February 21. Dr. C. M. Harold (by invitation): 'A Controversy about Technique; Comparison of the Methods of Theodor Reik and Wilhelm Reich.'

March 28. Dr. G. Zilboorg: 'The Discovery of the Œdipus Complex (Some Episodes from Marcel Proust).'

April 11. Special Meeting. Presentation of Papers by candidates for admission to the Society.

Dr. William H. Dunn: 'The Fear of Losing Control.'

Dr. Alva Gwin: 'Fixation at the Phallic Stage.'

Dr. Sidney Kahr: 'A Patient whose Parents Separated before his Birth.'

Dr. Emile Gordon Stoloff : ' Clinical Notes on Ejaculatory Inhibition.'

April 25. Dr. F. Wittels : ' Unconscious Phantoms in Neurotics.'

May 16. Dr. H. Nunberg (by invitation) : ' Ego Weakness and Ego Strength.'

G. E. Daniels.

THE TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1938

November 19. Dr. F. Moellenhoff : ' Some Psychoanalytic Observations on the Appeal of Mickey Mouse.'

1939

January 28. Dr. K. A. Menninger : ' Origins of Hate.'

February 25. Dr. L. Harrington : ' Learning in Psychoanalysis.'

March 25. Dr. E. Weiss : ' The Psychic Presence.'

April 29. Dr. E. Simmel (read by Dr. Knight) : ' The Criminal Neurosis ; Analysis of a Case of Lust Murder.'

May 27. Dr. R. P. Knight : ' Psychotherapy of Acute Paranoid Schizophrenia with Successful Outcome.'

June 24. Mrs. E. Fuchs-Heilpern : ' Psychoanalytic Techniques with Neurotic Children.'

R. P. Knight.

THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

1938

October. Dr. A. Stern : ' Psychoanalytic Investigation of and Therapy in the Border-Line Group of Neurosis.'

November. Mrs. L. Peller : ' The Child's Approach to Reality.'

December. Dr. B. Robbins : ' Prevailing Neurotic Attitudes to Work.'

1939

January. Dr. N. D. C. Lewis : ' An Attempt to Correlate Some Somatic Reactions and Psychoanalytic Data.'

February. Dr. E. Schachtel : ' Some Concepts of Psychoanalysis Applied to the Rorschach Method.'

March. Dr. C. Thompson : ' Identification with the Enemy with Loss of the Sense of Self.'

April. Dr. F. Wittels : ' Unconscious Phantoms in Neurotics.'

A. L. Stoughton.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

October 5. Dr. S. M. Payne : ' The Psychology of the Fetishist.'

October 19. Mrs. M. Klein : ' Mourning and its Relation to Manic Depressive States.'

November 2. Dr. B. Lantos: 'Work in Relation to the Theory of Instinct.'

November 17. Symposium on 'Psycho-Analytical Aspects of the War Crisis.' Contributors: Miss E. F. Sharpe, Dr. M. Brierley, Dr. S. M. Payne, Dr. M. Schmideberg.

December 7. Mrs. S. Isaacs: 'Temper Tantrums in Early Childhood in their Relation to Internal Objects.'

1939

January 18. Dr. K. Friedlander: 'On the "Longing to Die".'

February 1. Dr. I. Matte Blanco: 'Some Reflections on Psycho-Dynamics.'

February 15. Dr. M. Brierley: 'Scientific Method and Psycho-Analysis.'

March 1. Dr. E. Stengel: 'On Acquiring a New Language.'

March 15. Dr. A. Bálint: 'Altruism, Aggression and Reality Sense.'

April 19. Dr. M. Schmideberg: 'On Querulance.'

May 3. Dr. J. Bowlby: 'The Environmental Factor in the Development of Neurosis and Neurotic Children.'

May 25. Discussion of War Mental Emergency Measures. Mr. E. Kris: 'Summary of Relevant Literature'; Dr. E. Glover: 'Outline of Existing Approved Schemes'; Mr. W. Schmideberg: 'Treatment of Panic in Casualty Areas and Clearing Stations'; Drs. Carroll, Scott and Gillespie: 'Treatment of Acute States in Hospital'—'Differential Treatment of Pathological Types'—'Importance of Early Diagnosis'; Dr. J. Rickman: 'On Varieties of Treatment.'

June 7. Continued discussion on Treatment of Sub-Acute and Chronic War Neurosis. Dr. E. Bibring: 'Summary of Relevant Literature' by the Bibliographical Centre; Dr. E. Glover: 'Further Report on Organization'; Dr. W. A. Brend: 'Administrative Problems'; Dr. Mira (by invitation); 'War Experience in Spain'; Dr. S. M. Payne: 'Treatment of "Shock" by Hypnosis with or without Light Anæsthesia and Drugs'; Dr. D. Carroll: 'Report of Sub-Committee on Treatment of Acute States with Special Reference to Drug Treatment.'

June 30. Joint Meeting with Members of the French Psycho-Analytical Society. Miss A. Freud: 'Sublimation and Sexualization.'

July 5. Dr. P. Heimann: 'A Contribution to the Problem of Sublimation.'

E. Glover.

DANISH-NORWEGIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1939

February 9. Mrs. H. Simonsen: 'Case Histories.'

March 16. Dr. L. Liebeck: 'Case Histories.'

March 30. Dr. L. Liebeck : ' Case Histories,' continuation.

May 25. Miss Guenther (by invitation) : ' Case Histories.'

Hj. Simonsen.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1939

January 14. Dr. K. Landauer : ' Pathological Regressions to Early Stages of Ego Development.'

February 18. Dr. H. Lampl : ' Some Analogies in the Behaviour of Birds to Psychic Mechanisms in Man.'

April 15. Dr. M. Katan : ' On Jealousy.'

May 20. Dr. Feith : ' On Schizophrenic Thinking with Reference to Some Verses of Chr. Morgenstern.'

Dr. v. d. Heide : ' Review of Psycho-Analytical Concepts of Organ Neuroses.'

A. M. Blok.

FINNISH-SWEDISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

September 12. Dr. G. Nycander : ' Experiences from the Activity at the Erica Institution.'

October 3. Dr. G. Nycander : ' The Importance of Environmental Changes in the Treatment of Neuroses in Childhood.'

October 14. Dr. N. Nielsen : ' A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Oral Phase.'

December 10 (at Gothenburg). Dr. G. Gerö (by invitation) : ' Criteria of Exact Interpretation.' Mrs. Elster (by invitation) : ' The Position of Psycho-Analysis in Norway.'

December 11 (at Gothenburg). Dr. A. Tamm : ' A Case of Female Homosexuality.'

1939

January 23. Dr. A. Tamm : ' The Present Position of Psycho-Analysis in Norway.' Discussion on Dr. G. Nycander's paper : ' On the Genesis, Symptoms and Psychodynamics of Anxiety States.'

February 13. Dr. E. Lindbäck (by invitation) : ' A Case of Writing Disturbance.'

March 7. Discussion on the Attitude of the Society Regarding Possible Training of Lay Analysts.

June 5. Discussion on Training of Lay Analysts, continued. Dr. T. Sandström : ' The Psycho-Analytical Theory of Instincts.'

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

October 25. Dr. Lacan : ' From Instinct to Complex.'

November 15. Dr. Borel : ' Indications and Contra-Indications for Psycho-Analysis.'

December 20. Dr. Hartmann: 'The Psycho-Analytical Concept of Health.'

1939

January 17. Dr. Odier: 'Health and "Double Motivation".'

February 21. Dr. Carcamo: 'The Worship of the "Plumed Serpent" among the Ancient Maya-Aztecs.'

March 21. Dr. Allendy: '"Ragging" in Schools.'

May 16. Dr. Loewenstein: 'The Conception of the Ego and its Instincts.'

June. Discussion of Technical Problems.

J. Leuba.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

October 7. Dr. I. Schönberger: 'Clinical Data on Erotogenic Masochism.'

October 21. Dr. S. Feldmann: 'The Benediction Rite of the Kohanites.'

November 4. Dr. M. Bálint: 'Strength of the Ego, "Learning", Education of the Ego.'

November 18. Dr. E. Petö: 'Weeping and Laughing (Observations on Infants).'

December 2. Mrs. K. Lévy: 'Report on an Advisory Office for Secondary School Girls.'

December 16. Mrs. A. Hermann: 'Disturbances of Sexual Life with Free Object Choice.'

1939

January 13. Dr. I. Hermann: 'Supplementary Notes on the Castration Complex.'

February 3. Mrs. L. Perl-Balla (by invitation): 'Oral Motives in the Course of Treatment of a Neurosis.'

February 17. Dr. E. Kardos: 'A Case of Inversion.'

March 17. Dr. G. Kolosváry (by invitation): 'The Present Status of the Theory of Instincts.'

March 31. Dr. Z. Rubin-Färber: 'A Case of Anxiety Neurosis.'

April 14. Dr. I. Hollós: 'On Forgetting Names.'

April 28. Dr. A. Hermann: 'Case Histories.'

May 11. Mrs. M. Major: 'A Child Analysis.'

June 10. Ferenczi Memorial Meeting. Dr. S. Pfeifer: 'On Splitting of the Ego and Dramatizing.'

June 23. Discussion on Dr. Pfeifer's paper 'Splitting of the Ego and Dramatizing.'

S. Pfeifer.

INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938 to July 1939

No list of scientific meetings for this period has been received.

PALESTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

September to *December*. Owing to local conditions no meetings were held.

1939

February 4 (Jerusalem). Dr. E. Hirsch: 'On the Metapsychology of Fore-pleasure and End-pleasure.'

March 4 (Tel-Aviv). Dr. J. Friedjung: 'The Education of Children in the Kibbuz Community.'

May 6 (Jerusalem). Meeting in Honour of Professor Freud's 83rd Birthday.

Dr. E. Gumbel: 'The Man Moses.'

June 10 (Tel-Aviv). Dr. E. Rothschild (by invitation): 'Primal Instincts and Ego Formation.'

I. Schalit.

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1938

October 15. Dr. Repond: 'The "Démon du Midi".'

November 5. Dr. Meng: 'Psychology of Alcoholism Based on Psycho-Analysis.'

1939

January 21. Dr. Kielholz: 'The Temptation of St. Anthony.'

February 18. Mrs. C. Mayer-Fournier: 'On the Psychology of Defiance.'

March 11. Mrs. Baenziger: 'An Attempt at Self-Cure in Pictures.'

April 29. Dr. Storch: 'Psycho-Analysis and Man's Problems of Existence.'

May 20. Miss G. Schwing: 'Attempt at analysing a Small Child under Abnormal Conditions.'

June 24. Miss Sachs: 'Some Observations on Schizophrenics Treated by Sakel's Insulin Shock Therapy.'

Ph. Sarasin.